[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories
- From: "J" <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2009 23:50:37 -0000
Sean,
"Dictionary definitions" are but one kind of definition. And there were
definitions long before there were dictionaries. There are definitions by
divisio and by partitio, definitions by genus and differentia, definitions by
necessary and sufficient conditions, and so on. Denying that some of these are
definitions, calling them "formalisms" instead flies in the face of established
usage.
That a particular ideal to which we may aspire in seeking and offering
definitions may be chimerical, i.e. that we may not find a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions that capture our use of a word, is an important point.
That a definition may not be at all what we need to remove philosophical
puzzlement is also important. But whether a definition is part of a theory (in
any objectionable sense) depends on the context, the assumptions behind the
deployment of the definition, the debates surrounding it. A definition (formal
or otherwise) may simply be a grammatical remark.
Formal definitions are not Wittgenstein's preferred way of presenting
grammatical remarks - and for good reasons - but that does not mean that he
would reject them simply for being formal definitions, stigmatizing them as
"theories" on that basis.
As far as stigmatizing "justified true belief" on the basis of its being part
of the Theory of Knowledge, that argument is fallacious, because "the theory of
knowledge" is not the name of any particular theory but rather the name of a
field of investigation within philosophy, just as "literary theory" is not the
name of any particular theory. (In recent decades, "theory" has been used
synonymously with "deconstruction", showing some ignorance of the range of
approaches "literary theory" includes.) Likewise, some of Wittgenstein's
insights on formal logic are discussed under the rubric of "logical theory"
(where Oxonians divide "philosophy of logic", "philosophical logic", and
"logical theory", assigning different topics and problems to each) without
thereby implying that Wittgenstein subscribed to some theory called "Logical
Theory".)
"Justified true belief" can be treated as a theory, or approached with a
theorizing attitude, or it may be simply a grammatical remark. As the latter,
it misfires in certain respects but that can happen with any grammatical
remark. There's also a good deal that is correct about it. And Wittgenstein
accepted much of what such a definition says...
Quoting from _On_Certainty_ with my own remarks in parentheses:
12. --For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what
is known, guarantees it as a fact. One
always forgets the expression "I thought I knew".
(Ask yourself, why would "I know" even "seem" to guarantee what is known to be
a fact? And why does the expression, "I thought I knew" cast doubt on that
guarantee?)
13. For it is not as though the proposition "It is so" could be inferred from
someone else's utterance: "I know it is
so".
(A says that A knows that p does not imply p.)
Nor from the utterance together with its not being a lie.
(A honestly says that A knows that p does not imply p. A's honesty in the
matter is not what is it issue.)
--But can't I infer "It is so" from my own utterance "I
know etc."? Yes;
(I can infer p from my own knowing that p. It would be a contradiction to say
both that I know p and that not-p. Why? Because the truth of p is part of
what we mean by saying "I know that p". If it is not the case that p, then it
is also not the case that I know that p. Hence the expression, "I thought I
knew".)
and also "There is a hand there" follows from the proposition "He knows that
there's a hand there".
(Note well the contrast between the proposition "He knows that p" and his claim
to know that p, considered just previously.)
But from his
utterance "I know..." it does not follow that he does know it.
(I've seen people get confused by this passage because of the distinction
between the utterance of "I know..." and the proposition "he knows..." The
proposition does imply the truth of p, though the proposition could be false.
The fact that he utters it, even sincerely, implies no such thing.)
14. That he does know remains to be shewn.
18. "I know" often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement.
(In other words, my statement is justified. But note, he does say "often", not
"always".)
So if the other person is acquainted with the
language-game, he would admit that I know. The other, if he is acquainted with
the language-game, must be able to
imagine how one may know something of the kind.
42. One can say "He believes it, but it isn't so", but not "He knows it, but it
isn't so".
(Further emphasizing the "truth" condition of knowledge.)
Does this stem from the
difference between the mental states of belief and of knowledge? No.--One may
for example call "mental state" what
is expressed by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures etc. It would thus be
possible to speak of a mental state of
conviction, and that may be the same whether it is knowledge or false belief.
(Note, in contrast with "justified true belief", Wittgenstein emphasizes a
contrast we often draw between "knowledge" and "belief" rather than treating
knowledge as a species of belief. But he also speaks of a "mental state of
conviction" that may be expressed by both.)
To think that different states must
correspond to the words "believe" and "know" would be as if one believed that
different people had to correspond to
the word "I" and the name "Ludwig", because the concepts are different.
23. If I don't know whether someone has two hands (say, whether they have been
amputated or not) I shall believe
his assurance that he has two hands, if he is trustworthy. And if he says he
knows it, that can only signify to me that
he has been able to make sure, and hence that his arms are e.g. not still
concealed by coverings and bandages, etc.
etc.
(Again, justification.)
91. If Moore says he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant him
that it has existed all that time, and also
believe him when he says he is convinced of it. But has he also got the right
ground for his conviction? For if not,
then after all he doesn't know (Russell).
(He doesn't know if he doesn't have grounds, even if we do grant the truth of
what he says.)
407. For when Moore says "I know that that's..." I want to reply "you don't
know anything!"--and yet I would not
say that to anyone who was speaking without philosophical intention. That is, I
feel (rightly?) that these two mean to
say something different.
(Here he seems to be at least tentatively granting the possible use of "I know"
outside of philosophy that is more akin to what he would have philosophers
replace with "I am certain". People do sometimes use "I know" when they cannot
give grounds - when giving grounds is not possible - but philosophers ought to
be more careful. So, he's granting a use that does not not involve being
justified but he would object to that usage in philosophical discussion.)
438. It would not be enough to assure someone that I know what is going on at a
certain place--without giving him
grounds that satisfy him that I am in a position to know.
441. In a court of law the mere assurance "I know..." on the part of a witness
would convince no one. It must be
shown that he was in a position to know.
Even the assurance "I know that that's a hand", said while someone
looked at his own hand, would not be
credible unless we knew the circumstances in which it was said. And if we do
know them, it seems to be an
assurance that the person speaking is normal in this respect.
563. One says "I know that he is in pain" although one can produce no
convincing grounds for this.--Is this the same
as "I am sure that he..."?--No. "I am sure" tells you my subjective certainty.
"I know" means that I who know it, and
the person who doesn't are separated by a difference in understanding. (Perhaps
based on a difference in degree of
experience.)
If I say "I know" in mathematics, then the justification for this is a
proof.
If in these two cases instead of "I know", one says "you can rely on
it" then the substantiation is of a
different kind in each case.
And substantiation comes to an end.
JPDeMouy
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