SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>SWM wrote:

>>>I will try this again: THE PROPOSAL IS ONLY ABOUT HOW CONSCIOUSNESS
>>>MIGHT WORK IN A WAY THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH A PHYSICALIST ACCOUNT.

>>I will also try this again: there is more than one physicalist
>>account.

>>they all make the same predictions for currently performable physics
>>experiments; but, they make different claims about wave-function
>>collapse and consciousness. consequently, it is appropriate to ask
>>whether your account of consciousness is consistent with an
>>interpretation of QM that makes claims (about wave-function collapse
>>and consciousness) with which your theory of consciousness is
>>compatible.

>And my point has nothing to do with how many physicalist theories there
>are. It has to do with whether one can offer a comprehensive
>comprehensible account of consciousness as physically derived. It is
>not to make ANY kind of case FOR physicalism but only to make the case
>that one CAN account for consciousness in physicalist terms. There is a
>huge difference here between what you are arguing against above and
>what I am saying.

>>>I really don't know how to make this point any clearer. You are
>>>arguing the wrong issue with me insofar as you want to insist that
>>>this is about whether physicalism in some form is a true account or
>>>not.

>>as long as we let physicists define physicalism, it is clear that
>>physicalism in some form is true. the problem is that we don't know
>>which version is true.

>My point has nothing to do with which, if any, are true. It's only
>about a way of conceiving of consciousness. It's purely a conceptual
>question. (In Wittgensteinian terms, it's about how we use words like
>"consciousness", "mind", etc.)

you seem to think that it is meaningful and useful to claim that, if
there is a way to conceive of consciousness that is consistent with a
physicalist account (of consciousness? of the universe); then, there is
no need to postulate that anything non-physical is required to account
for your conception of consciousness.

the problem with your claim is that it is potentially vacuous. Chalmers
claims that zombies are conceivable (even though (as far as we know)
there aren't any in our universe) because it is conceivable that they
might exist in a parallel universe (which might have different laws of
physics).

consequently, your conception of consciousness might conceivably be
consistent with a physicalist account of this universe that is known to
be false as applied to our universe.

what matters is whether your conception of consciousness is consistent
with a physicalist account of this universe that is true or (since there
are several candidates) potentially true --- for this universe.

which brings us back to the claim I'm defending: your conception
(theory) of consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is
wrong. you think that consciousness is something that brains 'do'
whereas von Neumann postulates that consciousness (or at least some part
of it) is something other than the brain.

it is irrelevant that your conception of consciousness may conceivably
be consistent with some other interpretation of QM. if it is
inconsistent with the von Neumann Interpretation; then, your conception
can't possibly be true unless the von Neumann Interpretation is false.

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
<snip>

> >My point has nothing to do with which, if any, are true. It's only
> >about a way of conceiving of consciousness. It's purely a conceptual
> >question. (In Wittgensteinian terms, it's about how we use words like
> >"consciousness", "mind", etc.)
>
> you seem to think that it is meaningful and useful to claim that, if
> there is a way to conceive of consciousness that is consistent with a
> physicalist account (of consciousness? of the universe); then, there is
> no need to postulate that anything non-physical is required to account
> for your conception of consciousness.
>

I don't "seem to think" it. That's what I said.

> the problem with your claim is that it is potentially vacuous. Chalmers
> claims that zombies are conceivable (even though (as far as we know)
> there aren't any in our universe) because it is conceivable that they
> might exist in a parallel universe (which might have different laws of
> physics).
>

I think Dennett's point, that they are not conceivable, is right. We may think we are conceiving of zombies but what we actually end up conceiving of is something more like the Hollywood variety which don't operate the way a philosophical zombie would. After all, if Dennett's model is correct, and since it does account for all the features of consciousness it very well could be, then having ALL the physical parts and operations and behaviors in common with us makes such entities non-zombies because at the end of the day we don't rely on access to another's mental life to accept that the other has it.

> consequently, your conception of consciousness might conceivably be
> consistent with a physicalist account of this universe that is known to
> be false as applied to our universe.
>

Since the concept of philosophical zombies, a la Chalmers, is flawed, your conclusion doesn't follow.

> what matters is whether your conception of consciousness is consistent
> with a physicalist account of this universe that is true or (since there
> are several candidates) potentially true --- for this universe.
>

That certainly matters on an empirical level. At the end of the day no model can be presumed to be correct in any really strong sense of "correct" without testing in the real world and results that give us reason to accept it as correct. But here we are ONLY dealing with the conceptual question of whether a Dennettian model is conceivable, might it be correct?

The Dennettian model is finally a blueprint for experimental research. It is not a metaphysical claim.

> which brings us back to the claim I'm defending: your conception
> (theory) of consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is
> wrong.

First, you haven't established what you mean by von Neumann's thesis. It's not enough to recite some physics jargon here, you have to say WHY that has an impact on the question of what consciousness is in terms that relate to what we mean by "consciousness" when we use it and similar terms. You have to say why being a subject in a physically derived way cannot meet the demands of von Neumann's conjecture.

Second, there are lots of theories around. My conception of consciousness also can't possibly be true unless Christianity and Judaism and Islam are wrong. It also can't possibly be true unless Berkely and Hegel and Schopenhauer et al are wrong. Just because we can't demonstrate every alternative theory that denies our own to be false doesn't mean that that failure precludes ours from being true.

Anyway, you need to give us a reason, as I noted in the above paragraph and in several nearby posts, for why the von Neumann thesis is relevant. All you have given us so far is a reiteration of the claim in terms reflecting highly specialized linguistic usages without demonstrating how those uses relate to how we actually use our terms when speaking of consciousness.

I'm willing, even interested, to consider this IF you can provide such an explication. Otherwise all your argument boils down to is deployment of some arcane and specialized verbiage in defense of a challenge to a claim made in perfectly ordinary language. Insofar as you cannot show how your verbiage relates to how we ordinarily speak, this is just obfuscation, that is, hiding behind jargon and relying on the opaqueness of your meaning to avoid a serious response.

> you think that consciousness is something that brains 'do'
> whereas von Neumann postulates that consciousness (or at least some part
> of it) is something other than the brain.
>

What he postulates is fine. What is the basis for claiming that one needs to postulate any such thing, though, in clear language?

Why should it matter that there is an uncertainty principle in effect when attempting to measure phenomena on a quantum level?

Why should it matter that the physical universe operates differently at that level than our experience tells us it should?

Why should we think it requires a different idea of consciousness just because our consciousness is unable to operate on a quantum level?

Otherwise this is an argument from arcana (akin to Edelman's argument from infinite complexity).

> it is irrelevant that your conception of consciousness may conceivably
> be consistent with some other interpretation of QM. if it is
> inconsistent with the von Neumann Interpretation; then, your conception
> can't possibly be true unless the von Neumann Interpretation is false.
>
> Joe

You keep saying that but, as I have noted, there are other contradictory theories which must also be false yet it doesn't follow that they can be demonstrated to be. Dualism, for instance, could be true. Does that mean we should assume it is, even if another theory seems to fit the bill better? Just because we cannot disprove dualism, should we therefore presume that some other theory which seems to do a better job in light of what we know must be jettisoned?

You seem to be laboring under the idea that I have to disprove every other possible theory for mine to be true but that's an absurd standard because the truth of a theory never hinges on our knowing that its alternatives are false.

What's needed now from your side is a clear explanation of why "collapsing the wave function" is relevant here. What does a consciousness that is physically derived at the non-quantum level lack that some other quantum level derived consciousness would have that enables "collapsing wave functions"? And what is "collapsing the wave function" anyway but a locution for describing a failure to get a precise measurement at a certain level of observation? And if THAT is all this is, why should it matter than we can or cannot "collapse wave functions" for how consciousness comes about anyway?

It strikes me that, so far at least, yours is a VERY undeveloped thesis. Can you develop it sufficiently to enable us to do more than just go back and forth like this, you repeating certain mantra-like statements about "collapsing" and me asking the same questions repeatedly?

Since I must ask these questions and wait for answers if we are to make any progress, your failure to give the answers in lieu of reiterating phrases about "collapsing the wave function" will quickly doom this discussion to what we so often see on lists like these, an endless cycle of repetitive remarks. If you don't or cannot explicate, I'll let it go but I want to stress here that I really am intrigued by your argument and would very much like to see where it goes (if it does go somewhere, of course).

SWM

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Joe, you've indicated several times here (and, I believe, on Analytic) that you think that the von Neumann presumption about collapsing the wave function leads, if true, to the conclusion that consciousness must be extra-physical because what is physical cannot "collapse the wave function" while the process of observing (a function of consciousness) "collapses the wave function" at the quantum level. As I have said, you have intrigued me by this assertion but I need to know more to see if I understand the point you are trying to make here. For some reason you haven't given answers yet to the questions I've put to you. I would appreciate it if you can do that here. Here is a rough recap of the questions I'd like to see answered so that we can move on in this discussion:

1) How is "collapsing the wave function" anything more than an artifact of operating at a quantum level in the physical universe? After all, just because there is an inability to fix a measurement on an observation at the quantum level, why should that mean that consciousness cannot be a function of physical operations at a level of atomic behavior above the quantum level (since conscious beings, whatever their provenance, have the ability to make observations at a quantum level using appropriate instrumentation)?

2) Given that consciousness (what we mean by the term) consists of a number of different features that we find in our mental lives (e.g., awareness, intentionality, understanding, reasoning, recognizing, observing, perceiving, remembering, etc.), which feature(s) of consciousness must be extra physical on this view and what would it mean to say it/they ARE extra physical? (Do you have in mind that they exist side by side all the physical stuff, or superimposed on the physical stuff, or underlying the physical stuff or in some separate realm from the physical stuff?)

3) Can you give us a more detailed and explicit explanation of Schrodinger's equation in ordinary language and explain why it is a factor in this von Neumann supposition that consciousness must be extra physical because of the way it and the universe operate together at a quantum level?

4) Can you explain just what the quantum level is and how it fits into the broader atomic picture of what we mean by the physics of the universe?

The first two questions are specific to your claim about why consciousness cannot be physically derived on your von Neumann view and the second two address important background information to better help us understand the expected answers to the first two questions. Thanks.

SWM

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As you can see, you've really piqued my curiosity here Joe. Since you seem to be otherwise engaged or reluctant to respond, I have taken the liberty of doing a quick Internet search and picked up a few entries on this issue:

http://www.gmilburn.ca/2009/06/15/the-mystics-and-realists-of-quantum-physics/

"The interesting conclusion arises when we consider the 'real' interpretation of these mathematical operators. While we may say that an scientific instrument has caused wave function collapse, we run into the problem that no physical system (and a scientific instrument is a physical system completely described by quantum mechanics) can cause wave function collapse. We can describe the entire ensemble perfectly as a Hilbert space. But we do not experience this Hilbert space ? we measure and experience only finite values.

"The conclusion von Neumann reached is that consciousness, whatever it is, appears to be the only thing in physics that can ultimately cause this collapse or observation. This does not mean that consciousness is 'required' for the universe to work, but that wave function collapse appears to be caused by consciousness and we observe only a tiny slice. We are therefore an 'abstract ego' acting as a measurement device on the infinite values of true reality."

[I want to note that nothing as per the above says that consciousness cannot be something that arises from what is physical as you seem to have presented it (correct me if I've got you wrong). It only says that consciousness, whatever it is, introduces the surprising mathematical phenomenon that von Neumann describes as "collapsing the wave function." On this view alone, nothing is implied about the derivation of consciousness, therefore we are not obligated to conclude that consciousness must be outside of the physical universe in the sense that it cannot be a function of some aspect(s) of physics! Or am I missing something? Below is a bit more that I found which seemed relevant and interesting. -- SWM]

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T2K-4FVH4K0-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=1148575092&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=f7196308b36c14d030b095a5fabc409f

"An analysis has been performed of the theories and postulates advanced by von Neumann, London and Bauer, and Wigner, concerning the role that consciousness might play in the collapse of the wave function, which has become known as the measurement problem. This reveals that an error may have been made by them in the area of biology and its interface with quantum mechanics when they called for the reduction of any superposition states in the brain through the mind or consciousness. Many years later Wigner changed his mind to reflect a simpler and more realistic objective position which appears to offer a way to resolve this issue. The argument is therefore made that the wave function of any superposed photon state or states is always objectively and stochastically changed within the complex architecture of the eye in a continuous linear process initially for most of the superposed photons, followed by a discontinuous nonlinear collapse process later for any remaining superposed photons, thereby guaranteeing that only final, measured information is presented to the brain, mind or consciousness. An experiment to be conducted in the near future may enable us to simultaneously resolve the measurement problem and also determine if the linear nature of quantum mechanics is violated by the perceptual process."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave_function_collapse

"In quantum mechanics, wave function collapse (also called collapse of the state vector or reduction of the wave packet) is the process by which a wave function, initially in a superposition of different eigenstates, appears to reduce to a single one of the states after interaction with an observer. In simplified terms, it is the condensation of physical possibilities into a single occurrence, as seen by an observer. It is one of two processes by which quantum systems evolve in time according to the laws of quantum mechanics as presented by John von Neumann.[1] The reality of wave function collapse has always been debated, i.e., whether it is a fundamental physical phenomenon in its own right or just an epiphenomenon of another process, such as quantum decoherence.[2] In recent decades the quantum decoherence view has gained popularity. Collapse may be understood as a change in conditional probabilities."

[If you can offer some answers to the questions I've posed on several nearby posts, Joe, perhaps we can get to something like the bottom of this assertion you have introduced into the present discussion. Thanks. -- SWM]

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