[C] [Wittrs] Wittgenstein's references to law and jurisprudence (for Sean)
- From: "J" <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 26 Dec 2009 04:06:39 -0000
First, very much appreciated the RPM quote dealing with
> statute books. If you know of any other references that
> mention law or legal practice, I would appreciate it if you
> sent them along. That was great.
The first that comes to my mind, even more memorable that the RFM remarks, is
PI 118
It looked at first as if these considerations were meant to shew
that 'what seems to be a logical
compulsion is in reality only a psychological one'--only here the question
arose: am I acquainted with both kinds of
compulsion, then?!
Imagine that people used the expression: "The law §... punishes a
murderer with death". Now this could only
mean: this law runs so and so. That form of expression, however, might force
itself on us, because the law is an
instrument when the guilty man is brought to punishment.--Now we talk of
'inexorability' in connexion with people
who punish. And here it might occur to us to say: "The law is inexorable--men
can let the guilty go, the law executes
him". (And even: "the law always executes him".)--What is the use of such a
form of expression?--In the first
instance, this proposition only says that such-and-such is to be found in the
law, and human beings sometimes do
not go by the law. Then, however, it does give us a picture of a single
inexorable judge, and many lax judges. That is
why it serves to express respect for the law. Finally, the expression can also
be so used that a law is called inexorable
when it makes no provision for a possible act of grace, and in the opposite
case it is perhaps called 'discriminating'.
Now we talk of the 'inexorability' of logic; and think of the laws of
logic as inexorable, still more inexorable
than the laws of nature. We now draw attention to the fact that the word
"inexorable" is used in a variety of ways.
There correspond to our laws of logic very general facts of daily experience.
They are the ones that make it possible
for us to keep on demonstrating those laws in a very simple way (with ink on
paper for example). They are to be
compared with the facts that make measurement with a yardstick easy and useful.
This suggests the use of precisely
these laws of inference, and now it is we that are inexorable in applying these
laws. Because we 'measure'; and it is
part of measuring for everybody to have the same measures. Besides this,
however, inexorable, i.e. unambiguous
rules of inference can be distinguished from ones that are not unambiguous, I
mean from such as leave an alternative
open to us.
_On_Certainty_ has some references to jurisprudence
453. I do indeed say: "Here no reasonable person would doubt."--Could we
imagine learned judges being asked
whether a doubt was reasonable or unreasonable?
607. A judge might even say "That is the truth--so far as a human being can
know it". But what would this rider
achieve? ("beyond all reasonable doubt").
also
8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being
certain' isn't of any great importance at
all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong. In a law-court,
for example, "I am certain" could
replace "I know" in every piece of testimony. We might even imagine its being
forbidden to say "I know" there. (A
passage in Wilhelm Meister, where "You know" or "You knew" is used in the sense
"You were certain", the facts
being different from what he knew.)
Oh! I remembered a rather important one, an incident the reading of which
inspired the "picture theory" of meaning in TLP
NB 29.9.14
In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally.
(As when in the law-court in Paris a
motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc.?1) [Cf. 4.031.]
reference is to TLP 4.031
In the proposition a state of affairs is, as it were, put together for the sake
of experiment.
One can say, instead of, This proposition has such and such a sense, This
proposition represents such and such a state of affairs.
Most of the other references I can recall or find are more indirect than this,
like references to a flourish on a legal document and similarly tangentially
related points.
Like here there's a reference to statutes, but I'd imagine that's not what you
mean
BB p. 44
"Meaning" is one of the words of which one may say that they have odd
jobs in our language. It is these
words which cause most
philosophical troubles. Imagine some institution: most of its members have
certain regular functions, functions
which can easily be described, say, in the statutes of the institution. There
are, on the other hand, some members
who are employed for odd jobs, which nevertheless may be extremely
important.--What causes most trouble in
philosophy is that we are tempted to describe the use of important 'odd-job'
words as though they were words with
regular functions.
I don't know if you're acquainted with J.L.Austin. While not a Wittgensteinian
(he claimed Moore as a stronger influence), he shared an emphasis on careful
attention to how words are actually used in ordinary language. He also treated
legal cases as a major source of insight into the use of language. See, e.g.
"A Plea for Excuses", available online at
http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/1309/1/plea.html
And there's H.L.A.Hart, influenced by both Austin and Wittgenstein, who wrote
quite a lot on matters of law, most famously in his masterpiece
_The_Concept_of_Law_
JPDeMouy
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