[C] [Wittrs] Digest Number 83

  • From: WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: 24 Dec 2009 10:53:56 -0000

Title: WittrsAMR

Messages In This Digest (10 Messages)

Messages

1a.

Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "Joseph Polanik" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Dec 23, 2009 3:49 am (PST)



Cayuse wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>Cayuse wrote:

>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>>>we are discussing the way in which 'philosophy can talk about the
>>>>self'; but, it is not clear that you accept that there is a self
>>>>that philosophers may talk about, a self or an 'I' that is not the
>>>>human being, the human body or the human soul.

>>>>do you?

>>>I do -- it is the stream of experience, and not something that in
>>>some inexplicable manner "experiences" that stream.

>>well, then, here is the problem: you deny that the philosophical self,
>>the stream of experiences, is capable of first-person
>>self-referencing.

>First-person language use appears within the stream of experience.

because the philosophical self is capable of first-person
self-referencing.

>>LW ... for him the philosophical self is that which can say "I am my
>>world (the microcosm)". TLP 5.63

>LW claims that "I am my world (the microcosm)", but he does *not* claim
>that it is the philosophical self that makes this claim.

you have yourself identified the microcosm and the stream of experiences
(which you say is the philosophical self).

>Moreover, the very next paragraph reads "There is no such thing as the
>subject that thinks or entertains ideas" (5.631).

the question is whether the philosophical self experiences thinking.

is there any thinking in the stream of experiences?

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

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1b.

Re: Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "Cayuse" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Dec 23, 2009 5:00 am (PST)



Joseph Polanik wrote:
> Cayuse wrote:
>> Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>> well, then, here is the problem: you deny that the philosophical
>>> self, the stream of experiences, is capable of first-person
>>> self-referencing.
>
>> First-person language use appears within the stream of experience.
>
> because the philosophical self is capable of first-person
> self-referencing.

The stream of experience doesn't "do" anything.
All "doing" goes on /within it/.

>>> LW ... for him the philosophical self is that which can say "I am my
>>> world (the microcosm)". TLP 5.63
>
>> LW claims that "I am my world (the microcosm)", but he does *not*
>> claim that it is the philosophical self that makes this claim.
>
> you have yourself identified the microcosm and the stream of
> experiences (which you say is the philosophical self).

Yes, /the physical organism that I am/ claims an identity for the stream of
experiences, the philosophical self, and what LW calls "the microcosm",
but /the stream of experiences that I am/ makes no claims at all --
the making of claims is an activity that goes on /within it/.

>> Moreover, the very next paragraph reads "There is no such thing as
>> the subject that thinks or entertains ideas" (5.631).
>
> the question is whether the philosophical self experiences thinking.
>
> is there any thinking in the stream of experiences?

The philosophical self IS the stream of experiences, and thinking
goes on within that stream. So the philosophical self can't be said
to *experience* thinking (as though it were something distinct from
that stream) -- rather the philosophical self *encompasses* thinking.

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1c.

Re: Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "void" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Dec 23, 2009 9:19 am (PST)



Mind
Synonyms: These nouns denote the capacity of thinking, reasoning, and acquiring and applying knowledge. Mind refers broadly to the capacities for thought, perception, memory, and decision: "No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear" (Edmund Burke).
Intellect stresses knowing, thinking, and understanding: "Opinion is ultimately determined by the feelings, and not by the intellect" (Herbert Spencer).
Intelligence implies solving problems, learning from experience, and reasoning abstractly: "The world of the future will be an ever more demanding struggle against the limitations of our intelligence" (Norbert Wiener).
Brain suggests strength of intellect: We racked our brains to find a solution.
Wit stresses quickness of intelligence or facility of comprehension: "There is no such whetstone, to sharpen a good wit and encourage a will to learning, as is praise" (Roger Ascham).
Reason, the capacity for logical, rational, and analytic thought, embraces comprehending, evaluating, and drawing conclusions: "Since I have had the full use of my reason, nobody has ever heard me laugh" (Earl of Chesterfield). See Also Synonyms at tend2.

self
It is plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. It is likewise evident that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects
consciousness

Access consciousness (A-consciousness) is the phenomenon whereby information in our minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the control of behavior. So, when we perceive, information about what we perceive is often access conscious; when we introspect, information about our thoughts is access conscious; when we remember, information about the past (e.g., something that we learned) is often access conscious, and so on. Chalmers thinks that access consciousness is less mysterious than phenomenal consciousness, so that it is held to pose one of the easy problems of consciousness. Daniel Dennett denies that there is a "hard problem", asserting that the totality of consciousness can be understood in terms of impact on behavior, as studied through heterophenomenology. There have been numerous approaches to the processes that act on conscious experience from instant to instant. Dennett suggests that what people think of as phenomenal consciousness, such as qualia, are judgments and consequent behavior.[citation needed] He extends this analysis by arguing that phenomenal consciousness can be explained in terms of access consciousness, denying the existence of qualia, hence denying the existence of a "hard problem."[citation needed] Chalmers, on the other hand, argues that Dennett's explanatory processes merely address aspects of the easy problem. Eccles and others have pointed out the difficulty of explaining the evolution of qualia, or of 'minds' which experience them, given that all the processes governing evolution are physical and so have no direct access to them. There is no guarantee that all people have minds, nor anyway to verify whether one does or does not possess one.

One may percieve clearly, that different names denote different objects.Name and its object connection is dualism undoubtedly.Since there are flaws in dualistic approach non dualism proposed by scholars of yester year.
Philosophical enquiry should not be a search for a light at the end of a tunnel.Instead seeing why we are in a tunnel and what is keeping us in a tunnel.Finally the question should be whether said tunnel is real or fabricated.
Here LW shows us clearly that mental problems are man made or made of language or grammatical errors.

thank you
sekhar

> a self that philosophers may talk about, a self or an 'I' that is not
> the human being, the human body or the human soul.
>
> do you?
>
> Joe
>
>
> --
>
> Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
>
> @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
> http://what-am-i.net
> @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
>
>
> ==========================================
>
> Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
>

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1d.

Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "Joseph Polanik" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Thu Dec 24, 2009 1:41 am (PST)



Cayuse wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>you have yourself identified the microcosm and the stream of
>>experiences (which you say is the philosophical self).

>Yes, /the physical organism that I am/ claims an identity for the
>stream of experiences, the philosophical self, and what LW calls "the
>microcosm", but /the stream of experiences that I am/ makes no claims
>at all -- the making of claims is an activity that goes on /within it/.

the stream of experiences that I am claims, "I am this stream of
experiences".

>>is there any thinking in the stream of experiences?

>The philosophical self IS the stream of experiences, and thinking goes
>on within that stream. So the philosophical self can't be said to
>*experience* thinking (as though it were something distinct from that
>stream) -- rather the philosophical self *encompasses* thinking.

the question is whether the stream of experiences can self-reference in
the first-person.

we agree as to the identity of 'the stream of experiences', 'the
philosophical self' and 'the microcosm'. we know that LW wrote "I am my
world (the microcosm)". TLP 5.63. consequently, it seems obvious that,
for LW, the philosophical self is capable of first-person
self-referencing.

yet you disagree. on what grounds?

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

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2.1.

Re: SWM: our 4 options

Posted by: "SWM" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Dec 23, 2009 7:00 am (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
>
> FOUR OPTIONS

Bruce,

I spent a couple of hours this morning providing a comprehensive response to this one and then my computer froze. After another hour of hoping it would come back I finally just gave up and clicked re-start so everything I wrote is gone and I just don't have the time or energy to go through it all again. Suffice it to say that the gist of my response to your assessment of the four options before us boils down to pointing out that you are focusing us on the metaphysical aspect of the dispute and I have not been addressing that at all.

All I have been saying is that, if consciousness can be explained in a way that is consistent with what we know about the physical universe as of now, without positing any additional entities, principles, factors or what not that are not otherwise accounted for in the current description(s) offered by physics, then there's no reason to posit them or to argue that we need to do so or that one such posit trumps another. My argument is solely about whether consciousness can reasonably be explained as a function of brains, that is as a function of some aspect of the operations of the physical universe.

All the rest I guess was just added detail (as I recall it now). As you said, have a Merry Christmas and we can discuss this further whenever you've a mind to do so.

Thanks.

SWM

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3.1.

Re: Wittgenstein and Theories

Posted by: "void" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Dec 23, 2009 9:16 am (PST)




>
> The idea is this. Whenever someone formally places a theory into play, what they are doing is offering the candidacy of a proposition. If the proposition survives its candidacy (in the academy), it becomes a sort of law for the thing in question.
>

> Regards.
>  
> Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
> Assistant Professor
> Wright State University
> Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
> SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
> Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
>
> Sekhar likes to quote a relative theory from Charles pierce

He calls it a state of fixation of belief
The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle inquiry, though it must be admitted that this is sometimes not a very apt designation.
1. Some philosophers have imagined that to start an inquiry it was only necessary to utter a question whether orally or by setting it down upon paper, and have even recommended us to begin our studies with questioning everything! But the mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There must be a real and living doubt, and without this all discussion is idle.
2. It is a very common idea that a demonstration must rest on some ultimate and absolutely indubitable propositions. These, according to one school, are first principles of a general nature; according to another, are first sensations. But, in point of fact, an inquiry, to have that completely satisfactory result called demonstration, has only to start with propositions perfectly free from all actual doubt. If the premisses are not in fact doubted at all, they cannot be more satisfactory than they are.
3. Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without a purpose.

Thus, both doubt and belief have positive effects upon us, though very different ones. Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in some certain way, when the occasion arises. Doubt has not the least such active effect, but stimulates us to inquiry until it is destroyed. This reminds us of the irritation of a nerve and the reflex action produced thereby; while for the analogue of belief, in the nervous system, we must look to what are called nervous associations -- for example, to that habit of the nerves in consequence of which the smell of a peach will make the mouth water.

thank you
sekhar

>
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3.2.

Re: Wittgenstein and Theories

Posted by: "jrstern" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Dec 23, 2009 4:56 pm (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "J" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> BBB pp. 18-19 Instead of "craving for generality" I could
> also have said "the contemptuous attitude towards the particular
> case". If, e.g., someone tries to explain the concept of number and
> tells us that such and such a definition will not do
> or is clumsy because it only applies to, say, finite cardinals
> I should answer that the mere fact that he could have
> given such a limited definition makes this definition extremely
> important to us. (Elegance is not what we are trying for.) For why
> should what finite and transfinite numbers have in common be
> more interesting to us than what distinguishes them? Or rather, I
> should not have said "why should it be more
> interesting to us?"--it isn't; and this characterizes our way of
> thinking.

Outstanding, I was not familiar with this quote, seems to relate
to some of the problems he had with Godel, much less Turing.

And overall, on this point, I am more on Wittgenstein's side.

Not that Turing was *actually* on the other side here, but I think
that Wittgenstein saw the resemblance of Turing's halting problem
solution and Godel's incompleteness results and took them as one
- and the above says
why Wittgenstein would just not find incompleteness results
interesting, at least not necessarily so, without further
argumentation - that is perhaps not utterly unknown, but seldom
really elaborated.

(Others argue for the "elegance" of a concise and universal
principle, but that's exactly what Wittgenstein dismisses here)

Josh

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3.3.

Re: Wittgenstein and Theories

Posted by: "Sean Wilson" whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx   whoooo26505

Wed Dec 23, 2009 8:29 pm (PST)



(J)

I'm traveling for the holidays. Might not be online tomorrow (don't know). So here is a much-too long reply. I'll start with agreements, then move to the only real point that I see a problem with.

1. First, very much appreciated the RPM quote dealing with statute books. If you know of any other references that mention law or legal practice, I would appreciate it if you sent them along. That was great.

2. Don't have any quarrel with the idea that philosophical entanglement (properly conceived) is rich, and that untying knots is laborious. Or that there is genuine work of this sort needed all over the place. 

PEDAGOGY
3. The issue as I understand it now is whether traditional approaches in epistemology could be undertaken if the approaches are not taken too seriously. If TJB, for example, is itself administered as a loose matter (or as a discussion starter). Or, perhaps, if  TJB and Gettier could themselves be put to Wittgensteinian ends (therapy). 

Although not what I originally addressed, let me offer my thoughts here. I would think that it would be good for philosophy as an academic discipline to adopt an apologetic approach to these things in a post-Wittgensteinian world. One of the reasons why is practical: Wittgenstein isn't around any longer. And if philosophy therefore were to adopt as its central mission "getting the thinking noggin going" -- not, as it were, solving problems -- then even energies spent upon spinning wheels would surely serve legitimate pedagogical ends. In fact, I can categorically state from my own experience in philosophy classrooms that going through and participating (in trying to solve) Gettier problems and the like were very important to me eventually becoming Wittgensteinian. And I do not say this as criticism. I had the most wonderful epistemology instructor in the world. And it took me a long while to shed those outlooks, but I still greatly respect him
today.

And for what it is worth, I do believe that philosophy as traditionally conceived -- even with its false problems -- is very important to the academy. Teaching kids to think conceptually and deeply is something that other fields desperately need. I know in political science, where philosophy is shunned, the insight can be staggeringly shallow and the ideas only surface-level.

So there is nothing that I have said that would strip pedagogical value from being exposed to a diverse philosophical program. Ultimately, though, to take a discussion about the value of an avuncular TJB beyond the aims of diverse pedagogy, one really needs an example.    

4. Regarding TJB as conveying merely a sense of knowledge, I think this remark regarding wishing is better: "And after all, there is not one definite class of features which characterize all cases of wishing (at least not as the word is commonly used). If on the other hand you wish to give a definition of wishing, i.e., to draw a sharp boundary, then you are free to draw it as you like; and this boundary will never entirely coincide with the actual usage, as this usage has no sharp boundary." (BB,19).  

ANTHROPOLOGY
4.  I'm in great disagreement over the anthropology problem, but I think the sense of my point here is not understood. (It rarely is). Philosophy is surely not "anthropology," just as it it not (strictly speaking) "art." But the relationship of both anthropology and art to philosophy-properly-conceived must be greater than science or mathematics. The point here is that what "knowledge" ultimately is, is a function of its uses in the language culture and its cognition within the form of life. These are the "inputs" of philosophy-properly-understood. (I know that this won't be understood. I'd like to link to something on the discussion board, but the server is down).

Here is where I am ultimately going. (I've got to go home). Knowledge is a family resemblance. It's in the service of a particular kind of grammar. The only thing that philosophy-proper can do ON THE MERITS -- putting aside pedagogy -- is show people the resemblance and how to navigate it. To show them what the grammar entails and to help them escape pitfalls. In this sense, philosophy is like coaching. Only if we do it on the basis of the individual (rather than the class), it looks more like "therapy." But the end result is never "what knowledge is," it is what the language game of knowledge entails -- and, more generally, how to navigate a lexicon and doctor other people's grammar.   

I'm tired J. I don't now what else to say. Happy holidays.   

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

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4a.

Re: [C] Re: help the math teachers?

Posted by: "kirby" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Dec 23, 2009 11:05 am (PST)



On Dec 22, 3:48 pm, "J" <jpdem...@rocketmail.com> wrote:

...

> > This isn't a show stopper though, as reassurance is what
> > we're after.
>
> Reassurance of what?
>

What we want to advance ab initio, from the top, is our streamlined
volumes table, wherein usually irrationally volumed shapes (thanks to
conventions) fit inside one another in a more memorable manner, with
lots of whole number volumes we weren't seeing before. This
concentric hierarchy is a core artifact in the curriculum, like part
of a backbone or spine.

We want to reassure teachers that this is fair play, that there's no
"catch" or "fine print" regarding some foundational mathematical rules
that we've broken. Furthermore, there's already a half century of
literature developing these concepts, with more on the way. This is
not about encouraging "fringe thinking" among students, is about
rescuing a languishing spatio-visual sophistication and reconnecting
with valuable heritage.

Reassuring math teachers may well involve getting under the hood such
as we're doing here and exploring the logic or grammar of
multiplication, what it means, how it might be visualized. The unit
volume tetrahedron is not "too good to be true", just goes by a
different set of rules, is permitted.

"Multiplication" is already the term for many binary operations with a
family resemblance. We multiply complex numbers and have
corresponding visualizations on the complex plane. We multiply
matrices, scalars and vectors, polynomials...

However, in this usage, we're adhering closely to a primitive 'two
edges make an area' model (one of the oldest), and a 'three edges make
a volume' model (like we do with a rectangular prism or brick).

We traditionally speak in terms of two and three dimensionality.
That's the ballpark we're in, though with some sensible alterations
for the purpose of developing these new language games.

> I wouldn't suggest at all that my remarks show that there is anything wrong with the different approaches.  I wouldn't speak of "show stoppers", no.
>
> I think the compact packing of spheres might be your best lead for demonstrating applicability here.  It's easy to visualize, easy to show using diagrams and models, obviously relevant to a variety of problems.

Yes I think so too. Six spheres fit around a nuclear sphere to form a
hexagonal packing. Then three spheres nest in the valleys, both above
and below, for a total of 12 balls connecting to that central one.

How those two sets of three, top and bottom, relate to each other (as
triangles pointing the same way or opposite) determines whether we
call this the CCP or HCP, both equally compact.

Packing outwardly from that nuclear ball in the CCP, we get successive
layers of 12, 42, 92, 162... balls, always in growing cuboctahedral
conformation. Here are a few pictures from Peter Pearce's book
'Structure in Nature is a Strategy for Design':

http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/4207576595/in/photostream/
http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/4208340720/in/photostream/
http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/4207576271/in/photostream/
http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/4208341378/in/photostream/

Here's that same sequence from the Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences.
Note the vast literature, including a pointer to K. Urner's web site
(mine) in the Links section.
Back to our volumes table, that 1-Frequency cuboctahedron (one
interval, 12 balls around a nuclear ball) has a volume of 20. So
simple! That's relative to the tetrahedron formed by taking four
balls and compacting them together, and connecting their centers --
our unit.

We may describe the volume of the growing cuboctahedron as 20 times
the 3rd power of F, where F is the number of intervals along any
edge. We also study the ball counts in successive layers (1, 12, 42,
92, 162...) an integer sequence, when introducing computer programming
concepts. There's a long literature behind doing this per 'The Book
of Numbers' by Conway and Guy, and 'Gnomon' by Midhat Gazale.

Also, here's another segue to Wittgenstein and RFM if we need it, as
he uses rule-generated sequences in many examples (including in the
PI) when investigating what it means to "understand" in terms of
continuing to follow some rule. "Now I can go on" means I know what
to write after 162.

Donald Coxeter (famous geometer, once of student of Wittgenstein's)
writes about this very rule by the way. From his recent biography by
Siobahn Roberts, 'King of Infinite Space' we get:

"""
Coxeter told Fuller how impressed he was with his formula -- on the
cubic close-packing of balls. And he later took pleasure in proving
it, noting in his diary one day in September 1970: "I saw how to prove
Bucky Fuller's formula," and publishing it in a paper, "Polyhedral
Numbers." Of course more than anything, Coxeter fell in love with
Fuller's geodesic domes.
"""

> > We wouldn't use Russell-Whitehead's Principia to prove 1 +
> > 1 = 2 in an
> > everyday classroom, either.
>
> No.  But I also wouldn't accept that PM shows what arithmetic operations "mean".
>

Yes, a subtle difference.

Reassuring has the flavor of showcasing close similarities (family
resemblances) even while making some changes, setting up a kind of
duckrabbit tension between the two approaches (90 degree and 60
degree).

> Those are viable alternatives, yes.  "N-triangled", aside from being a bit "cute" has the problem, etymologically, of suggesting the number 3 (where etymologically, "squared" does not suggest 4) and possibly being confused with raising to the third power.  
>

In a given lesson plan for teachers, we might invoke "n-triangled" and
"n-tetrahedroned" as swap-in terminology for n-squared and n-cubed.
This is to limber them up regarding our visualizations, getting them
to the point of realizing that (n x n) and (n x n x n) have non-
rectilinear interpretations.

Once they've had the necessary insight, then we maybe de-emphasize the
nomenclature. We go back to saying "n-squared" like everyone else,
but now there's an embedded reminder to think of a triangle-based
model instead.

Teacher's who've been through this training or workshop have a new
appreciation for these nuances. We expect them to return to their
rectilinear ways, having sampled our "gypsy math" (back to the ethnic
minority motif) but with new insights, new gestalts -- an important
aspect of "meaning" per the PI (Part 2 especially).

This is not a new pedagogical / andragogical technique: to use some
interim or "training wheels" vocabulary or notation, and then to let
go of it, having had the requisite insights.

For example, many elementary school math curricula introduce negative
numbers by making the minus sign a kind of superscript in the top left
hand corner of the number. That way of notating negative numbers goes
away in later years, is replaced by a non-subscripted subtraction
operator.

> > only to show that "squaring" and "2nd powering" may be
> > logically decoupled, likewise "3rd powering" and "cubing".
>
> I wonder about this way of putting things.  And I wonder if it's necessary.
>
> Here's a diagram showing a triangle made up of smaller triangles that are similar.  We can calculate the number of smaller triangles that make up the larger by counting the triangles along two of the sides and multiplying.
>

Here's another way of looking at it. We do the multiplication
independently, as a calculation per standard algorithm (developed from
the abacus some centuries ago), with no visualization.

Then we take our completed calculation and map it to a square and
triangle respectively, not to figure out an answer, but to display an
already-obtained result.

The computation might involve any two numbers, not just n x n. Just
extend two vectors along adjacent edges of an n x n grid for these
respective distances (a, b) and connect the tips of your arrows. The
enclosed area (a x b) will now have the correct surface area in terms
of triangular units.

Imagine turning the enclosed area to liquid and pouring it out into
unit triangle receptacles. Maybe the last unit triangle is only
partially filled, as the area is not a whole number.

Imagine tilting a 10 x 10 triangle of 100 units to put the apex at the
bottom and having some fixed amount of liquid fill the figure
vertically, parallel to the opposite edge.

If we started out showing 3 x 5 = 15 as an internal triangle with
unequal edges, then after tilting we'd have this same 15 as our areal
result (the same amount of liquid) but with two edge readouts at 2nd
root of 15 (about 3.83). The remaining trapezoidal region of the 10 x
10 triangle would now be 100 - 15 or 85 units.

We can (and do) play similar liquid redistribution games with squares
and cubes, thereby heightening the analogy.

We end up thinking of any amorphous surface area in terms of the
triangular units we might use to express it. Any volume (any 3D shape
at all) might be expressed in terms of tetrahedral measuring cups.

This mindset then sets the stage for our polyhedral "mixing bowls" and
pouring actual liquid or grain (I use beans) from one receptacle to
the next, per volumes table. Six tetrahedra worth of beans exactly
fill a rhombic dodecahedron per our canonical arrangement. Said
dodecahedra encase our CCP spheres.

http://wikieducator.org/Image:Ve_rd.png (teacher work, VRML browser)
http://wikieducator.org/Image:Ve_rd_ve.png (internal cubocta has
tetravolume 2.5)
http://wikieducator.org/Image:Still_life.jpg ("mixing bowls" -- an
international standard)

> We do something analogous with a square made up of smaller squares.  And we take this as a picture of the operations N x N or N-squared.
>
> (No one should dispute any of that.)
>
> Therefore...
>
> (Here's where you meet resistance.)
>
> The operation N x N can be applied in both cases, whether or not we call the cases "the same" in any other sense.  What sense is relevant here?  Isn't this a matter of wanting to persuade someone to adopt a way of speaking?  And is that way of speaking important?
>

We want to motivate a more 60-degree based approach to spatial
geometry more generally. A subculture imbued with this alternative
aesthetic might build houses looking more like this one:

http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/4208340102/in/photostream/
(op cit Pearce, not a geodesic dome)

Or this one (done in Google Sketchup by Trevor Blake):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Veli7iwqSuA (also not a dome)

> ("...the four sides of the cube."
>
> "Um, a cube has six sides."
>
> "The top and bottom aren't 'sides', asshat!")
>
> If we say that one is one of many applications of the operation n x n. while the other is a picture of what we mean by "n x n", no one could object!
>
> If we say that we can use the triangle rather than the square as a unit of area, this may arouse suspicion.  A reminder that we can readily convert between the units to whatever precision needed (they are only "incommensurable" in a philosophically innocent sense) and check the calculations made using triangles against calculations using squares ought to alleviate that.  
>

And we can use a tetrahedron instead of a cube as a unit of volume.

We actually put more emphasis and attention on this last bit, as it's
the volumes table we turn to first.

But then if teachers have philosophical objections, qualms, we might
retreat to the flat two dimensional case and explain how we're able to
work this approach consistently even in flatland.

> Then we have simply a method that is more efficient for some purposes.
>
> > Yes, you're defending the practicality of our rectilinear
> > 90-degree-
> > based conventions.
>
> It isn't just a question of practicality.  What I hope to convey is that what the "90-degree-based conventions" show as a picture of arithmetic operations is different.  Yes, there is an analogous "input" and "output" with the triangular case, but not all of the same transformations.
>
> "Seeing as" is important here.  An n x n square can be seen as n columns or as n rows.  And each column (or row) is the same arrangement (squares in a lined up or stacked) making their grouping perspicuous.  Being the same in this sense, the connection between multiplication and addition is clarified: n x n is a stack of n height (or in a line, n length), n times ("times" as literal repetition: the same again).  And that they are the same is not just a matter of their having the same arrangement (grouping) but their lining up (correlation).  
>

In the case of our equilateral triangle, you could envision a turtle
walking across the base, with a straight line to the apex defining a
"curtain" (the turtle is drawing a curtain across a triangular
window).

As the turtle traverses its edge, the curtain closes. This isn't an
arcing motion, i.e. the turtle is not moving like a pendulum. It
moves straight across.

If it lurches forward at equal intervals, then the area covered by the
curtain likewise increases at
equal intervals. This is a model of n x m, with n the full length of
the triangle, and m just a portion across the base, up to and
including another n (m < n).

Now you might vary the other edge as well (two turtles).

We've let go of the underlying grid pattern by now (training wheels).
Maybe there's an electronic readout of the area, in terms of unit
triangles, but only one such triangle is shown, off to the side, as
part of the legend or key. You needn't "count triangles". Just do
the multiplication with pen and paper, as usual, and recognize this as
a legitimate display or visualization (like something Tufte might do).

> What corresponds to grouping, to correlation, or to "the same again" with the triangles?
>

You're concerned with reading off the right answer from the grid,
thinking of an orchard of X trees in some triangular arrangement, and
wondering how you'd easily compute how many. The rank and file
system, the array, the phalanx, stacks the same number side by side,
repeatedly, is easy to read.

I'm happy with a "when in Rome" approach, i.e. lets look at the
complementary strengths of both models.

The thing about squares is you may connect opposite corners in either
of two ways to form two triangles (not equilateral), and then you're
maximally connected in the sense of having no more adjacent dots to
connect.

Those wire frame computer drawings of bodies, faces, curved surfaces,
usually break down into an all-triangles vista (are "omni-
triangulated"). That's an aesthetic we're encouraging, one that "goes
with the territory".

Triangles have structural integrity, whereas squares need to be
stabilized. In pure geometry, this doesn't matter as the wire frames
are ethereal. Nevertheless, there's a minimalist aesthetic associated
with triangles and tetrahedra that we want to harp on.

Our claim would be that squares and cubes are not as "with the
grain" (of nature) as triangles and tetrahedra, and this counts for
something when it comes to applications.

To get very general about it, Oregon's bioengineering community would
rather students think of triangles and tetrahedra as emblematic of
"high tech" (organic, natural, green), with the older gridiron
aesthetics (rectilinear) more retro, emblematic of a more backward,
less tech-savvy industry. Those are connotations, aesthetic
considerations -- important to meaning.

When I visited ONAMI the other day, our nanatechnology lab (onami.us),
currently under construction on the HP campus in Corvallis (in a
facility owned by OSU), I noticed the PR materials featured a Zome kit
for assembling a buckyball, all hexagons and pentagons (no right
angles). That's indicative of the direction we're taking: more
spatial geometry in high schools, more computer use (e.g. vZome), and
more emphasis on non-rectilinear patterns in nature.

> Also, with squares, we also have the ability to form rectangles, n x m, which obey the same rule of multiplication and exhibit the other aspects mentioned above.  What is an "n x m" triangle, where n does not equal m?  And can n x m still be multiplied?
>
> One of the colored graphics you showed previously does show how this works, but it is not really analogous to the "n x n" triangle in the way that the n x m rectangle is analogous to the n x n square.
>

It's not too far different though. We're accepting two or three
inputs in the form of edges, and figuring a resulting area or volume
based on these edges.

Interestingly, the regular tetrahedron's three pairs of opposite (non-
touching) edges are at 90 degrees to one another. It's not like the
90 degree angles go away. They just need to share the road more.

> To put it in your terms (?), the "n x n" when speaking of triangles belongs to a different "namespace".  Or rather, the relationship between the arithmetic operation and the pictures is not the same here as it is with the square.  That's not because the later is the "correct" picture or because the triangles are "sophistry", as your Midwestern interlocutor might have it, but just because the connection between the operation and the square involves more than just the fact that you can count the squares along each edge and multiply them to arrive at the same total as counting all of the squares within the larger square.
>
> He is right to object to "it means the same here", though he offers no clear grounds that I can see.
>

Yes, I agree with "not the same" but then fall back on "family
resemblance" and even "close family resemblance".

> But if I've helped you see what would be good grounds for that objection, perhaps by pointing out the differences as well as the similarities, such conflicts can be averted.
>
>  I have no objection, provided
>
> > we're free to
> > establish / explore a logically permitted alternative in
> > some
> > lessons.  We want to keep using that concentric
> > hierarchy with its
> > volumes table.
>
> Certainly!  I have no objections to any of this!
>

That's refreshing. It's an uphill slog to get these curriculum
reforms implemented, despite the 50+ years of literature and a
subculture of scholars such as myself, frustrated by our slow
progress, agitating for an upgrade.

People telling the history of the "math wars" will have a field day
with our story someday.

I've been using my background in the philosophy and religion
departments (Princeton, Rorty, Preller) to seek this bridge to
Wittgenstein and his lineage.

Here's an opportunity to show where philosophy is making a positive
contribution in some practical sense, helping our math teachers co-
develop a more up-to-date and relevant spatial geometry curriculum.

Philosophy of mathematics to the rescue!

Thanks again for your assistance, hope you will continue our dialog.
Maybe others will join in. The Coxeter-Wittgenstein connection is of
some interest as well.

Kirby

>
>
> JPDeMouy
>
> Need Something? Check here:http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

5.

# 898  Stuart on Searle (A mismatch Made in Heaven!)

Posted by: "gabuddabout" gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx   gabuddabout

Wed Dec 23, 2009 3:03 pm (PST)



SWM writes:

"On a prior list I've argued with a fellow named Walter and another named PJ over
whether John Searle's Chinese Room Argument, which purports to demonstrate
logically why computational processes can never be a basis for consciousness, is
deficient because it is circular, contains various equivocations and is based on
an unestablished preconception of consciousness which, itself, cannot be
defended."

Firstly, the CRA is the upshot of a thought experiment and isn't an exercise in pure logic.

The reason why computational processes can never (by themselves) be a basis for consciousness is that they do not name an intrinsic physical process: Computation is never discovered in the physics; it is merely assigned to it. Note that this thesis is from Searle's APA address ten years after the CRA titled "Is the Brain a Digital Computer?"--it is not necessarily part of the upshot of the CRA which shows the Turing test's insufficiency to distinguish bona fide semantics from what merely appears as semantics but really isn't. This upshot comes from the original target article "Minds, Brains, and Programs" and is to be distinguished from Searle's claim ten years later in his APA address along with his Scientific American article "Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program?" (1990).

In a review of _The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul_ composed and arranged by Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, Searle complains that a complete fabrication is made the basis of their criticism.

Stuart's finding circularity is a complete fabrication based on a very poor analysis of English sentences. Searle is not the one who equivocates; Stuart does via poor analysis. Finally, Stuart's charge that Searle's notion of consciousness can't be defended may be predicated on simply bad analysis such that Stuart gets his way only given such palaver as he's concocted with truly poor analysis of English.

That the CRA (and the later view that computation is never discovered in the physics but only assigned to it) is a case of a mistaken notion of consciousness in Stuart's view shall amount to exactly what Stuart thinks wrong with it.

My guess is that he will get Searle wrong and hold Searle's real position knowingly or not. Is he flaming or just benighted?

Cheers,
Budd

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