Sean, We could imagine such a language, yes. But in our language, Wittgenstein's use of "thesis" escapes self-refutation because it is not contentious in the context of the teacher-student relationship. It is instruction in a method and one who wants to learn and practice the method must accept it. But it is self-refuting to use it in a dispute with a non-Wittgensteinian philosopher. And note that when discussing matters, say with members of the Vienna Circle, he merely expresses his own preference, that a thesis or theory is of no use to him. In discussions with other philosophers, one examines the theses they advance, rather than foolishly attempting to silence them by saying that theses have no place in philosophy. In that context, it would be contentious. It would be a thesis. And a self-refuting one. In discussions such as those on this board (where there is some reason to expect a broadly Wittgensteinian approach), one might point out, if someone professes to be doing Wittgensteinian philosophy, that they are advancing theses and that this is inconsistent with Wittgenstein's methods. If this is contentious, it is a point of exegetical - not philosophical - dispute. But if they say, "I'm not that kind of Wittgensteinian," well then the alternative is to interrogate the thesis, as Wittgenstein does with various theses throughout the PI and elsewhere. If "philosophy cannot advance theses" is rejected, then it should be withdrawn. It is only a legitimate move in Wittgensteinian philosophy if one is instructing someone who wishes to learn the method. And this is not just a matter of consistency. It is a practical aspect of the method. If someone wishes to advance all sorts of philosophically confused theses, telling them not to advance theses is unlikely to help them. Dissolving a philosophical misunderstanding is not so simple. Obviously. JPDeMouy ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/