Sean, I really wonder about this example of a theory. > ... yes: "knowledge is true, > justified belief. It has these three properties. If, > therefore, one element is missing, you don't have > knowledge." That's not a theory. It's a definition. Definitions are a formal way of presenting certain kinds of grammatical remarks, albeit not the only way and often not the most helpful way. They can be misleading and they can obscure the variety of ways in which a word may be used. The way the definition is phrased may suggest reification - that we are, in presenting the definition, discovering "properties" of this "thing" called knowledge. But that misleading way of speaking is fine so long as we recognize it as such and it doesn't lead us into muddles. > (Notice that this is exactly what lawyers do). > ...and do you suppose that Wittgenstein would have thought that legal practice needed to be corrected by philosophy? > And when a conundrum can be invented, you search for a > better law to account for the matter and defend it with the > ritual of proof. If a definition can be shown not to account for existing usage, you revise the definition. That's a perfectly reasonable procedure and it is only philosophically problematic if one supposes one is "discovering" some "deep" fact about the term under discussion. (Or if one supposes that a certain kind of definition must be available, if only we're clever enough. Or that such a definition is the only way to understand the use of a word.) In a Wittgensteinian universe, this is not > only a language fallacy, A fallacy? What fallacy is that? but it's not philosophy properly > conceived. It's premised upon a confusion. What confusion? Note also: Wittgenstein clearly accepts something like "justified true belief" when he contrasts "knowledge" with "certainty". JPDeMouy ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/