[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2009 18:56:41 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Rob de Villiers <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
> Sean,
>
> Yes, Wittgennstein's "a-theoretical" cum "purely descriptive"
> conception of philosophy has caused great consternation, even
> distress or fury, to many.
Hello Rob. How do you think that applies to questions about consciousness,
i.e., what it is, what it results from, etc.?
Some here seem to think such questions are really irrelevant to philosophy in a
Wittgensteinian sense and that asking what consciousness is just boils down to
how we use the words we apply to such things, e.g., whether and how we might
say of a fully functional human-like android (say the Data of Star Trek fame)
that it is conscious or not. That is, such a decision would really be driven by
adapted uses of the term to fit any relevant new criteria presented by the Data
entity, etc.
More generally this position seems to be that there isn't a lot philosophy
could bring to the table here.
While agreeing that the job of determining what causes (makes, produces,
results in) consciousness is, finally, a scientific question, I tend to
disagree with the notion that such questions are, finally, just about words,
that is, how we are using existing terms and how we adapt them to new uses (or
coin adequate substitutions).
My view is that the question of what a thing like consciousness is is a real
one, even if we don't solve the problem of what causes it philosophically (via
armchair speculation).
Thus it seems perfectly useful to me to ask what we mean by the term
"consciousness" and want to know by that, NOT just when we use the term and in
what circumstances, but also what these whens and whats say about the idea of
consciousness itself, i.e., about the idea we are representing by, and alluding
to, in the use of the term.
This looks like a rather fine point but I think it's important for getting a
handle on what Wittgenstein was really on about. After all, many of his critics
(Popper for instance) accuse him of just playing with words. My view is that
that is a superficial understanding of what the linguistic turn in analytic
philosophy is all about. Yet linguistic philosophy (whether done in the guise
of a Wittgensteinian approach or, more generally, as an instance of so-called
ordinary language philosophy) can very easily slide into this sort of attitude,
making it ripe for critics like Popper.
In the end, asking what consciousness is, in a philosophical (not a scientific
way), is NOT to ask for a theory about consciousness per se but only to ask
what theories might make sense, which ways we should proceed in trying to
develop such theories on a scientific level. That is, it's to ask what we have
in mind when we use the term in various situations. That, of course, will
inform and constrain the development of any actual theories developed in the
course of scientific inquiry.
I'm inclined to think we sometimes go to far in sloughing off theories in line
with Wittgenstein's comments on the matter. I don't think he wanted to shut the
door on theories but only to note that that isn't the job of philosophy which
has, as it's main goal, getting clear, enhancing undersanding.
SWM
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