[C] [Wittrs] Digest Number 85

  • From: WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: 26 Dec 2009 10:42:43 -0000

Title: WittrsAMR

Messages In This Digest (14 Messages)

Messages

1a.

Re: Where Is The Self That Philosophers Talk About?

Posted by: "Cayuse" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 3:36 am (PST)



Joseph Polanik wrote:
<snip>
> so, do you want to make things easier for Descartes; or, do you want to
> make things easier for the mind-brain identity theorists?

I'm saying that metaphysical claims are nonsensical and have no application,
so you present me with two metaphysical claims and ask me to choose one?

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2.

Self as an illusion

Posted by: "void" rgoteti@xxxxxxxxx   rgoteti

Fri Dec 25, 2009 6:09 am (PST)



In spirituality, and especially nondual, mystical and eastern meditative traditions, the human being is often conceived as being in the illusion of individual existence, and separateness from other aspects of creation. This "sense of doership" or sense of individual existence is that part which believes it is the human being, and believes it must fight for itself in the world, is ultimately unaware and unconscious of its own true nature. The ego is often associated with mind and the sense of time, which compulsively thinks in order to be assured of its future existence, rather than simply knowing its own self and the present.
The spiritual goal of many traditions involves the dissolving of the ego, allowing self-knowledge of one's own true nature to become experienced and enacted in the world. This is variously known as enlightenment, nirvana, presence, and the "here and now".

WIKIPEDIA

3a.

Re: Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "void" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 7:56 am (PST)





--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> void wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>we are discussing the way in which 'philosophy can talk about the
> >>self'; but, it is not clear that you accept that there is a self that
> >>philosophers may talk about, a self or an 'I' that is not the human
> >>being, the human body or the human soul.
>
> >>do you?
>
> >I am my consciousness,I am the mind,I am the knowledge acquired
> >(Duality)
>
> >There is no separation from knowledge and myself
>
> one possible state of understanding or knowledge may be expressed thus:
> I know that I am; but, not what I am.
>
> would you agree?
>
> Joe
> Dear Sir
> One may acknowledge,deny or manipulate the sentences of ones own liking.Beauty of language is that it appears to be flexible apparently but not really.One thing is very clear that we are the carriers of immutable word essence.
> -- This essence may be called mind,consciousness,I,seer,seen,ego etc.
How we look at things as such they appear.For example of a female figure.One lady is called with several names like . . .

aunt,mother,sister,wife, fiancé,love,daughter, etc etc
Case is clear that names indicate purpose of the object.Purpose is interlinked with socioeconomic relations.
Language is functional relationship like money.

thank you
sekhar

>
> Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
>
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>
>
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3b.

Re: Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "void" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 7:56 am (PST)




>
> it's not that simple. we are discussing the way in which 'philosophy can
> talk about the self'; but, it is not clear that you accept that there is
> a self that philosophers may talk about, a self or an 'I' that is not
> the human being, the human body or the human soul.
>
> do you?
>
> Joe
>
> Dear sirs
Starting point of the language is that word apple is not the real apple.It can only function in an indirect way.It can only present its pictures as samples nothing else.Seeing the pictures we derive feelings or emotions.Our thinking is verbal undoubtedly.
Process of thinking involves words like I,consciousness,mind,self,subject,object etc which are otherwise may be called as center.This is nothing more than log of knowledge acquired (experiences,images,hurts,felt phenomena,i.e all past).
Any philosophy may try to keep this log in order and all propositions are within this field.Field should be clean to have a clean game.

thank you
sekhar
> --
>
> Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
>
> @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
> http://what-am-i.net
> @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
>
>
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>
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4.1.

Re: SWM: our 4 options

Posted by: "SWM" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 8:06 am (PST)



It being Christmas Day, I had a little time so I thought I'd try to reprise the lost response to what you had written below. It won't be anything like what I had done and lost, but maybe it will add a little more to help further clarify my stand here:

--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
>
> FOUR OPTIONS
>
> 1. (Physicalism) The stuff of the world is physical, pure and simple, from the beginning until something new is created. That "we know the stuff to be physical" is set aside. Nagel's "view from nowhere.
>

I am not arguing for physicalism though I acknowledge that I accept a physicalist viewpoint de facto and on a contingent basis, i.e., that this way of thinking about the universe seems to work all right and thus provide no reason to come up with alternative scenarios/theses.

> ONTOLOGY, what is, precedes EPISTEMOLOGY. We may study and know the physical in various ways. But in the end it is physical. That something we call mental emerged later must be explained in terms of the physical so as not to add anything to the universe.
>

Not "must". Just that it's the most parsimonious approach. Why add more than you need? Why overcomplicate?

> Some of version of this is your position. Given this, you take the Body/Mind problem to be answerable EMPIRICALLY. When we find the physical cause for mind, we will explain its origin
>

I see no mind-body problem, actually, if mind can be understood as an outcome of what is physical and I think it can. The problem only occurs if we believe it cannot and, because mind looks like a very different thing from other things, we are sometimes led to think it cannot be. I think we can use philosophical inquiry to determine that it can however and thus there is no mind-body problem to worry about!

> 2. (Spiritualism) ONTOLOGY, first. The stuff of the world is spirit and spirit manifests itself physically. No one on this list, at least
> currently, holds to this position so let's this go.
>

Maybe no one here believes it as you say. Still that wouldn't exclude the possibility that some of what some here (or anywhere) believe implies this.


> 3. (Dualism). ONTOLOGY first. The stuff of the world is both physical and mental, though the mental emerges later under certain conditions causing a explanatory gap. Not sure, but this may be Chalmers and others who have written on our list.
>

Chalmers claims to be a "naturalistic dualist" and posits an extra principle or force in the universe, on a par with gravity, electro-magnetism and strong and weak nuclear attraction (none of which can be explained at this point in terms that seem to be more basic than themselves) as what is needed to explain the presence of consciousness. While the other four principles or forces are seen to be part of the physical universe (needed to explain the presence of matter and energy), he argues that consciousness requires an additional underlying and basic principle along these lines because consciousness is in no way amenable to an explanation in pure physical terms because of what he calls the "hard problem" (explaining the occurrence of subjective experience in an objectively observable world).

> This position also sees empirical research as a possible source of information or even a way of resolving the Body/Mind dilemma. Though the causal connection between body and mind is viewed, by some, as too mysterious to penetrate.
>

Yes, it is possible that, if there is such a missing factor or principle along these lines, we would be able to study the phenomena of the universe and formulate a theory that does account for (by positing) the presence of the missing factor in the way we account for gravity (we just say it is part of the picture and look for ways to study its role).


> 4. (Neutral Monism) EPISTEMOLOGY first. Though the world consists of stuff, we cannot know what the stuff is other than the categories of thought. A Kantian Idealism. Not that the mind created the stuff, but what we know, we can only know as we know.
>

> The stuff in the beginning was neither physical nor mental. But we can know satisfactorily say -- because it works for us -- that in the
> beginning the stuff was physical. Later we attribute mentally to some of the stuff we deem physical. We can give the criteria for making this switch. But criteria aren't caused.
>

This point of yours does not seem clear to me. If we are studying the universe in terms of the phenomena it contains, then minds are among such phenomena (whatever "mind" means). Therefore, in THAT kind of study, it follows that it is sensible and intelligible to ask (and try to answer) how it is minds come about. This is NOT the same, nor should we think it ought to be, as studying human behavior in a psychological or sociological way. It does not preclude such studies. It is just a different game.


> Wittgenstein writes we learn what pain means when we learn the language. In the same way we learn what mental means. We learn that mental is correlated with physical changes in the brain. Neurology specifies the details.
>

But this isn't about our learning what words mean or how to talk about some of the subjective phenomena we experience! It's about whether there is a role for science in understanding how brains do minds!

> Hence, the body/mind problem is not EMPIRICAL. It is conceptual.

This is a confusion. There are conceptual issues, some of which we are addressing in these exchanges. But the question about brains' relations to minds is manifestly empirical. Cut off the blood to the brain and the mind goes away to all intents and purposes. How is that not an empirical issue?

> We can't find a cause for why we associate c-fiber with pain because the association is not causal but conceptual.

Cause for that? What are you trying to say here? We associate certain words with certain experiences beCAUSE we learn to do that in learning the language. That's one kind of "cause". We associate certain experiences with certain phenomena because we can observe certain phenomena under certain conditions. THAT is another use of cause, i.e., the ability to observe is enabling of the ability to draw conclusions. The conclusions we draw concerning certain observations which reveal existential dependence is still another kind of assertion of a "cause." There are lots of uses for "cause" and the existence of one does not thereby undermine or vitiate the force of the others.

> We can only study the relationship between c-fiber and the experience of pain if we agree first mean by these concepts. But if we attempt to shift the meaning of these terms, then it becomes uncertain whether we are still talking about the same thing, or what in the world we are talking about.
>

What shifting do you think is at work here? Isn't part of the conceptual effort to come to some agreed-upon understandings about what we each have in mind by the terms we use? Is it shifting, then, to state what we mean in as clear terms as possible and insist that that IS what we mean and not just whatever our interlocutor claims we mean?

SWM

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5a.

Oh! So It's Common Ground You Want?

Posted by: "Joseph Polanik" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 9:01 am (PST)



SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>SWM wrote:

>>>Given your fairly strong and explicit commitment to Cartesian
>>>dualism, I'm not sure there is room for us to find common ground
>>>though. Perhaps it may be in this: That we each agree that dualism is
>>>not impossible and that there could be some kind of evidence for it.
>>>Our current difference seems to be that you think it can be argued
>>>for successfully via logic, with everything else in the world
>>>remaining just as modern science tells us it is and I do not. In
>>>fact, I see no point in arguing about something for which evidence is
>>>not held to be relevant. But give me the right evidence and I would
>>>agree even to dualism.

>>you may have me confused with someone else.

>>while I "agree that dualism is not impossible and that there could be
>>some kind of evidence for it", I do not argue for Cartesian dualism.

>That is good to know. All right, if you say you aren't a Cartesian I
>have to accept that at this point but perhaps further comments by you
>will make this clearer. So what do you want to argue for?

that physicalism, as an explanation for the fact of consciousness and/or
the phenomenology of conscious experience, can't possibly be true unless
von Neumann is wrong.

>I am certainly not arguing against dualism, only pointing out it's
>irrelevance here if we can account for consciousness without it which I
>believe (and HAVE argued that) we can.

it seems that you are claiming that you can account for consciousness
(to your own satisfaction) on the basis of a physicalism that some
physicists reject as inadequate to explain physics.

>I'm not evaluating a metaphysical question ... I am, in fact, ignoring
>it because there's nothing in the metaphysical realm that can be
>resolved by argument, i.e., by recourse to logic alone.

there are any number of metaphenomenal theories that can account for the
phenomenology of conscious experience.

you are advocating one particular metaphenomenal theory (physicalism)
that is at odds with at least one interpretation of QM; so, I don't
think you can avoid all challenges to the basis of your claim.

Joe

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5b.

Re: Oh! So It's Common Ground You Want?

Posted by: "SWM" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 9:33 am (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> > All right, if you say you aren't a Cartesian I
> >have to accept that at this point but perhaps further comments by you
> >will make this clearer. So what do you want to argue for?
>
> that physicalism, as an explanation for the fact of consciousness and/or
> the phenomenology of conscious experience, can't possibly be true unless
> von Neumann is wrong.
>

Physicalism is NOT being proposed as "an explanation for the fact of consciousness and/or the phenomenology of conscious experience" by me nor, as far as I can tell, by Dennett. That is a mischaracterization based, presumably, on a misunderstanding of the position I've been presenting here.

My only point is that, if consciousness CAN be explained in a way that is consistent with a physicalist account of the way things are, then there is no reason to suppose a different account of the way things are is needed because consciousness is present in the universe. There may be other reasons, of course, quite independent of the fact that there is consciousness, but the fact that there is consciousness does not require a rejection of physicalism if a Dennettian account is sufficient. And, of course, my argument is that it certainly looks to be sufficient or, at least to be deemed a viable candidate for empirical research into whether it is an adequate theory.

Whether von Neumann is right or wrong, or right AND wrong, about the significance and behavior of quantum events for a theory of the universe is an entirely different question.

> >I am certainly not arguing against dualism, only pointing out it's
> >irrelevance here if we can account for consciousness without it which I
> >believe (and HAVE argued that) we can.
>
> it seems that you are claiming that you can account for consciousness
> (to your own satisfaction) on the basis of a physicalism that some
> physicists reject as inadequate to explain physics.
>

I am arguing that we CAN account for consciousness this way, yes. But consciousness is a much more limited phenomenon than the entire universe (or the universe of universes)!

My argument that we can account for it hinges on examining the various features we recognize as part of what it means to be conscious and determining to what extent they are explicable as operations performed by physical processes and I have claimed that when we do this we can arrive at a picture of consciousness in which nothing that we associate with being conscious is actually missing.

To suppose that such an account cannot work, you have to say what is missing and argue why the account in terms of processes and functions cannot produce it. Searle's Chinese Room argument is certainly one way to make that case though I think his argument is flawed in serious ways. Edelman offers another argument for this which I think is highly confused and hides behind an assertion of massive complexity. Hawkins' offers an interesting argument for at least one of the features of consciousness, the kind of deep intelligence we recognize in ourselves though his account actually hinges on a rejection of Edelman's argument for massive complexity.

There are ways to argue that a Dennettian model not only doesn't work (ultimately an empirical question) but cannot. Insisting that qualia cannot be explained in terms of a processed based system is one way (the method PJ ultimately fixed on). But insofar as this is based on either a misreading of the Dennettian argument or an assertion of an insurmountable "hard problem", an "explanatory gap", it also fails. The first way fails because Dennett does NOT deny experience, he only explains it, via reduction, to something else (something physical). Explaining something in this way is not denying. And, insofar as the argument against the Dennettian model hinges on the notion of an ultimately "hard problem", it is circular since it implies dualism so it becomes an argument for a dualistic account that begins with the assumption of dualism.

But perhaps you have a different way to show that a Dennettian account really cannot fully explain what you call the phenomenology of experience?

> >I'm not evaluating a metaphysical question ... I am, in fact, ignoring
> >it because there's nothing in the metaphysical realm that can be
> >resolved by argument, i.e., by recourse to logic alone.
>
> there are any number of metaphenomenal theories that can account for the
> phenomenology of conscious experience.
>

Sure there are. But if, in order to make them, we have to presume more complex explanations of the universe than the current physicalist one which seems to work pretty well, then we are working against the standard of explanatory parsimony. While this is not proof that a more complex explanation isn't finally the better one, it is at least a reason to first see if we can account for consciousness along the simpler lines of our current understandings of the physics of the universe.

Moreover competing arguments about physics questions are not the domain of philosophy which is all we are really able to accomplish on lists like these.

> you are advocating one particular metaphenomenal theory (physicalism)

No, no and no. I am not advocating (as in arguing for) physicalism. I am simply noting that if consciousness can be explained in entirely physical terms, then it is not evidence (does not provide us a reason) to look further! There is no need to posit extra entities, forces or principles in the universe than our current body of physics knowledge provides (even if some at the theoretical level are indeed making such posits to see if they get a better explanation than we currently have).

> that is at odds with at least one interpretation of QM; so, I don't
> think you can avoid all challenges to the basis of your claim.
>
> Joe
>

That there are some theories of physics that posit extra entities is a matter for physics. What is needed to understand how consciousness comes about is for those engaged in the sometimes reviled and still coalescing field of cognitive science.

That all science may at some point merge into a single theory of what is is an interesting possibility, of course, though a question that is as yet unanswered (since our various scientific fields are still rather a patchwork). But it is largely irrelevant to the very specific questions of how brains do minds.

SWM

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5c.

Oh! So It's Common Ground You Want?

Posted by: "Joseph Polanik" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 1:11 pm (PST)





SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>My only point is that, if consciousness CAN be explained in a way that
>is consistent with a physicalist account of the way things are, then
>there is no reason to suppose a different account of the way things are
>is needed because consciousness is present in the universe.

your position assumes that there is one and only one physicalist account
of the way things are; and, that assumption is false.

>competing arguments about physics questions are not the domain of
>philosophy

true; but, certain differences between various interpretations of QM
affect philosophers of consciousness; because, a theory of consciousness
that is inconsistent with some interpretations of QM can not be true
unless those interpretations are false.

>>it seems that you are claiming that you can account for consciousness
>>(to your own satisfaction) on the basis of a physicalism that some
>>physicists reject as inadequate to explain physics.

>I am arguing that we CAN account for consciousness this way, yes. But
>consciousness is a much more limited phenomenon than the entire
>universe (or the universe of universes)!

>My argument that we can account for it hinges on examining the various
>features we recognize as part of what it means to be conscious and
>determining to what extent they are explicable as operations performed
>by physical processes

your argument is, therefore, falsifiable by finding at least one
'feature' of consciousness that can not be explained as an operation
performed by physical processes.

the crucial feature for the physics of consciousness is the ability (if
there is such an ability) to collapse the wave function. if
consciousness is required to collapse the wave function; then,
consciousness can not be an operation performed by a physical process
because (according to the von Neumann Interpretation) something
non-physical is required to collapse the wave function.

Joe

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6a.

Josh's Physicalism

Posted by: "jrstern" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 1:59 pm (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> someone like Dennett (or like you) who advocates a physicalist
> theory to explain the relation between experiencable phenomena and
> measurable phenomena is effectively prefacing any remarks by
> saying 'assuming von Neumann is wrong, my theory is ...'.

I don't get this, if I want to "believe in" Newtonian physics
as far as using it for mundane purposes, do I have to take a
position about the wave function?

I advocate an utterly physicalist position, citing nothing that
goes beyond Newton. I though this was extremely conservative in its
way, not radical, at least not in physics terms.

I've mostly not followed this thread, but saw the " von " in the
message summary so clicked to see wassup, so my apologies if this
was all discussed upstream.

Merry Christmas.

Josh

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6b.

Re: Josh's Physicalism

Posted by: "Joseph Polanik" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sat Dec 26, 2009 2:29 am (PST)



jrstern wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>someone like Dennett (or like you) who advocates a physicalist
>>theory to explain the relation between experiencable phenomena and
>>measurable phenomena is effectively prefacing any remarks by saying
>>'assuming von Neumann is wrong, my theory is ...'.

>I don't get this, if I want to "believe in" Newtonian physics as far
>as using it for mundane purposes, do I have to take a position about
>the wave function?

>I advocate an utterly physicalist position, citing nothing that goes
>beyond Newton. I though this was extremely conservative in its way, not
>radical, at least not in physics terms.

what 'mundane purposes' do you have in mind?

we've only been discussing the impact of quantum physics theories on
theories of consciousness.

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

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7.1.

Re: Wittgenstein and Theories

Posted by: "J" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 8:03 pm (PST)



SW,

I want to bring this back around to the earlier question of my disputing "knowledge is justified, true belief" as an example of a theory, because it seems the connection to later remarks of mine has been lost.

What I wish to emphasize is that "justified, true belief" in itself is not a good example because it depends upon how the statement is used, what surrounds it, what arguments are made in relation to it. It may be a grammatical remark, albeit poorly expressed and perhaps poorly thought. But it may also be a theory. What I want to question is the idea that the form of the statement in itself makes it in some way objectionable, that it should be stigmatized as "theory" on the basis of form alone.


The issue as I understand it now is whether traditional
> approaches in epistemology could be undertaken if the
> approaches are not taken too seriously.

There's a lot to unpack here. Which "tradition"? And what constitutes one approach rather than another?

If we take a remark of the same form and approach it differently, is that not a different approach?

And if we approach it differently, must that be any less "serious"?

If Gettier's observations and examples are used as the basis for a research program to find the "correct" definition of "knowledge" (as has happened), then is the "therapy" needed one of saying that the initial remarks and the attempts to answer them are misguided or one of examining the assumptions the motivate this dialectic?

And note: one can readily read Gettier himself (who wrote a very short article and has had little to say on the subject beyond that, especially compared to the ink others have spilled) as actually challenging the whole idea that a set of necessary and sufficient conditions defining "knowledge" is a reasonable goal. Given his studies under Norman Malcolm, I don't find such a reading at all implausible.

The challenge to the "justified, true belief" account does not itself offer a further definition. I don't think Wittgenstein would find fault with that at all! Recall a remark recorded by Bouwsma, "Now, when it comes to those early dialogues, one on courage for instance, one might read and say, 'See, see, we know nothing!' This would, I take it, be wholesome." (Wittgenstein: conversations, 1949-1951)

Now, a "wholesome" response may not be the goal of "therapy" (though it may be a useful step in the process). Such skepticism may also be very confused and lead to other confusions. It depends on the individual.

My take away from Gettier: sometimes the warrant for saying, "I only thought I knew," need not be a matter of what one believed having been false. It may be warranted by one's seeing that one's grounds, though perfectly reasonable, were in some way defective, though what they seemed to support was nevertheless true.

And that is a valuable insight into the grammar of "I know" and "I thought I knew".

And if
> philosophy therefore were to adopt as its central mission
> "getting the thinking noggin going" -- not, as it were,
> solving problems -- then even energies spent upon spinning
> wheels would surely serve legitimate pedagogical ends.

Indeed. Boncampagni's "vaccination" is one way of putting it that I find appropriate.

I know in political science, where
> philosophy is shunned, the insight can be staggeringly
> shallow and the ideas only surface-level.

I am reminded of the closing remarks of the PI regarding the state of psychology as a science. And as well, from CV, "Man has to awaken to wonder ? and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again." And from _Zettel_, "Some philosophers (or whatever you like to call them) suffer from what may be called `loss of problems'. Then everything seems quite simple to them, no deep problems seem to exist any more, the world becomes broad and flat and loses all depth, and what they write becomes immeasurably shallow and trivial. Russell and H. G. Wells suffer from this."

> 4. Regarding TJB as conveying merely a sense of
> knowledge, I think this remark regarding wishing
> is better: "And after all, there is not one definite class
> of features which characterize all cases of wishing (at
> least not as the word is commonly used). If on the other
> hand you wish to give a definition of wishing, i.e., to draw
> a sharp boundary, then you are free to draw it as you like;
> and this boundary will never entirely coincide with the
> actual usage, as this usage has no sharp
> boundary." (BB,19).
>

That too would be appropriate, though I wouldn't say "better". That would depend on the circumstances of the remark.

The fact is that he did consider partial definitions, definitions that do not cover all cases but cover many, to have value in some circumstances.

(An aside: note that he inadvertently put forth a thesis here. Compare the remark here about "wishing" with the discussion of "game" in which we are led to such a conclusion and told not to think but look, but we are not simply, "there is not one definite class of features which characterize all (proceedings we call 'games')")

> 4. I'm in great disagreement over the anthropology
> problem, but I think the sense of my point here is not
> understood. (It rarely is). Philosophy is surely not
> "anthropology," just as it it not (strictly speaking) "art."

The practice of philosophy (as Wittgenstein would have it) is "an art" in the same (perfectly legitimate) sense that psychotherapy is an art or that oratory is an art. Philosophical writing is (usually) not poetry however, and not just because it typically lacks meter. Our relationship to these things is different. From LWPP II

653. Proverbs are sometimes hung on the wall. But not theorems of geometry. Our relation to these two things.
[PI II, xi, p. 205c]

and PI II, including the cross-referenced remark:

For when should I call it a mere case of knowing, not seeing?--Perhaps when someone treats the picture as a
working drawing, reads it like a blueprint. (Fine shades of behaviour.--Why are they important? They have
important consequences.)

You need to think of the role which pictures such as paintings (as opposed to working drawings) have in our
lives. This role is by no means a uniform one.
Page 205
A comparison: texts are sometimes hung on the wall. But not theorems of mechanics. (Our relation to these
two things.)

> But the relationship of both anthropology and art to
> philosophy-properly-conceived must be greater than science
> or mathematics.

Why? How is that to be measured? And is not anthropology also a science?

Philosophy is not an empirical discipline. Anthropology (as much as physics) is.

Logic is the business of philosophy but part of logic (a very small part, according to Wittgenstein's usage) is now a part of mathematics.

The point here is that what "knowledge"
> ultimately is, is a function of its uses in the language
> culture and its cognition within the form of life. These
> are the "inputs" of philosophy-properly-understood. (I know
> that this won't be understood. I'd like to link to something
> on the discussion board, but the server is down).

Hmmm. Okay.

I do not at all disagree that the actual use of the word "knowledge" in our language games is the relevant thing. But how we use that familiarity, the role it plays is philosophical discourse, makes all the difference in the world. Logic is not an empirical discipline. It is neither anthropology nor psychology. "Anthropological" data do not explain nor yet do they provide the ground for philosophical understanding, partly because (on a Wittgensteinian view) philosophy is not in the business of offering explanations nor in the business of stating theses that are to be given grounds and partly because, as Frege and Husserl both demonstrated (with psychologism, though it applies as much to "anthropologism"), attempts to explain or ground logic in that way lead to contradictions, vicious circles, and nonsense.

I don't disagree with your other remarks. Again, I am emphasizing that the role of a statement like "knowledge is justified true belief" is not, on the basis of its form alone, to be stigmatized as "theoretical". Though even if it is not used to express a theory (which it may be), it may be problematic on other grounds.

What such a statement says may be something with which Wittgenstein would largely agree (and I earlier presented textual evidence to support that claim), though he would surely have considered such a statement to be quite limited if its role is to serve as a definition.

I want to distinguish between what may be a poorly expressed and poorly thought grammatical remark and the _expression_ of a theory. The form of the statement alone does not allow us to make that distinction.

A better example of a "theory" and an illustration of where these go wrong by Wittgenstein's lights would be Russell's Theory of Types.

(The reason it is a better example, aside from being a likely candidate historically for something Wittgenstein might have had in mind, is that we know that Russell called it a theory as well as quite a lot about the context of it. And I want to say" context is key here.)

Suppose that Russell had said:

"Here I've created a calculus. In it certain transformations can be shown to be analogous to certain transformations we perform with the system of natural numbers. Now in this system, we speak of classes. But the calculus has certain rules for the introduction of classes in order to avoid paradoxes like this..."

I want to say: whether or not he saw much point to such an activity (and whether or not he saw the creation of such calculi as relevant to philosophy), Wittgenstein would not have objected to this!

But instead, what Russell (and Whitehead, who disavowed the Theory of Types) wrote in the Preface to _Principia_Mathematica_:

"We have examined a great number of HYPOTHESES for dealing with these contradictions; many such HYPOTHESES have been advanced by others, and about as many have been invented by ourselves.
...the form of the doctrine which we advocate appears to us the most PROBABLE, and because it was necessary to give at least one perfectly definite theory which avoids the
contradictions." (emphasis mine)"

Now, there are a number of other observations that Wittgenstein has made regarding the system of PM, the Theory of Types, and related issues, but these remarks from Russell by themselves seem to clearly show a way of talking about logic that is deeply misleading if not profoundly confused.

Verificationism is often regarded as a theory. It is certainly a thesis. We find this in some members of the Vienna Circle under Wittgenstein's influence and in Wittgenstein himself during his transition.

It is also one of the "theses" explicitly identified as such by Waissman in _Thesen_, a work originally begun in collaboration with Wittgenstein. This book, I would suggest, is a good clue to white Wittgenstein specifically has in mind when he eschews theses in philosophy.

WWK p. 244, from _Thesen_

"To say that a statement has sense means that it can be verified."
"The sense of a proposition is the way it is verified."

PR pp. 199&200

How a proposition is verified is what it says. Compare the generality of genuine propositions with generality
in arithmetic. It is differently verified and so is of a different kind.

The verification is not one token of the truth, it is the sense of the proposition. (Einstein: How a magnitude is
measured is what it is.)

But apropos of salvaging the grammatical insight in a statement that might have been presented as a thesis or theory, we have in the PI

353. Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking "How d'you
mean?" The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition.

JPDeMouy

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7.2.

Re: Wittgenstein and Theories

Posted by: "J" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 8:05 pm (PST)



JRS,

First, I should preface what follows with the caveat that, having read some of what Floyd and Putnam have written on the topic of Wittgenstein and Godel, I still cannot speak confidently of understanding the issues involved. It's also been awhile and I don't have those texts handy.

My understanding is that Wittgenstein's concerns turn on two points. First would be the issue of "provable in a system" vs. "true in a system" and second would be the relationship between the formalism and prose and whether we could simply reject an interpretation of the Godel numbers according to which a contradiction is derived. But I can't emphasize enough the previous caveats regarding my reading.

If you might elaborate on the connection you see between these issues and the _Blue_Book_ quotation, perhaps that would help my understanding.

Regarding that quotation, I read it slightly differently. Admittedly, there is some ambiguity, but when I read, "it isn't", I don't take that to say, "it isn't interesting". Rather, "it isn't MORE interesting." Which is not to say that it might not be EQUALLY interesting or ALMOST as interesting.

The quest for elegance treats the emphasis on differences as much LESS interesting, the identification of common features as much MORE interesting. In rejecting such an aim (for his purposes), he needn't deny that common features might be QUITE interesting, only reject the idea that attention to differences and to partial definitions cannot be quite interesting as well.

JPDeMouy

(Elegance is not what we are trying
> for.) For why
> > should what finite and transfinite numbers have in
> common be
> > more interesting to us than what distinguishes them?
> Or rather, I
> > should not have said "why should it be more
> > interesting to us?"--it isn't; and this characterizes
> our way of
> > thinking.
>

> - and the above says
> why Wittgenstein would just not find incompleteness
> results
> interesting, at least not necessarily so, without further
> argumentation - that is perhaps not utterly unknown, but
> seldom
> really elaborated.
>
> (Others argue for the "elegance" of a concise and
> universal
> principle, but that's exactly what Wittgenstein dismisses
> here)

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8.1.

Wittgenstein's references to law and jurisprudence (for Sean)

Posted by: "J" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 8:06 pm (PST)



First, very much appreciated the RPM quote dealing with
> statute books. If you know of any other references that
> mention law or legal practice, I would appreciate it if you
> sent them along. That was great.

The first that comes to my mind, even more memorable that the RFM remarks, is PI 118

It looked at first as if these considerations were meant to shew that 'what seems to be a logical
compulsion is in reality only a psychological one'--only here the question arose: am I acquainted with both kinds of
compulsion, then?!
Imagine that people used the _expression_: "The law §... punishes a murderer with death". Now this could only
mean: this law runs so and so. That form of _expression_, however, might force itself on us, because the law is an
instrument when the guilty man is brought to punishment.--Now we talk of 'inexorability' in connexion with people
who punish. And here it might occur to us to say: "The law is inexorable--men can let the guilty go, the law executes
him". (And even: "the law always executes him".)--What is the use of such a form of _expression_?--In the first
instance, this proposition only says that such-and-such is to be found in the law, and human beings sometimes do
not go by the law. Then, however, it does give us a picture of a single inexorable judge, and many lax judges. That is
why it serves to express respect for the law. Finally, the _expression_ can also be so used that a law is called inexorable
when it makes no provision for a possible act of grace, and in the opposite case it is perhaps called 'discriminating'.
Now we talk of the 'inexorability' of logic; and think of the laws of logic as inexorable, still more inexorable
than the laws of nature. We now draw attention to the fact that the word "inexorable" is used in a variety of ways.
There correspond to our laws of logic very general facts of daily experience. They are the ones that make it possible
for us to keep on demonstrating those laws in a very simple way (with ink on paper for example). They are to be
compared with the facts that make measurement with a yardstick easy and useful. This suggests the use of precisely
these laws of inference, and now it is we that are inexorable in applying these laws. Because we 'measure'; and it is
part of measuring for everybody to have the same measures. Besides this, however, inexorable, i.e. unambiguous
rules of inference can be distinguished from ones that are not unambiguous, I mean from such as leave an alternative
open to us.

_On_Certainty_ has some references to jurisprudence

453. I do indeed say: "Here no reasonable person would doubt."--Could we imagine learned judges being asked
whether a doubt was reasonable or unreasonable?

607. A judge might even say "That is the truth--so far as a human being can know it". But what would this rider
achieve? ("beyond all reasonable doubt").

also

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at
all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong. In a law-court, for example, "I am certain" could
replace "I know" in every piece of testimony. We might even imagine its being forbidden to say "I know" there. (A
passage in Wilhelm Meister, where "You know" or "You knew" is used in the sense "You were certain", the facts
being different from what he knew.)

Oh! I remembered a rather important one, an incident the reading of which inspired the "picture theory" of meaning in TLP

NB 29.9.14

In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As when in the law-court in Paris a
motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc.?1) [Cf. 4.031.]

reference is to TLP 4.031

In the proposition a state of affairs is, as it were, put together for the sake of experiment.

One can say, instead of, This proposition has such and such a sense, This proposition represents such and such a state of affairs.

Most of the other references I can recall or find are more indirect than this, like references to a flourish on a legal document and similarly tangentially related points.

Like here there's a reference to statutes, but I'd imagine that's not what you mean

BB p. 44

"Meaning" is one of the words of which one may say that they have odd jobs in our language. It is these
words which cause most
philosophical troubles. Imagine some institution: most of its members have certain regular functions, functions
which can easily be described, say, in the statutes of the institution. There are, on the other hand, some members
who are employed for odd jobs, which nevertheless may be extremely important.--What causes most trouble in
philosophy is that we are tempted to describe the use of important 'odd-job' words as though they were words with
regular functions.

I don't know if you're acquainted with J.L.Austin. While not a Wittgensteinian (he claimed Moore as a stronger influence), he shared an emphasis on careful attention to how words are actually used in ordinary language. He also treated legal cases as a major source of insight into the use of language. See, e.g. "A Plea for Excuses", available online at
http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/1309/1/plea.html

And there's H.L.A.Hart, influenced by both Austin and Wittgenstein, who wrote quite a lot on matters of law, most famously in his masterpiece _The_Concept_of_Law_

JPDeMouy

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9a.

[C] Re: help the math teachers?

Posted by: "J" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Fri Dec 25, 2009 8:07 pm (PST)



Kirby,

Lots more interesting stuff and it is appreciated. I'm snipping where I don't see any philosophical issues, though you can imagine me having read along nodding and occasionally saying, "kewl!"

> Also, here's another segue to Wittgenstein and RFM if we
> need it, as
> he uses rule-generated sequences in many examples
> (including in the
> PI) when investigating what it means to "understand" in
> terms of
> continuing to follow some rule. "Now I can go on"
> means I know what
> to write after 162.

Are there also series and sequences corresponding to these constructions and provable in terms of other maths? I would assume there would be...

> Coxeter told Fuller how impressed he was with his formula
> -- on the
> cubic close-packing of balls. And he later took pleasure in
> proving
> it, noting in his diary one day in September 1970: "I saw
> how to prove
> Bucky Fuller's formula," and publishing it in a paper,
> "Polyhedral
> Numbers." Of course more than anything, Coxeter fell in
> love with
> Fuller's geodesic domes.
> """

yes, I turned this up by Googling as I read along:

http://mathworld.wolfram.com/TetrahedralNumber.html I note the Coxeter reference.

> Reassuring has the flavor of showcasing close similarities
> (family
> resemblances) even while making some changes, setting up a
> kind of
> duckrabbit tension between the two approaches (90 degree
> and 60
> degree).

I certainly see how family resemblances between different sorts of structures and different operations, but I am not getting the duck-rabbit connection (though I of course recognize the allusion.)

> In a given lesson plan for teachers, we might invoke
> "n-triangled" and
> "n-tetrahedroned" as swap-in terminology for n-squared and
> n-cubed.
> This is to limber them up regarding our visualizations,
> getting them
> to the point of realizing that (n x n) and (n x n x n) have
> non-
> rectilinear interpretations.

What I am seeing is that these operations have non-rectilinear APPLICATIONS. Is it important for your purposes to also describe these as "interpretations" of those operations?

This may seem like a niggling objection. After all, couldn't we say that every new application of a concept expands the meaning of the concept? We might say such a thing and I won't say that's "wrong".

But I could easily imagine someone being quite at ease with, "Look! Here's a way that we can apply these same operations in a way that is analogous in some respects to this other way of applying them..." but being resistant and feeling that the foundations of mathematics are being challenged when they hear, "See! We don't have to think of 'n x n x n' as meaning this. It can also mean this."
>
> Once they've had the necessary insight, then we maybe
> de-emphasize the
> nomenclature. We go back to saying "n-squared" like
> everyone else,
> but now there's an embedded reminder to think of a
> triangle-based
> model instead.

The point that 'n-squared' may conjure up a clashing picture (where 'n x n' may not) is well taken, yes.

>
> Teacher's who've been through this training or workshop
> have a new
> appreciation for these nuances. We expect them to
> return to their
> rectilinear ways, having sampled our "gypsy math" (back to
> the ethnic
> minority motif)

Just be careful they don't feel "gypped". (I don't know if my having a Gitano partner makes such a joke acceptable, but the joke does offer a reminder of the risks of being accused of "sleight of hand" if differences aren't acknowledged up front. Interesting how metaphors can outrun their intention.)

but with new insights, new gestalts -- an
> important
> aspect of "meaning" per the PI (Part 2 especially).

And especially RPP1&2 and LWPP1&2, where these topics get a much deeper treatment...

I'm still not quite sure about the connection here, not sure that there is a phenomenon here like a change of aspect. An aspect of what? The arithmetical operations? Any particular volume that might be "seen as" made up of tetrahedrons or cubes? Is that a case of "seeing as" or of making other pictures? And perhaps seeing that other pictures may be more effective in dealing with certain problems.

>
> This is not a new pedagogical / andragogical
> technique:

I had to do some searching here

http://teachingadultsonline.pbworks.com/Adult+Learning+Theory

to use some
> interim or "training wheels" vocabulary or notation, and
> then to let
> go of it, having had the requisite insights.

No, of course not. My point about "triangling" was just to warn that as a set of "training wheels", it can create its own difficulties. Just an observation of something you may want to watch for.

With educated adults, I would suspect it not to be an issue.

> Here's another way of looking at it. We do the
> multiplication
> independently, as a calculation per standard algorithm
> (developed from
> the abacus some centuries ago), with no visualization.
>
> Then we take our completed calculation and map it to a
> square and
> triangle respectively, not to figure out an answer, but to
> display an
> already-obtained result.

Yes. The application can go on both directions. But be careful in using "display the result". Countless things can illustrate an arithmetic operation, some more perspicuously than others, which is just to say that arithmetic operations have countless applications. But, "This is what 'n x n' means here," can get us into needless confusion and disagreement if it is then asked, "Does 'n x n' mean the same here or different?"

We don't ask whether 'n x n' means something different or means the same in different concrete applications, e.g. a dozen cartons of eggs, a pair of married couples, or a chessboard. But when we are applying one part of a calculus to another part or one calculus to another. After all, we don't see the application as merely contingent!

But then, I am using "calculi" to include systems of calculating with pictures. As I would imagine you would as well. But this is far from typical, even among math educators. (Recall your Midwesterner who seemed to be suggesting that the relationship between the sides and the overall number of triangles was contingent but that the analogous relationship for the squares was necessary!)

No one would suggest that by multiplying to get the total number of M&Ms had changed the meaning of "multiplication" from the previous use of Reese's pieces, nor feel that there was a threat to the consistency of mathematics in doing this.

> We want to motivate a more 60-degree based approach to
> spatial
> geometry more generally. A subculture imbued with
> this alternative
> aesthetic might build houses looking more like this one:

Is the issue of what "n x n" means relevant to this goal? That "n x n" is an arithmetical operation that is applicable here as well would seem to be sufficient.

> > If we say that one is one of many applications of the
> operation n x n. while the other is a picture of what we
> mean by "n x n", no one could object!
> >
> > If we say that we can use the triangle rather than the
> square as a unit of area, this may arouse suspicion. A
> reminder that we can readily convert between the units to
> whatever precision needed (they are only "incommensurable"
> in a philosophically innocent sense) and check the
> calculations made using triangles against calculations using
> squares ought to alleviate that.
> >
>
> And we can use a tetrahedron instead of a cube as a unit of
> volume.

yes

The "turtle" examples were helpful, though the move from multitudes to multitudes misses the point I was hoping to make and even in terms of magnitudes, the areas made by the turtle's "curtain", while demonstrably equal are not congruent, so "the same again" as part of what we mean by multiplication is lost here. Snipping ahead though, you seem to get that...

> > What corresponds to grouping, to correlation, or to
> "the same again" with the triangles?
> >
>
> You're concerned with reading off the right answer from the
> grid,
> thinking of an orchard of X trees in some triangular
> arrangement, and
> wondering how you'd easily compute how many. The rank
> and file
> system, the array, the phalanx, stacks the same number side
> by side,
> repeatedly, is easy to read.

You seem here to be getting the distinction I wish to make but not yet its import.

>
> I'm happy with a "when in Rome" approach, i.e. lets look at
> the
> complementary strengths of both models.

My concern isn't with the relative strengths of the approaches. I had no doubt (though your remarks were interesting and informative) that there are a great many advantages to the triangle/tetrahedron approach. The approach is fine.

Actually, it's really frakkin' cool! My appreciation of this stuff may get lost in my examination of some of the philosophical issues.) But I also may not have been sufficiently clear about the reasons I have for drawing such distinctions. Perhaps other remarks here make that clearer, but at the risk of hammering excessively, I'll elaborate tying it to this case.

When it comes to using triangles/tetrahedra or squares/cubes as a basis for measuring area/volume, provided there are straightforward conversion rules between these systems (One reason that the entrenched system would be preferred is the ability to bring various data together) and one is consistent with the other, I can see no reason not to choose whichever is most efficient for a given application. (Of course, conventions have a value in themselves, but the transition to adopting an alternate system is a social and educational problem, not a philosophical one.)

And if the claim is only that it is entirely consistent to apply the arithmetic operation "n x n" to triangular units of area or "n x n x n" to tetrahedral units of volume, that's something that can be demonstrated straightforwardly by existing mathematical means.

It is the claim that the _expression_ "means the same" - or even that it "means something different" or "means something similar" - that strikes me as potentially misleading and possibly confused.

If you are saying something about what the _expression_ means in a given application, presumably you don't mean anything like contrasting counting M&Ms with Reese's pieces.

And even if you were contrasting square arrays of M&Ms with squaring the distance in calculating gravitational force, saying that n-squared "means" the same or that it "means" different both seem queer.

The operation is applicable to both cases. And it is the same operation - the same role in the calculus - in either case.

Any application of the operation might be used as a demonstration of that operation. We might them say that with a different method of demonstration, we teach something different and the meaning changes. But if we teach someone to perform the operation using one example and they are not able to apply it to quite a few other cases, then they haven't learned the concept. They do not know how to "go on".

Still suppose we take the use of diagrams of squares and cubes as paradigmatic demonstrations. Would that mean that someone who knew how to perform various calculations and apply them in various cases but had never applied them to squares and cubes didn't really know how to calculate? Why would we say that? Perhaps because an important part of the calculus is in its relationships to certain kinds of measurement.

If members of a tribe knew how to count heads, hands, fingers, toes, rocks, beans, trees, and so forth, could work out that a pile of 7 beans and a pile of 5 beans together made the same number as 3 piles of 4 beans, and so forth, but did not apply these methods to distance, time, area, volume, and the like, we could certainly say that theirs was a more primitive game, but we could still have every reason to translate one of their words as "plus", another as "times", and so on.

We might nevertheless treat a certain picture as a paradigm for what we mean.

(Compare, swatches of color preserved as standards for our use of color words: someone who had never traveled to see those swatches might still learn to use our color language with perfect eloquence, albeit having learned with different examples.)

The use of pictures of squares and cubes as paradigms of multiplication, squaring, and cubing might be a way to give sense to the idea that we "mean the same" (or "different") in applying "n x n" "n-squared" and so on to one case or another. That seems to me to be the use of the picture your Midwesterner had in mind.

And in some ways, it has sounded as if you saw the triangles and tetrahedrons as a competing picture that might serve the same paradigmatic role. Talk of different tribes and such reinforced that impression for me.

If you wish only to defend the legitimacy of applying arithmetic in a way that seems odd because it is analogous in some respects but different in others and to defend the merits of an alternative system of measurement, then I don't see any value in a war over the whether a particular picture can serve just as well as a paradigm. But the talk of "meaning" and "interpretation" rather than "technique" and "application" seems to suggest that.

But if you want to treat this as a matter of pictures seeking equal legitimacy as paradigms of calculation, then the problems I raised apply. Someone who sees the pictures of squares and cubes as paradigms of multiplying, squaring, and cubing will not find the triangles and tetrahedra to be equally legitimate for THAT purpose (though they may be quite useful for other purposes).

It isn't about the ease, per se, of using one picture or another; it is about the perspicuity with which the picture represents different aspects of the calculation for which it is to serve as a paradigm. My talk about "grouping", "correlation", and so forth was easily mistaken for a remark on the ease with which a picture can be used (and the answer, "but this picture is easier to use for other things," is then a reasonable one).

The orthogonal arrangement is easier to work with for some purposes (not for all) but the point of treating it as a paradigm is that it is not just a picture of the concept of multiplication, but clearly shows the related concepts of grouping, of correlation, and repetition, the relationship between multiplication and addition, and so on. The value of clarity here is not simply a matter of ease of use in a particular application, but ease of understanding as an overview of the concepts.

your
> Midwestern interlocutor
> >
> > He is right to object to "it means the same here",
> though he offers no clear grounds that I can see.
> >
>
> Yes, I agree with "not the same" but then fall back on
> "family
> resemblance" and even "close family resemblance".
>

And as I've probably hammered enough by now, I'm now wondering whether making it a question of "n x n" MEANING the same, similar, or different isn't just counter-productive.

But if it is important to speak of an "interpretation" of "n x n" rather than simply of applications, then yes, family resemblances and specifically emphasizing differences as well as similarities (so as to avoid the suggestion of fallacious arguments) would be well-advised.

>
> Here's an opportunity to show where philosophy is making a
> positive
> contribution in some practical sense, helping our math
> teachers co-
> develop a more up-to-date and relevant spatial geometry
> curriculum.
>
> Philosophy of mathematics to the rescue!

(You may want to catch the postscript to my reply to Sean regarding "cognitive science" if your interested in some of my views related to this.)
>
> Thanks again for your assistance,

I'm pleased to be able to help.

hope you will continue
> our dialog.
> Maybe others will join in.

I'm somewhat surprised they haven't. But inevitably, tastes and interests vary and with a philosopher whose work was as varied as Wittgenstein's, a common interest in his work may not indicate a common interest in much else.

(I've noticed professed Wittgensteinians also to be more varied in their religious beliefs, political positions, ethical attitudes, and aesthetic sensibilities than those who are influenced by other philosophers. I wonder if that reflects a wider appeal or just a greater flexibility in Wittgensteinian thought. Certainly, Ayn Rand is more popular in many circles, but Randians seem to be in agreement about quite a lot. Likewise, Popperians, Perhaps also the widespread disagreements in how Wittgenstein is to be understood plays a role here. But I digress...)

I've been working on a couple of posts on two still different topics. One concerns the grammar of pictorial images and the other an examination of some research on sexual arousal (I know: cue inane Beavis and Butt-head laughter. Right?) I'm not sure how much attention they'll receive, but thoughtful feedback is certainly useful.

JPDeMouy

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