Messages In This Digest (17
Messages)
Messages
- 1a.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 5:19 am (PST)
SWM wrote:
>Joe, ... For some reason you haven't given answers yet to the
>questions I've put to you.
the reason is simple: I can't type as fast as you can.
>2) Given that consciousness (what we mean by the term) consists of a
>number of different features that we find in our mental lives (e.g.,
>awareness, intentionality, understanding, reasoning, recognizing,
>observing, perceiving, remembering, etc.), which feature(s) of
>consciousness must be extra physical on this view and what would it
>mean to say it/they ARE extra physical? (Do you have in mind that they
>exist side by side all the physical stuff, or superimposed on the
>physical stuff, or underlying the physical stuff or in some separate
>realm from the physical stuff?)
the features that you mention are phenomenological (or experiential) . we
*experience* awareness, intentionality, understanding and the other
features that you mention.
it is quite alright to begin with a discussion of or description of
phenomena. now, as scientists and philosophers typically try to explain
the origin of phenomena by attributing properties to (meta-phenomenal)
objects, the question becomes 'which object(s) account for consciousness
and/or the features of consciousness? '.
if von Neumann is correct, something non-physical (the abstract 'I') is
at least partially responsible for intentionality; although, ironically
enough, the aspect of intentionality that is relevant here is the aspect
you typically exclude from your definition, the sense of intending ---
willing or making choices.
you can get some idea of the importance of this point by checking out
Conway, John H; Kochen, Simon. The Strong Free Will Theorem. online at
http://www.ams.org/notices/200902/rtx090200226p.pdf
Joe
--
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- 1b.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 6:41 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@.. .> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joe, ... For some reason you haven't given answers yet to the
> >questions I've put to you.
>
> the reason is simple: I can't type as fast as you can.
>
I'm not that fast a typist but I am a great ditherer where my daily tasks are concerned and it often seems easier to diddle around on this list than to do the work of the day!
<snip>
> the features that you mention are phenomenological (or experiential) . we
> *experience* awareness, intentionality, understanding and the other
> features that you mention.
>
> it is quite alright to begin with a discussion of or description of
> phenomena.
I don't see the point you are making with this statement. Why shouldn't it be alright and did anything I say lead you to believe I wouldn't have thought it alright to do so?
> now, as scientists and philosophers typically try to explain
> the origin of phenomena by attributing properties to (meta-phenomenal)
> objects, the question becomes 'which object(s) account for consciousness
> and/or the features of consciousness? '.
>
"Account for" in the sense of making it happen or in the sense of providing the raw material of inputs of which we are conscious?
> if von Neumann is correct, something non-physical (the abstract 'I')
Well the "abstract I" can be non-physical in the sense of it's not being any kind of physical object while still being physical in the sense of it being the outcome of physical properties. (The spinning of a wheel isn't a physical object, after all, but it is hardly non-physical! )
> is
> at least partially responsible for intentionality;
Whoa, this is a peculiar statement, Joe. If intentionality is one of those features we experience, as you put it (though I probably wouldn't have said it that way since it looks more like intentionality is better described as a feature of experience rather than as an experienced feature, but let's put that aside for the moment), then how can intentionality be responsible for itself which is the way what you write above reads????
Maybe the problem here is that language just isn't suited for discussions of this kind, i.e., language is built on a public foundation and here we are talking (or trying to talk) about things that are outside of that framework.
> although, ironically
> enough, the aspect of intentionality that is relevant here is the aspect
> you typically exclude from your definition, the sense of intending ---
> willing or making choices.
>
Both are phenomena of experience in a sense, but it is not clear that they are themselves experienced features. But I don't exclude purposiveness at all. It's just that, while sharing the term "intention" with the aboutness philosophy usually refers to by the term "intentionality" , they are different features (though it looks like aboutness must occur for there to be purposes so aboutness appears to be more fundamental in this sense).
> you can get some idea of the importance of this point by checking out
> Conway, John H; Kochen, Simon. The Strong Free Will Theorem. online at
> http://www.ams.org/notices/200902/rtx090200226p.pdf
>
> Joe
> --
Thank you for the reference (which I'll take a look at when I have the chance) but what is your answer to my question:
"2) Given that consciousness (what we mean by the term) consists of a
number of different features that we find in our mental lives (e.g., awareness, intentionality, understanding, reasoning, recognizing, observing, perceiving, remembering, etc.), which feature(s) of consciousness must be extra physical on this view and what would it
mean to say it/they ARE extra physical? (Do you have in mind that they
exist side by side all the physical stuff, or superimposed on the
physical stuff, or underlying the physical stuff or in some separate
realm from the physical stuff?)"
Note that the issue is why should we think that the von Neumann thesis implies, as you propose, that consciousness cannot be physically derived because consciousness "collapses the wave function"?
What you have given us above, aside from an off-line reference which may or may not answer the question but which you seem to think holds the key, so far is just the following:
You wrote: ". . . the features that you mention are phenomenological (or experiential) . we 'experience' awareness, intentionality, understanding and the other features that you mention."
and then
"if von Neumann is correct, something non-physical (the abstract 'I') is at least partially responsible for intentionality"
and you proceed to suggest that the relevant feature of experience is one I haven't named. But, of course, I will readily grant that purposiveness is part of experience, too.
Without addressing what purposiveness entails (having an objective in mind including what it means to formulate and have such an objective in mind), can you explain how the alleged fact that "collapsing the wave function" requires consciousness (I am not disputing this "fact", indeed, I barely understand what it means, but I will grant if for now!) MEANS that consciousness (or whatever we mean by "consciousness" , that is, whatever constitutes the referent we mean by it) cannot be physically derived?
It looks to me, so far, that there is a jump in your (or von Neumann's) reasoning here. Why should the fact that experiencing, in the form of a measuring observer, alters the facts of measurements clocked at the quantum level IMPLY that the observer cannot be a physically derived phenomenon?
If you have an off-line citation that explains or argues for this conclusion please offer at least some statement (either your own or another's) which affects to make and/or support this claim IN ADDITION to any URL you want us to link to. Only in that way can we see the point you are actually making in support of your claim that we ought to draw this conclusion. Otherwise all you're doing is saying the argument is elsewhere, go look for yourself. If the argument is something you agree with, then, presumably, you can state it here rather than simply asserting or alluding to it.
Thanks.
SWM
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- 1c.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 8:18 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@.. .> wrote:
> if von Neumann is correct, something non-physical (the abstract
> 'I') is at least partially responsible for intentionality;
Maybe it has more to do with whether your understanding of von Neumann
is correct. As far as I know, he was concerned about explaining (or
explaining away) the evidence from physics. I doubt that he was
studying consciousness.
> you can get some idea of the importance of this point by checking out
> Conway, John H; Kochen, Simon. The Strong Free Will Theorem. online
> at http://www.ams.org/notices/200902/rtx090200226p.pdf
< http://www.ams.org/notices/200902/rtx090200226p.pdf>
LOL. I get from that paper that the idea has no importance at all.
Conway and Kochen are discussing determinism, not free will, although
they chose to give their paper a colorful title. Using the search
function of the Adobe reader, I could not find the string "intent"
anywhere in that paper.
I'll agree with Josh and Stuart on this. There's no evident reason to
look to QM here.
Regards,
Neil
- 1d.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 10:12 am (PST)
sigh
"Once more into the breech dear friends, once more..."
As near as I can tell from his suggestive remarks, what JP is calling von Neumann's interpretation is what would better be called Stapp's interpretation. Von Neumann's approach clearly influenced Stapp's, but von Neumann wisely didn't say the sorts of things Stapp did, leaving a lot of questions open.
Relevance? Aside from simply accuracy, if one finds the interpretation to be pseudoscientific silliness, one would wish not to see von Neumann slandered with such a ascription. Furthermore, any attempt to attach von Neumann's prestige to the interpretation, which would be a fallacious appeal anyway, is easily dispensed with.
Aside from that, those trying to find a more thorough exposition of the ideas to which JP is appealing would have better luck googling the name "Henry Stapp" and "quantum mechanics" rather than "von Neumann".
In a straightforward, simple defense of what I am saying, I offer this
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/#4.2
Note well the following:
In Chapter VI, von Neumann (1955) discussed the conceptual distinction between observed and observing system. In this context, he applied (1) and (2) to the general situation of a measured object system (I), a measuring instrument (II), and (the brain of) a human observer (III). His conclusion was that it makes no difference for the result of measurements on (I) whether the boundary between observed and observing system is posited between I and (II & III) or between (I & II) and III. As a consequence, it is inessential whether a detector or the human brain is ultimately referred to as the "observer".[ 6]
JPDeMouy
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- 1e.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 5:19 pm (PST)
J wrote:
>As near as I can tell from his suggestive remarks, what JP is calling
>von Neumann's interpretation is what would better be called Stapp's
>interpretation. Von Neumann's approach clearly influenced Stapp's, but
>von Neumann wisely didn't say the sorts of things Stapp did, leaving a
>lot of questions open.
>Aside from that, those trying to find a more thorough exposition of the
>ideas to which JP is appealing would have better luck googling the name
>"Henry Stapp" and "quantum mechanics" rather than "von Neumann".
Stapp's interpretation is an elaboration of the von Neumann
Interpretation. Stapp has written two books and many papers (most of
which are online at http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/stappfiles.html).
>In a straightforward, simple defense of what I am saying, I offer this
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/#4.2
>Note well the following:
>In Chapter VI, von Neumann (1955) discussed the conceptual distinction
>between observed and observing system. In this context, he applied (1)
>and (2) to the general situation of a measured object system (I), a
>measuring instrument (II), and (the brain of) a human observer (III).
>His conclusion was that it makes no difference for the result of
>measurements on (I) whether the boundary between observed and observing
>system is posited between I and (II & III) or between (I & II) and III.
>As a consequence, it is inessential whether a detector or the human
>brain is ultimately referred to as the "observer".[ 6]
what von Neumann actually wrote was: "let us divide the world into three
parts: I, II, III. Let I be the system actually observed, II the
measuring instrument and III the actual observer." [Mathematical
Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. p. 421]
notice that (for III) von Neumann wrote "the actual observer" whereas
Atmanspacher (author of the cited SEP page) wrote "(the brain of) a
human observer".
this difference is crucial because the point of von Neumann's analysis
is that you can put the entire body and brain of the experimenter in
division II, and treat it as part of the measuring instrument. that
leaves the actual observer (the abstract 'I') alone in division III.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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- 1f.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 6:31 pm (PST)
JP,
> what von Neumann actually wrote was: "let us divide the
> world into three
> parts: I, II, III. Let I be the system actually observed,
> II the
> measuring instrument and III the actual observer."
> [Mathematical
> Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. p. 421]
>
> notice that (for III) von Neumann wrote "the actual
> observer" whereas
> Atmanspacher (author of the cited SEP page) wrote "(the
> brain of) a
> human observer".
>
> this difference is crucial because the point of von
> Neumann's analysis
> is that you can put the entire body and brain of the
> experimenter in
> division II, and treat it as part of the measuring
> instrument. that
> leaves the actual observer (the abstract 'I') alone in
> division III.
>
The difference is not crucial at all, because if you'd included the subsequent sentences, they would make amply clear that the SEP is accurate on the central point, viz. that we can divide things between I and II+III or between I+II and III. How we describe division III is a minor point by comparison. Furthermore, von Neumann's description grants that we can treat III as the "abstract 'ego'" as he puts it, or we can treat III as "from the retina on in".
JPDeMouy
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- 1g.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 8:48 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "J" <wittrsamr@. ..> wrote:
>
> The difference is not crucial at all, because if you'd included the subsequent sentences, they would make amply clear that the SEP is accurate on the central point, viz. that we can divide things between I and II+III or between I+II and III. How we describe division III is a minor point by comparison. Furthermore, von Neumann's description grants that we can treat III as the "abstract 'ego'" as he puts it, or we can treat III as "from the retina on in".
Thank you for your posts on this, which I entirely endorse.
I would add some negative things about Stapp if I wanted to take the time to defend them, having become familiar with his works years ago when it seemed productive to debate Penrose and such issues, and we were all much younger.
All I will say now for those who see a need for QM here is that your new physics highway goes this way, my computational explanations highway goes that way, and I'll get to Scotland before yeh.
Josh
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- 1h.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 11:52 pm (PST)
iro3isdx wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>if von Neumann is correct, something non-physical (the abstract 'I')
>>is at least partially responsible for intentionality;
>Maybe it has more to do with whether your understanding of von Neumann
>is correct. As far as I know, he was concerned about explaining (or
>explaining away) the evidence from physics. I doubt that he was
>studying consciousness.
the claim is not that von Neumann was studying consciousness when he
wrote the Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. the claim is
that, in the course of formalising the math that predicted the results
of experiments in QM, he attributed collapse of the wave function to the
abstract 'I' of the experimenter.
>>you can get some idea of the importance of this point by checking out
>>Conway, John H; Kochen, Simon. The Strong Free Will Theorem. online
>>at http://www.ams.org/notices/200902/rtx090200226p.pdf
>I get from that paper that the idea has no importance at all. Conway
>and Kochen are discussing determinism, not free will
Conway and Kochen are speak of free will and free choice.
"Another customarily tacit assumption is that experimenters are free to
choose between possible experiments. "
"It is the experimenters' free will that allows the free and independent
choices of x, y, z, and w." [x, y, z and w represent choice as to what
to measure].
Joe
--
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- 1i.
-
Wed Dec 30, 2009 12:43 am (PST)
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>SWM wrote:
>can you explain how the alleged fact that "collapsing the wave
>function" requires consciousness ... MEANS that consciousness (or
>whatever we mean by "consciousness" , that is, whatever constitutes the
>referent we mean by it) cannot be physically derived?
>It looks to me, so far, that there is a jump in your (or von Neumann's)
>reasoning here. Why should the fact that experiencing, in the form of a
>measuring observer, alters the facts of measurements clocked at the
>quantum level IMPLY that the observer cannot be a physically derived
>phenomenon?
I doubt that a physicist would express himself as you have. I suspect
that he would probably say something like the fact of measuring alters
the state of the quantum object being measured. in between measurements,
the quantum object exists in a condition described by the wave function
superposition of all possible values it might have. when measured, the
quantum object exists in a particle like condition where the property
being measured has a single definite value.
this makes the act of measuring causally effective.
that's quite different from Dennett's metaphor of the experiencing I as
a press agent who plays no part in decision making but merely reports
the result.
>>if von Neumann is correct, something non-physical (the abstract 'I')
>>is at least partially responsible for intentionality;
>Well the "abstract I" can be non-physical in the sense of it's not
>being any kind of physical object while still being physical in the
>sense of it being the outcome of physical properties. (The spinning of
>a wheel isn't a physical object, after all, but it is hardly
>non-physical! )
is the spinning of the wheel itself causally effective? I don't think
so. the causal efficacy of the wheel is derived from the wheel as a
physical object with certain properties.
similarly, if the brain (and the entire physical universe) is placed in
von Neumann's divisions I + II; and, if there is still something left
over (the abstract 'I') in division III which is causally effective;
then, it clearly suggests that the abstract 'I' is a non-physical
(metaphenomenal) object that is causally effective at collapsing the
wave function during quantum measurements.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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- 2.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 5:56 am (PST)
Grammatical mood (also mode) is one of a set of distinctive verb forms that are used to signal modality.[1] It is distinct from grammatical tense or grammatical aspect, although these concepts are conflated to some degree in many languages, including English and most other modern Indo-European languages, insofar as the same word patterns are used to express more than one of these concepts at the same time.
Currently identified moods include conditional, imperative, indicative, injunctive, optative, potential, subjunctive, and more. Infinitive is a category apart from all these finite forms, and so are gerunds and participles. Some Uralic Samoyedic languages have more than ten moods; Nenets has as many as sixteen. The original Indo-European inventory of moods was indicative, subjunctive, optative, and imperative. Not every Indo-European language has each of these moods, but the most conservative ones such as Avestan, Ancient Greek, and Sanskrit have them all. Italian has replaced optative with condizionale, which is a mix of conditional and optative mood.
However, not all of the moods listed below are clearly conceptually distinct. Individual terminology varies from language to language, and the coverage of (e.g.) the "conditional" mood in one language may largely overlap with that of the "hypothetical" or "potential" mood in another. Even when two different moods exist in the same language, their respective usages may blur, or may be defined by syntactic rather than semantic criteria. For example, the subjunctive and optative moods in Ancient Greek alternate syntactically in many subordinate clauses, depending on the tense of the main verb. The usage of the indicative, subjunctive and jussive moods in Classical Arabic is almost completely controlled by syntactic context; the only possible alternation in the same context is between indicative and jussive following the negative particle lā.
- 3.1.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 5:59 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>> My only quarrel with Stuart is that I don't like people making
> bs statements and then attributing them to me.
>
> ============ ========= ========= ========= ===
Lots of people don't like seeing the implications of what they write made explicit and it seems you are no exception, Cayuse.
Of course, if you think that I, as explicator, have it wrong, you can always demonstrate that by clarification, argument or the like, but it seems to be easier for you to accuse me of "making bs statements and attributing them to [you]".
As it happens, Cayuse, I have grown tired of discourse with you because you rely on declaration, e.g., insisting on statements like "it has no application" in reference to the use of a word like "I" when people keep giving you the applications. Just as Bruce can't stipulate "unintelligibility" , you can't stipulate the absence of application!
I have shown, in the past, how you've quoted Wittgenstein out of context and consequently misread him and then you blithely go on to do it again. In your recent debate with Joe, who I think is wrong on lots of things, you have persisted in arguing with him that his use of "I" has no application when it is plain that as he is using it, it does. You insist to Joe that it's the "philosophical I" you have in mind but you don't say what THAT is and how that is what Joe is talking about.
The same happened in your argument with him that the fact of experience does not imply an experiencer. Note that there is NO use in the English language for experience without the implied notion of an experiencer, no ordinary language example of experience happening by itself, i.e., not in the context of someone experiencing it. There's a reason for that which, if you thought about it, you might see for yourself.
I don't know anyone here using the word "I" or "self" who has in mind what you have called the "philosophical I" unless it is the "I" of self-reference used by a philosopher which manifestly has an application!
Now it's true (or at least it seems true to many of us) that on a certain level of consideration, what we recognize as the "I" merges with all other phenomena so that we can identify no pure subject. The "I" as subject thus occupies a special place in our lexicon and is understood by examining how the term "I" is used in order to identify and shake off some of the illusory ideas it prompts in us (i.e., as a pronoun it has a naming function and so appears to name something like other nouns do and yet that something is not to be found along side the other somethings of the universe -- so we must recognize its function is somewhat different than other naming words). But discussions here about the concepts of "self" and of "consciousness" are NOT references to that aspect of the word "I" nor do they imply a belief in the objective reality of an unperceived perceiver.
It is your mistake to confuse the latter notion, which is empty of content and therefore of reference, with what is meant when ideas of a self, a subject, consciousness or mind are being referred to in discussions of the things brains do and people manifest. Cognitive science is not concerned with the "I" as an empty referencing term. That is best left to the projects of religion and art or to the field of psychology that studies such human projects and practices or even to philosophy in examining the confusions we can fall into because of the way the word "I" works. But philosophy applied to concepts like consciousness, self, etc., in the service of understanding what we mean by "mind," "consciousness" and the like is addressing a different kind of question, one which Joe, whether he is ultimately right or wrong in how he answers such questions, correctly addresses when he aims to consider what it means to be a self, a consciousness, etc.
However, having realized how little is to be gained by communicating with you about any of this, given your past unseemly remarks in response to things I've said, I have no wish to pick this up with you again in any great detail. If you want to continue to quote Wittgenstein out of context and read such quotes in support of your misguided notion that "I", as used in these discussions, has no application, when ONLY YOU HAVE SUCH A REFERENTLESS 'REFERENT' IN MIND (only you are invoking the confusion you are seeking to address), go for it. But suggesting that my response to you is "bs" is an easy and intemperate way out for you, enabling you to avoid coming to grips with any of this.
SWM
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- 3.2.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 7:34 am (PST)
--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "Cayuse" <wittrsamr@. ..> wrote:
>
> Joseph Polanik wrote:
> > if this philosophical self that I am states "I am this
> > philosophical self"; then, I am self-referencing.
> >
> > do you agree?
>
> No, the philosophical self doesn't DO anything
> (in this particular case, that means that it doesn't
> "make statements" such as "I am this philosophical self").
> All statements (including the statement that "I am this
> philosophical self") are part of what appears /within/
> (or what is emcompassed by) the philosophical self.
> Statements are attributable to *physical organisms*.
> Answers.com
The view, particularly associated with Hume but anticipated in Buddhism, that we have no reason to think in terms of a single unified self that owns a variety of experiences or states; we only have access to the succession of states themselves. The enduring self is then a fiction, or a figment of the imagination. However, Hume confessed himself dissatisfied with his own account of the matter (Treatise, 1st Appendix). The problem is that the idea of one determinate self, that survives through life's normal changes of experience and personality, seems to be highly metaphysical. But if we avoid it we seem to be left only with the experiences themselves, and no account of their unity in one life, or, as it is sometimes put, no idea of the rope around the bundle. A tempting metaphor is that from individual experiences a self is `constructed' , perhaps as a fictitious focus of the narrative of one's life that one is inclined to give. But the difficulty with the notion is that experiences are individually too small to `construct' anything, and anything capable of doing any constructing appears to be just the kind of guiding intelligent subject that got lost in the flight from the metaphysical view. See also atman, personal identity.
bundle theory of the mind or self
from Answers.com
thank you
sekhar
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- 3.3.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 7:55 am (PST)
void wrote:
> "Cayuse" wrote:
>> the philosophical self doesn't DO anything
>> (in this particular case, that means that it doesn't
>> "make statements" such as "I am this philosophical self").
>> All statements (including the statement that "I am this
>> philosophical self") are part of what appears /within/
>> (or what is emcompassed by) the philosophical self.
>> Statements are attributable to *physical organisms*.
> Answers.com
> The view, particularly associated with Hume but anticipated in
> Buddhism, that we have no reason to think in terms of a single
> unified self that owns a variety of experiences or states; we only
> have access to the succession of states themselves.
*What* has "access" to the succession of states?
> The enduring self
> is then a fiction, or a figment of the imagination. However, Hume
> confessed himself dissatisfied with his own account of the matter
> (Treatise, 1st Appendix). The problem is that the idea of one
> determinate self, that survives through life's normal changes of
> experience and personality, seems to be highly metaphysical. But if
> we avoid it we seem to be left only with the experiences themselves,
> and no account of their unity in one life, or, as it is sometimes
> put, no idea of the rope around the bundle. A tempting metaphor is
> that from individual experiences a self is `constructed' , perhaps as
> a fictitious focus of the narrative of one's life that one is
> inclined to give. But the difficulty with the notion is that
> experiences are individually too small to `construct' anything, and
> anything capable of doing any constructing appears to be just the
> kind of guiding intelligent subject that got lost in the flight from
> the metaphysical view. See also atman, personal identity.
Because of our innate capacity to reason we feel that
all things should be explicable, but there is a limit to
explanation, and it is reached right here.
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- 3.4.
-
Tue Dec 29, 2009 5:18 pm (PST)
--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <wittrsamr@. ..> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "Cayuse" <z.z7@> wrote:
> >> My only quarrel with Stuart is that I don't like people making
> > bs statements and then attributing them to me.
> >
> > ============ ========= ========= ========= ===
>
> Lots of people don't like seeing the implications of what they write made explicit and it seems you are no exception, Cayuse.
You too! I made explicit your lack of understanding English given your reinterpretation of Searle's premise that syntax is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics. You couldn't read "sufficient for" as "sufficient to cause."
Then you made it sound as if Searle needs to have semantics cause semantics if syntax couldn't.
I couldn't help but think you got Searle wrong on purpose just to see how irritated you could make another. Or I thought you just couldn't read English.
Note that Searle wasn't too happy with Hofstadter completely fabricating a quote to argue with....
You happily went on with that sort of line when saying that Searle's view (of computers) is too simplistic. Then Peter pinned you down to talking about either more hardware or more computation and then you waffled to the point of doing something Searle notes his CRA has no answer for, namely, some other thesis besides strong AI. It was a change in topic and that's why we at Analytic made clear that you might be simply embracing Searle's position some of the time when thinking you're at odds with it.
We tried and tried....
Cheers,
Budd
>
> Of course, if you think that I, as explicator, have it wrong, you can always demonstrate that by clarification, argument or the like, but it seems to be easier for you to accuse me of "making bs statements and attributing them to [you]".
Tried and tried....... ...
>
> As it happens, Cayuse, I have grown tired of discourse with you because you rely on declaration, e.g., insisting on statements like "it has no application" in reference to the use of a word like "I" when people keep giving you the applications. Just as Bruce can't stipulate "unintelligibility" , you can't stipulate the absence of application!
>
> I have shown, in the past, how you've quoted Wittgenstein out of context and consequently misread him and then you blithely go on to do it again. In your recent debate with Joe, who I think is wrong on lots of things, you have persisted in arguing with him that his use of "I" has no application when it is plain that as he is using it, it does. You insist to Joe that it's the "philosophical I" you have in mind but you don't say what THAT is and how that is what Joe is talking about.
>
> The same happened in your argument with him that the fact of experience does not imply an experiencer. Note that there is NO use in the English language for experience without the implied notion of an experiencer, no ordinary language example of experience happening by itself, i.e., not in the context of someone experiencing it. There's a reason for that which, if you thought about it, you might see for yourself.
>
> I don't know anyone here using the word "I" or "self" who has in mind what you have called the "philosophical I" unless it is the "I" of self-reference used by a philosopher which manifestly has an application!
>
> Now it's true (or at least it seems true to many of us) that on a certain level of consideration, what we recognize as the "I" merges with all other phenomena so that we can identify no pure subject. The "I" as subject thus occupies a special place in our lexicon and is understood by examining how the term "I" is used in order to identify and shake off some of the illusory ideas it prompts in us (i.e., as a pronoun it has a naming function and so appears to name something like other nouns do and yet that something is not to be found along side the other somethings of the universe -- so we must recognize its function is somewhat different than other naming words). But discussions here about the concepts of "self" and of "consciousness" are NOT references to that aspect of the word "I" nor do they imply a belief in the objective reality of an unperceived perceiver.
>
> It is your mistake to confuse the latter notion, which is empty of content and therefore of reference, with what is meant when ideas of a self, a subject, consciousness or mind are being referred to in discussions of the things brains do and people manifest. Cognitive science is not concerned with the "I" as an empty referencing term. That is best left to the projects of religion and art or to the field of psychology that studies such human projects and practices or even to philosophy in examining the confusions we can fall into because of the way the word "I" works. But philosophy applied to concepts like consciousness, self, etc., in the service of understanding what we mean by "mind," "consciousness" and the like is addressing a different kind of question, one which Joe, whether he is ultimately right or wrong in how he answers such questions, correctly addresses when he aims to consider what it means to be a self, a consciousness, etc.
>
> However, having realized how little is to be gained by communicating with you about any of this, given your past unseemly remarks in response to things I've said, I have no wish to pick this up with you again in any great detail. If you want to continue to quote Wittgenstein out of context and read such quotes in support of your misguided notion that "I", as used in these discussions, has no application, when ONLY YOU HAVE SUCH A REFERENTLESS 'REFERENT' IN MIND (only you are invoking the confusion you are seeking to address), go for it. But suggesting that my response to you is "bs" is an easy and intemperate way out for you, enabling you to avoid coming to grips with any of this.
>
> SWM
>
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- 3.5.
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Tue Dec 29, 2009 6:01 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@. ..> wrote:
>
> --- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
> >
> > --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "Cayuse" <z.z7@> wrote:
> > >> My only quarrel with Stuart is that I don't like people making
> > > bs statements and then attributing them to me.
> > >
> > > ============ ========= ========= ========= ===
> >
> > Lots of people don't like seeing the implications of what they write made explicit and it seems you are no exception, Cayuse.
>
>
> You too! I made explicit your lack of understanding English given your reinterpretation of Searle's premise that syntax is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics. You couldn't read "sufficient for" as "sufficient to cause."
>
I'm sorry Budd but on my view you have no real grasp of the CRA (or the points I made about it which your comment above once again amply demonstrates) . Perhaps if you demonstrate a better understanding of this stuff down the road I'll address these things with you again but there's really no point in going back and forth over the same stuff yet another time with yet another audience to bore or agitate. Either you don't understand Searle or I don't, and you are already on record misreading a whole slew of things about Searle's argument (which has been adequately demonstrated in the past on Analytic). Perhaps the most egregious of your confusions was your complete misreading of Searle's terms "strong AI" and "weak AI" which are what his whole argument is about.
After that particular faux pas (along with others, of course), I'm surprised you still think you can speak authoritatively on any of this.
> Then you made it sound as if Searle needs to have semantics cause semantics if syntax couldn't.
>
???
> I couldn't help but think you got Searle wrong on purpose just to see how irritated you could make another. Or I thought you just couldn't read English.
>
Or you can't think very clearly.
> Note that Searle wasn't too happy with Hofstadter completely fabricating a quote to argue with....
>
Are you trying to channel Searle or make an argument?
> You happily went on with that sort of line when saying that Searle's view (of computers) is too simplistic. Then Peter pinned you down
Peter was wrong. That you can't see it and he wouldn't admit it is beside the point.
> to talking about either more hardware or more computation and then you waffled
Echoing Peter's baseless charge of "waffling" means nothing coming from you since you can't understand Peter's points anymore than you get Searle's . . . or mine. But you are rather good at picking up and repeating terms ad infinitum.
>to the point of doing something Searle notes his CRA has no answer for, namely, some other thesis besides strong AI. It was a change in topic and that's why we at Analytic made clear that you might be simply embracing Searle's position some of the time when thinking you're at odds with it.
>
The strong thinkers at Analytic may not have agreed with me or liked my style of posting very much, but you certainly should not place yourself in their number or presume to speak for others beside yourself. Try giving some arguments for what you say once in a while rather than just confining yourself to narratives referencing what you believe others have said.
> We tried and tried....
>
> Cheers,
> Budd
>
>
One of the things I liked about leaving Analytic and joining Sean's list, Budd, was that it freed me from the torture of having to read your posts which are invariably full of ad hominems, baseless charges and obscurantist misreadings and confusions, and rarely, if ever, contain substantive or closely reasoned points. This post is par for that course.
(Sorry Sean but if Budd is here and going to post the same old junk again for a new audience, I don't see how I can simply ignore him.)
SWM
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- 4.1.
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Tue Dec 29, 2009 9:46 pm (PST)
Hi J.
Sorry I've been away. My daughter and I are still away for the holidays. I won't be more active here until the 4th. Some brief remarks on your mail:
1. Whether TJB is a "theory" is a function of the sense of the term "theory," and the behavior of the language participants. I think we're on board on this. I've never said anything contrary. But where we may or may not differ is in this respect:
When it is not a theory as such, I might also question its usefulness as a definition. If I were asked to give a definition of knowledge -- in the sense of it being neither a formula, "law-candidate, " a formalism, etc., -- I would use Webster's before TJB. And in fact, if someone asked me what "knowledge" was, I would prefer to say this: it has to do with the coronation of doubt-removal.
Actually, when I teach in class, I get this sort of thing all of the time. Periodically, I have minds in the class that cannot think well. They always say things like, "I'll give you the answer professor if you give me the definition." I always say back to them: definition? Are you not an English speaker? Have you never used the word? Definitions are only for people who have a "foreign language problem." Once you are plugged into the grammar, they are of no further use.
One more point here. To the extent I am known at all in my "field," it is as a disciplinary critic. I see myself doing things in political science that Wittgenstein did in philosophy. For example, I teach what the field calls "American government," but I do it without reference to any political scientist whatsoever. I don't mention them. My class is called philosophy and development of American government. There is no class that I teach that resembles anything anyone else in the field does. Why am I telling you this? Because if I were asked to teach epistemology in a philosophy department, I would do something Wittgenstein would be quite happy with. I would take a third of course and discuss intellectual history -- what cultures have thought to be "knowledge" through time. I would teach the sociology and anthropology of knowledge. And then, with the rest of the class, I would teach uses and sense of "knowledge," its grammar, and how current
philosophy on the subject isn't helpful (because it asks the wrong questions). The class would be 1/3 TJB & Gettier stuff; 1/3 Wittgenstein; & 1/3 historical/anthropo logical/sociolog ical.
As to the value of propounding questions like "what is knowledge," I would say it has the same sort of utility as setting bowling pins. If you think about it, the question is really quite fitting for 3rd graders. As Wittgenstein noted, one could make a philosophy (by playing games with sense) out of anything -- what is wishing, intention, law, winning, fatherhood, courtesy , etc. etc. Knowledge is not special here (at least not to asking what it is).
2. I do concede your biographical claims about Gettier. I've never read anything about him. Thought that was good stuff.
3. On the value of partial definitions, I'm not sure I completely agree. The passages you and I exchanged in the BB really only say one thing. They say that definitions are good not if they are partial or full -- but ONLY if they convey sense. That's the reason W is not opposed to a partial definition in the passage you cite. Because it did the job in conveying what was important to know -- which was not IT (the definition). Same with the wishing remark. He says if you give us a sharp-boundary for a family resemblance term and it does the trick, that's ok too. The key is to avoid traffic accidents in the language game. Not to give accounts of words outside of this end.
There are all sorts of anti-definition stuff in Wittgenstein' s lectures. Particularly in philosophy of mathematics, in exchanges with Turing. But elsewhere too. I don't have time to gather them. Later in the week, I'll do a "Wittgenstein and definitions" mail, and maybe we can talk more about it.
4. I don't think we are seeing eye to eye on anthropology and "logic." I think the best way to get through that is to get to the level of example. Because saying philosophy is or is not logic, or is more cousin to anthropology than science, is not going to help until we actually see "philosophy" in action.
5. You mentioned the Bouwsma book. Just got it and about 7 other books for Christmas! Great stuff in there about seeing Wittgenstein as a prophet-like figure. (I'm going to write about that soon, too). Bouwsma seems like a really great person.
Regards and thanks
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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- 5.1.
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Tue Dec 29, 2009 9:47 pm (PST)
... thanks for those, J!
SW
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