J wrote:

>JP wrote:

>>what von Neumann actually wrote was: "let us divide the world into
>>three parts: I, II, III. Let I be the system actually observed, II
>>the measuring instrument and III the actual observer." [Mathematical
>>Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. p. 421]

>>notice that (for III) von Neumann wrote "the actual observer"
>>whereas Atmanspacher (author of the cited SEP page) wrote "(the
>>brain of) a human observer".

>>this difference is crucial because the point of von Neumann's
>>analysis is that you can put the entire body and brain of the
>>experimenter in division II, and treat it as part of the measuring
>>instrument. that leaves the actual observer (the abstract 'I') alone
>>in division III.

>The difference is not crucial at all, because if you'd included the
>subsequent sentences, they would make amply clear that the SEP is
>accurate on the central point, viz. that we can divide things between I
>and II+III or between I+II and III.

von Neumann's point is that there is no arbitrary division between the
quantum world and the classical world as Bohr insisted. in the
Copenhagen Interpretation it is simply assumed that there is a
quantum/classical dichotomy between I and II+III.

>How we describe division III is a minor point by comparison.
>Furthermore, von Neumann's description grants that we can treat III as
>the "abstract 'ego'" as he puts it, or we can treat III as "from the
>retina on in".

what von Neumann is showing is that, for purposes of predicting the
results of physics experiments, it makes no difference whether we treat
III as the abstract 'I' or everything from the retina on in. that is
precisely what refutes the idea that there is a specific, privileged
place in the physical universe (whether at the measuring instrument or
at the retina or elsewhere) that is the border between that portion of
the universe that must be described as a quantum system and that portion
of the universe that may be described as a classical system.

the von Neumann Interpretation is an all-quantum universe. in the words
of Nick Herbert:

von Neumann's world is entirely quantum --- there's not a bit of
classical physics in it. ... it works ... if you make one assumption ...
a collapse [of the wave function] occurs as a physical process in every
quantum measurement. [Herbert, Nick. 1985. Quantum Reality. 145-7]

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:

>>> you can get some idea of the importance of this point by checking
out
>>> Conway, John H; Kochen, Simon. The Strong Free Will Theorem. online
>>> at http://www.ams.org/notices/200902/rtx090200226p.pdf
<http://www.ams.org/notices/200902/rtx090200226p.pdf>

>> LOL. I get from that paper that the idea has no importance at all.
>> Conway and Kochen are discussing determinism, not free will

> Conway and Kochen are speak of free will and free choice.

> "Another customarily tacit assumption is that experimenters are free
to
> choose between possible experiments."

> "It is the experimenters' free will that allows the free and
independent
> choices of x, y, z, and w." [x, y, z and w represent choice as to what
> to measure].

LOL.

You don't know how to read a mathematics paper.

One reads a mathematics paper for its mathematics, and only for its
mathematics. Conway and Kochen state some axioms, and then derive a
theorem from those axioms. That's the mathematics here. All of the
other stuff (physics, comments on free will, etc) are just background
discussion to provide context for why the authors think that their
result is of value. John Conway is a bit of a showman, so it is no
surprise that he uses particularly colorful allusions in his background
commentary.

You don't have to take my word for this. Go ask some research
mathematicians for their take on the paper.

> the claim is not that von Neumann was studying consciousness when he
> wrote the Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. the claim
> is that, in the course of formalising the math that predicted the
> results of experiments in QM, he attributed collapse of the wave
> function to the abstract 'I' of the experimenter.

John von Neumann was also a mathematician. One holds him responsible
for his mathematics, but not for his casual allusions to human
consciousness.

----------

Personally, I think Stapp and other quantum consciousness folk are on a
wild goose chase. If you want to go along for the ride, that's fine
with me. Maybe it will even turn out that the quantum consciousness
people will come up with the explanation they are seeking, though I
remain skeptical. I think its good that people are looking at
consciousness from many different perspectives.

Where you make your mistake, is in thinking that you can refute non-QM
ways of investigating consciousness. You cannot. Or, at least you
cannot do so with present knowledge.

Regards,
Neil

--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:<snip>

> >can you explain how the alleged fact that "collapsing the wave
> >function" requires consciousness ... MEANS that consciousness (or
> >whatever we mean by "consciousness", that is, whatever constitutes the
> >referent we mean by it) cannot be physically derived?
>
> >It looks to me, so far, that there is a jump in your (or von Neumann's)
> >reasoning here. Why should the fact that experiencing, in the form of a
> >measuring observer, alters the facts of measurements clocked at the
> >quantum level IMPLY that the observer cannot be a physically derived
> >phenomenon?

> I doubt that a physicist would express himself as you have.

Why should that matter? The point is to ask why your claim that the von Neumann hypothesis requires that we posit something non-physical as the source of consciousness be true?

The question now is: Does it require that?

If a physicist following von Neumann's approach would not express him or herself in a way that translates into THAT claim, then what's the point of our discussing this?

You made the claim that the implications of von Neumann's supposition about the need for something non-physical to "collapse the wave function" meaning that consciousness could not be understood as something physical. Now assuming that you are not just collapsing the meanings of physical objects and physically caused phenomena, then it looks like there is something substantive to consider. But if you doubt that any physicist would say anything that implies your claim, then aren't we just on a merry-go-round?

> I suspect
> that he would probably say something like the fact of measuring alters
> the state of the quantum object being measured. in between measurements,
> the quantum object exists in a condition described by the wave function
> superposition of all possible values it might have. when measured, the
> quantum object exists in a particle like condition where the property
> being measured has a single definite value.
>

And this looks to me to be a claim that the underlying constituents of the universe operate at a level that we don't operate on and so different rules apply. But this doesn't seem to have any implications for why consciousness cannot be understood as derived from physical phenomena, whatever the underlying constituents of everything are or how they behave at a level sufficiently deep as to alter the rules we normally think apply.

Remember, YOU made a claim here that the need for consciousness to "collapse the wave function" demonstrates that consciousness cannot be physically derived. I still see NOTHING in the back-up that implies such a conclusion.

I'll keep reading though.

> this makes the act of measuring causally effective.
>
> that's quite different from Dennett's metaphor of the experiencing I as
> a press agent who plays no part in decision making but merely reports
> the result.
>

This isn't about metaphors though. Dennett uses lots of metaphors in making his point but he doesn't mean them literally. He's a kind of cutesie writer, for good or ill. Dennett's model is basically this:

The brain operates in a way that is analogous to a supercomputer capable of running a vast array of program-like operations in a massively parallel way. Consciousness IS the running of many of these "programs" (he actually calls them "virtual machines") on the real machine (the hardware) of the brain qua supercomputer at any given time, i.e., when enough are running in the right way, we get the phenomenon we call consciousness.

His model and Dehaene's proposal are very close. Dehaene supposes that the brain is made up of many different components performing many different functions independently but that these components are capable of operating in a coordinated way and that what we call consciousness (awareness of what is going on) occurs when a certain threshold of coordination (interaction between certain components) is crossed. Before that level of interaction is achieved, consciousness does not appear, though many things are still going on and the brain may even retain a "record" of many of these events at their source or in some other location, even if they haven't yet risen to the consciousness threshold, for future access.

The AI theorists and Dehaene both have affinities with Dennett's theoretical model, with the AIers seeking to build complex algorithms that run on sufficiently powerful computers to perform all the functions that the brain, as Dehaene sees it, performs.

Note that Hawkins, in challenging the AIers with respect to the question of intelligence (one feature of consciousness), asserts that the AI approach of building complex algorithms is mistaken because the brain is much slower in its mechanics than a computer and could never run so many complex algorithms in the short amount of time it takes for our brains to do the things they do. Thus, he reasons, the cortex (the part of the brain he is mainly concerned with) actually operates on a relatively simple algorithm which achieves the feature he is interested in (intelligence) in an analogical way (retained and recapitulated patterning by masses of relatively simple neurons operating in different, but linked, architectural arrays).

These approaches all have in common the supposition that the brain is a type of machine, albeit an organic one, and that it is such "machine" operations that are responsible for what we recognize as consciousness (including its many features). Against this view, you are proposing that von Neumann's thesis that something non-physical is required to "collapse the wave function" dictates that consciousness must be non-physical.

Assuming we can get past the question of whether we are each talking about the same thing by our respective uses of the term "physical" (I don't mean "a physical object" but anything that is a feature of the physical universe and I presume you mean the same), then you are making the claim that the universe contains at least one other thing besides everything that is physical in nature and that other thing, whatever it is, is the source of consciousness.

This is what the argument over dualism has been about here. Your suggestion that the von Neumann thesis supports such a view was, I agreed, a reasonable challenge to the kind of model Dennett proposes and I have supported.

As a result I asked you to explicate the von Neumann thesis so we could see more clearly how his claim does what you say it does, i.e., how it implies that consciousness cannot be physical in any way. We still need to see that from you, on my view.

> >>if von Neumann is correct, something non-physical (the abstract 'I')
> >>is at least partially responsible for intentionality;
>
> >Well the "abstract I" can be non-physical in the sense of it's not
> >being any kind of physical object while still being physical in the
> >sense of it being the outcome of physical properties. (The spinning of
> >a wheel isn't a physical object, after all, but it is hardly
> >non-physical!)
>
> is the spinning of the wheel itself causally effective? I don't think
> so.

Why not? It can be in certain contexts. Think of a set of gears with an end result that moves a lever or shuts a door.

Are we going to need to dispute about the various meanings of "causal" too now?

> the causal efficacy of the wheel is derived from the wheel as a
> physical object with certain properties.
>

Are you after some "first cause" then? Does it make sense to think in such terms?

> similarly, if the brain (and the entire physical universe) is placed in
> von Neumann's divisions I + II; and, if there is still something left
> over (the abstract 'I') in division III which is causally effective;
> then, it clearly suggests that the abstract 'I' is a non-physical
> (metaphenomenal) object that is causally effective at collapsing the
> wave function during quantum measurements.
>
> Joe

I take it that this is the argument you want to stand on then?

There is:

(I) The observed phenomenon

(II) The physical device that captures the data that is being observed

(III) The observer that apprehends the data about the phenomenon that is captured by the physical device

The argument is that, since the observer(III) effects a result in the observed phenomenon(I) in the course of observing it, the observer causes something outside itself. Since the observer is always separate and distinct from the physical phenomena that are the observed phenomenon(I) and the data-capturing device(II), it must be seen as causing but not, itself, being subject to being caused.

Is THIS the crux of your claim?

Before commenting on it I want to be sure this IS what you are claiming and that I am not somehow guilty of misreading you. Please feel free to explicate or correct my statements before we proceed to consider the argument in depth. Let's get this first part right so we can avoid later arguments and recriminations about who is misrepresenting whom. I want you to restate or repair my presentation of your argument to your own satisfaction here.

Thanks.

SWM

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JP

Saying that the mathematics work wherever we choose to draw the boundary is=
not equivalent to saying that consciousness is necessary for collapsing th=
e wave function. It may suggest that for some readers and obviously some h=
ave developed the argument in that direction. But if he did believe such a=
thing himself, von Neumann was far more circumspect in admitting such a be=
lief, so it is disingenuous to credit (or blame) him for such a view.

And Nick Herbert is a popularizer, albeit a rather good one. But in saying=
that "von Neumann's world is entirely quantum", he grossly oversimplifies.=
That where we choose to draw the boundary is arbitrary relative to the ex=
isting maths is not to deny that there is a boundary nor yet is it to draw =
the boundary at the consciousness of the observer. Rather, it is to show t=
hat the (current) maths leave such matters undecided.

The parenthentical insertions of "current" allude to developments subsequen=
t to von Neumann's text, such as the study of quantum decoherence, which ma=
y yet indicate a non-arbitrary way of drawing such a boundary. Or rather, =
if I understand correctly, how seemingly classical behavior can occur with =
no such boundary.

At the risk of being further entangled in these discussions than I'd ever w=
ished, I'll say this: as it stands, various interpretations of quantum mech=
anics are underdetermined by the theory. They are philosophical positions,=
not scientific theories. If one favors an Instrumentalist view or perhaps=
the Ensemble interpretation, then this is all much ado about nothing. Muc=
h ado about our temptation to go beyond the maths and the observations in w=
hat we say.

I wouldn't advocate that we never attempt to do that, but until such activ=
ities lead to new observations or new mathematics, the dispute is merely co=
mpeting ways of speaking.

JPDeMouy

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SWM,

As you may have noted, elsewhere I've presented reasons for not ascribing certain views to von Neumann as JPolanik has done. Be that as it may, I thought I might chime in with my take on the sort of claim being made. JP can clarify matters if he believes that I am not accurately reflecting the position he is putting forth. What follows will be grossly oversimplified and this partly reflects the limits of my own understanding and partly an effort to make things as clear as possible.

The equations of quantum mechanics describe an indeterminate world. Classical mechanics describes a determinate world. Measurement, or collapsing the wave function, is understood as bridging the divide.

Now, how does this happen?

Treating the measuring apparatus as classical is arbitrary. So is treating the observers retina or brain as classical: quantum mechanics applies to all physical systems and brains are physical systems. Yet when we observe phenomena, we observe determinate states. Therefore, something non-physical - something not covered by quantum mechanical laws - must be at work in the observation event.

That at any rate is the argument as I understand it.

JPDeMouy.

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "J" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
<snip>

>
> Treating the measuring apparatus as classical is arbitrary. So is treating the observers retina or brain as classical: quantum mechanics applies to all physical systems and brains are physical systems. Yet when we observe phenomena, we observe determinate states. Therefore, something non-physical - something not covered by quantum mechanical laws - must be at work in the observation event.
>
> That at any rate is the argument as I understand it.
>
> JPDeMouy.

An interesting addition, thanks. I don't pretend to understand quantum theory in any depth but am always interested in such claims and hope to see them presented and explicated with as much clarity as possible. Of course that may be a lot to hope for given that the arena of existence being described is so different from the world in which we operate as observers.

I asked Joe to give us as clear a statement of the argument as he sees it as possible so that we can see how it relates to the claim he made. Your proposal looks like an interesting start though I have no idea if Joe will agree to it.

Although I find this issue of interest, given my interest in ideas about mind (and all that entails), I have too much experience on lists like these with being accused of putting words in others' mouths, etc., as recent posts have demonstrated.

I certainly don't want to do that though I do think that if we are to make progress we need to come to some common understandings of terms and claims and that, to do that, we need to be able to restate what others say in words of our own. Just parroting another's formulations is not really an indication of understanding and so I generally try to find ways to say things that others are saying in words that I think I understand. But I certainly don't aim to create those infamous "strawmen" some like to claim they see.

Yet so much of what we have to talk about in discussions like these is hard to pin down, so much hard to work through to the point where the different interlocutors involved will think they are on that much sought for common ground.

So one of the things I'm keen to avoid is a debate about what Joe is claiming using a set of statements he has not already agreed reflects his claims.

Your presentation looks like it should be a good place to start in getting closer to understanding whether Joe's argument is a good one against an idea of consciousness like Dennett's or not. But I'm afraid that, aside from appreciating your comments (because they are somewhat clear to me and do seem to add something to the discussion) I cannot move forward (safely as it were since I want to avoid future personal attacks about how I impute "bs" to others) until Joe weighs in with enough information to enable me (us) to have a high level of confidence as to what his actual position is.

Or until he decides to let it drop which he may do as well.

But I remain open to the idea that perhaps there is a serious challenge in the quantum theory/collapse-the-wave-function argument to the more mechanistic model of minds I think is probably right.

SWM

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "J" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> At the risk of being further entangled in these discussions than
> I'd ever wished, I'll say this: as it stands, various
> interpretations of quantum mechanics are underdetermined by the
> theory. They are philosophical positions, not scientific
> theories. If one favors an Instrumentalist view or perhaps
> the Ensemble interpretation, then this is all much ado about
> nothing. Much ado about our temptation to go beyond the maths
> and the observations in what we say.

I just want to again endorse your post.

To clarify here, when you mention an instrumentalist view here,
you mean an instrumentalist (or operationalis) view of QM. That
is certainly the way I believe QM must be viewed. And I would add
that it is also the way a computational theory of mind would be
viewed, in fact, the way computation itself must be viewed, and
that even this does follow from the Wittgenstein maxim that
meaning is use.

(rereading that, no, I am not saying that holding to "meaning is
use" necessarily implies an instrumentalist view, but I would suggest
it allows a compatible instrumentalist view ... which I happen to
hold)

> I wouldn't advocate that we never attempt to do that, but until
> such activities lead to new observations or new mathematics, the
> dispute is merely competing ways of speaking.

OTOH, I might quibble with this. Certainly JP is making an
ontological claim, and asserting that he thinks von Neumann did,
though you and I disagree with that last. And I am happy to make
substantial claims about what scientific and methodological
commitments a computational theory needs, implies, assumes. I
see Turing as having done so, although I see Wittgenstein attempted
to avoid doing so. And in that, I go with Turing.

Josh

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SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>SWM wrote:<snip>

>>>can you explain how the alleged fact that "collapsing the wave
>>>function" requires consciousness ... MEANS that consciousness (or
>>>whatever we mean by "consciousness", that is, whatever constitutes
>>>the referent we mean by it) cannot be physically derived?

>>>It looks to me, so far, that there is a jump in your (or von
>>>Neumann's) reasoning here. Why should the fact that experiencing, in
>>>the form of a measuring observer, alters the facts of measurements
>>>clocked at the quantum level IMPLY that the observer cannot be a
>>>physically derived phenomenon?

>>I doubt that a physicist would express himself as you have.

>Why should that matter?

because your statement is ambiguous at best. the argument is that the
experimenter's choice of which measurement to perform *initiates* a
sequence of events. experiencing the outcome (seeing a dial point one
way instead of another; seeing the numbers on a printout; etc.) is the
*last* event in the chain.

>The point is to ask why your claim that the von Neumann hypothesis
>requires that we posit something non-physical as the source of
>consciousness be true?

the relation between the abstract 'I' and consciousness depends on how
you define 'consciousness'. as a succession of experiences,
consciousness might not be any more causally effective than Dennett's
press agent.

my claim is that the von Neumann Interpretation of QM posits the
abstract 'I' as something non-physical that collapses the wave function.

>The question now is: Does it require that?

yes.

remember, when we put the quantum system into division I and the
remainder of the physical universe into division II, the world is
represented, thus: (I + II) | III

[the '|' represents the collapse of the wave function of whatever is to
the left of that symbol.]

>You made the claim that the implications of von Neumann's supposition
>about the need for something non-physical to "collapse the wave
>function" meaning that consciousness could not be understood as
>something physical. Now assuming that you are not just collapsing the
>meanings of physical objects and physically caused phenomena, then it
>looks like there is something substantive to consider.

I'm not sure what you mean by "collapsing the meanings of physical
objects and physically caused phenomena". as I've indicated on more than
one occasion, I only recognize three reality types (numbered as followed
for use in subscripting pronouns):

1 - existential (physical) - anything made of mass/energy and spacetime.
2 - phenomenological - experience; any experiencable phenomenon
3 - ontological (metaphenomenal but not physical)

>Assuming we can get past the question of whether we are each talking
>about the same thing by our respective uses of the term "physical" (I
>don't mean "a physical object" but anything that is a feature of the
>physical universe and I presume you mean the same),

by 'physical object' I mean a reality of type 1.

I don't know what you mean by a feature of the physical universe that is
not a physical object; so, I can't say for sure; but, I suspect that at
least some of them are phenomenological realities (type 2).

>then you are making the claim that the universe contains at least one
>other thing besides everything that is physical in nature

my claim is that the von Neumann Interpretation postulates at least one
'thing' of reality type 3, the abstract 'I'.

>and that other thing, whatever it is, is the source of consciousness.

depends on your definition of 'consciousness'.

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:

<snip>

>
> >>>It looks to me, so far, that there is a jump in your (or von
> >>>Neumann's) reasoning here. Why should the fact that experiencing, in
> >>>the form of a measuring observer, alters the facts of measurements
> >>>clocked at the quantum level IMPLY that the observer cannot be a
> >>>physically derived phenomenon?
>
> >>I doubt that a physicist would express himself as you have.
>
> >Why should that matter?
>
> because your statement is ambiguous at best. the argument is that the
> experimenter's choice of which measurement to perform *initiates* a
> sequence of events. experiencing the outcome (seeing a dial point one
> way instead of another; seeing the numbers on a printout; etc.) is the
> *last* event in the chain.
>

Again, if the issue is why we need a non-physically derived consciousness to account for the collapsing-of-the-wave phenomenon, what IS the point of this? But let's see below as I offered a number of more focused comments later on to which, I hope, you are now responding.

> >The point is to ask why your claim that the von Neumann hypothesis
> >requires that we posit something non-physical as the source of
> >consciousness be true?
>
> the relation between the abstract 'I' and consciousness depends on how
> you define 'consciousness'. as a succession of experiences,
> consciousness might not be any more causally effective than Dennett's
> press agent.
>

Nowhere does Dennett assert that conscious agents cannot cause anything. If you think that follows from his thesis, you are misreading him. If that is how you are misreading him, then you are proposing something to contradict his theory which addresses something he is not asserting.

> my claim is that the von Neumann Interpretation of QM posits the
> abstract 'I' as something non-physical that collapses the wave function.
>

Yes, you have said this already. So WHAT is the "abstract I" and how does it differ from other "I's"? And what is non-physical about it (in the sense of physical being the result of physical processes)?

Are you proposing that the "abstract I" is some kind of spiritual co-existent with the brains and bodies where it is manifest? What, exactly, is your thesis re: this?

> >The question now is: Does it require that?
>
> yes.
>
> remember, when we put the quantum system into division I and the
> remainder of the physical universe into division II, the world is
> represented, thus: (I + II) | III
>
> [the '|' represents the collapse of the wave function of whatever is to
> the left of that symbol.]
>

Yes, I previously addressed that below so I will assume you pick up on that further on.

> >You made the claim that the implications of von Neumann's supposition
> >about the need for something non-physical to "collapse the wave
> >function" means that consciousness could not be understood as
> >something physical. Now assuming that you are not just collapsing the
> >meanings of physical objects and physically caused phenomena, then it
> >looks like there is something substantive to consider.
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by "collapsing the meanings of physical
> objects and physically caused phenomena". as I've indicated on more than
> one occasion, I only recognize three reality types (numbered as followed
> for use in subscripting pronouns):
>

> 1 - existential (physical) - anything made of mass/energy and spacetime.
> 2 - phenomenological - experience; any experiencable phenomenon
> 3 - ontological (metaphenomenal but not physical)
>

Okay, by "1" I take it that you recognize that anything that is part of this physical universe, derived from any of its constituents, etc., is physical and that you DO NOT mean by "physical" only those "objects with physical properties", i.e., what are commonly called "physical objects".

My reading of the texts you posted earlier, however, made II (I am assuming it corresponds to your "2" above) the instrumentation of data capture which is certainly physical in the same sense that "anything made of mass/energy and spacetime" is physical.

Are you diverging from THAT view by asserting here that "2" consists of the phenomenological, i.e., of experience only? Moreover, isn't there a distinction that should be made between "experience" (as in the contents thereof) and an "experienceable phenomenon" (which to me looks like anything that has the kinds of features that are accessible to us via our sensory equipment and our mental capacities to process the information)? Yet you seem to elide the two together.

I am beginning to think that our terminologies and our understandings are much farther apart than I had initially thought. If so, it will be very, very hard to find common ground to continue. The first job for us, now, must be to clarify our respective linguistic usages about these things (which may be rather hard when we try to talk about something like experience which, as Wittgenstein noted, is not, at least on the subjective or private level, very amenable to referencing in language).

> >Assuming we can get past the question of whether we are each talking
> >about the same thing by our respective uses of the term "physical" (I
> >don't mean "a physical object" but anything that is a feature of the
> >physical universe and I presume you mean the same),
>
> by 'physical object' I mean a reality of type 1.
>

Okay

> I don't know what you mean by a feature of the physical universe that is
> not a physical object;

Hmmm, here I see some fuzziness creeping in. Perhaps it is just an artifact of our different uses though.

By "physical object" I mean any object of reference that has tangible physical features in some finite sense, e.g., a rubber ball, a rock, a tree, a particular mammal, a planet, a star, etc. I do not mean certain aspects of the physical universe which are part of that universe but not identifiable as particular objects in space/time, such as hurricanes, electromagnetism, gravity, light waves, microwave radiation, the motion and trajectories of billiard balls, etc., as well as the various properties we associate with physical objects (as described above) such as colors, textures, extension, mass, density, etc. All of these latter are perfectly physical, too, and can even be thought of as "objects" when we are referring to them, that is they can be singled out as objects of our reference. But they are not particular objects in space/time (even though such objects ARE objects of our reference too).

Thus, when I speak of being physical I don't only mean what I've called physical objects above. Until told otherwise by you, I will assume we share the same understanding of the usages in question here.

> so, I can't say for sure; but, I suspect that at
> least some of them are phenomenological realities (type 2).
>

"Type 2"? Is that like the class of things that fall under the rubric "II" in the von Neumann thesis you are presenting? My reading of that thesis suggests that things in category "II" include the physical instruments that capture data about things in the first category but I see nothing involving "phenomenological realities" there (unless we have some further definitional issues to iron out).


> >then you are making the claim that the universe contains at least one
> >other thing besides everything that is physical in nature
>
> my claim is that the von Neumann Interpretation postulates at least one
> 'thing' of reality type 3, the abstract 'I'.
>

And I have been asking you what is this "abstract I" beyond the term that is being used to represent it! After all, one could stipulate that "XYZ" represents whatever this is, but we would be no closer to understanding what is being represented because to make a successful stipulation we already have to know what it is we are stipulating to.

My point is that, if you are saying that consciousness must have something about it which is not grounded in the physical universe then just calling that the "abstract I" doesn't help much because we cannot see what you mean (or, at least, I cannot). This IS very much like Cayuse' complaint against you that there is no application for your use of "I" or my earlier criticism of Cayuse that he was arguing against something that boiled down to a referentless referent.

Just giving us the same formulation again and again doesn't address the concern I'm raising. We KNOW you CALL this (presumably with some others) an "abstract I". BUT WHAT IS IT YOU MEAN BY THIS LOCUTION?

> >and that other thing, whatever it is, is the source of consciousness.
>
> depends on your definition of 'consciousness'.
>
> Joe
>

My definition has already been delivered. It is that array of features we recognize in ourselves, as part of our mental lives and abilities, including, but not limited to, awareness, remembering, intentionality, understanding, thinking about, perceiving, having mental images, ideas, etc. (The "not limited to" qualification is paramount because on my view consciousness is not some particular thing -- though we can reference it and so objectify it -- but a range of sometimes related and sometimes quite distinct features that occur in tandem in the context of our having experience, being a subject.)

Now what is YOUR definition of "consciousness"?

By the way Joe, there was a whole lot more to my last post and it was more focused and substantive the further down you went. Yet it is is precisely the latter section you have cut off in favor of a more truncated response. Worse, the responses you give above leave the important stuff still unaddressed.

I will just repeat what I have been seeking: I am asking what your argument is for your claim that IF consciousness can be shown to have an effect at the quantum level, then it must not be physically based?

I'm sorry but nothing you've said so far gets at that and just repeating terms mantra-like (e.g., "the abstract I") doesn't help.

WE KNOW YOU CLAIM THAT THERE MUST BE AN "ABSTRACT I" BUT YOU HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO SAY WHAT IT IS OR WHY ITS EXISTENCE, IF IT EXISTS, ENTAILS A CONCLUSION THAT CONSCIOUSNESS CANNOT BE PHYSICALLY BASED.

Look, I really am interested in this claim and you have undertaken to make it, so let's see this through. IF THERE IS A REASON TO THINK THAT THE DENNETTIAN MODEL CANNOT WORK BECAUSE OF VON NEUMANN'S IDEAS ABOUT THE QUANTUM ASPECTS OF THE UNIVERSE, then let's see what it is (or what they are). Let's try to seriously consider this on the merits, okay?

SWM

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Stuart is a flamer.

Stuart below doesn't address anything I wrote recently concerning Dennett and Searle. Notice that his first response doesn't even pretend to address the claim I made, which is true by the way. He knows it. And flames.

So I'll be happy to let Stuart know that strong AI is the claim that the appropriately programmed computer literally has a mind.

Stuart is the one who isn't up to speed on the original target article.

He mindlessly repeats the systems reply which is not even strong AI any longer.

Ergo, it is often the case that while apparently disagreeing with Searle he holds the same position.

Unless he is a dualist which, btw, is endemic to strong AI because strong AI isn't intrinsicaslly about the hardware at all.

Now for Stuart's waffling:

He will either hold strong AI or not.

The systems reply is not made from withing the strong AI position.

If the subject is changed, Searle's CRA no longer applies.

Stuart in the past wanted it both ways, i.e., that Searle's argument against strong AI had dualistic tendencies and that the systems reply is effective against the CRA whent such a reply is a change of subject.

I don't suppose many of the eight or nine here are as quick to understand what I just wrote above.

But it is well-rehearsed, coherent, and right on the money.

Stuart can lie about what I understand if he likes, but to be honest, a mistake I made concerning strong AI was the result of his twisting and turning vis a vis strong AI (he kept on thinking the systems reply is motivated by strong AI when in fact it is in contradiction to it.

So there's a thesis some may want to dispute. Here it is:

The systems reply to the CRA is inconsistent with strong AI; and Searle admits that if one changes the subject (like the Churchlands do in the form of saying that further technology may vindicate strong AI--which is a conflation of the formality of programs with brute physics), then the CRA is powerless to refute such and Searle isn't interested in refuting the thesis he already holds, namely, that AI is possible.

If one likes, one can go to the Analytic list and witness Peter being gracious enough to allow for some very long threads where Stuart is given ample opportunity to make his case. He waffled between strong AI and the further technology (of hardware or software?) approach of the Churchlands which is a change of subject matter.

Anyway, I think Stuart a real drip for not responding directly to the very first thing I wrote--instead he hopes he's convincing when saying I might not be up to speed.

Did he correct the title to one of the references given in a very recent post? No.

Cheers,
Budd

--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
> >
> > --- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
> > >
> > > --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "Cayuse" <z.z7@> wrote:
> > > >> My only quarrel with Stuart is that I don't like people making
> > > > bs statements and then attributing them to me.
> > > >
> > > > ==========================================
> > >
>
> > > Lots of people don't like seeing the implications of what they write made explicit and it seems you are no exception, Cayuse.
> >
> >
> > You too! I made explicit your lack of understanding English given your reinterpretation of Searle's premise that syntax is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics. You couldn't read "sufficient for" as "sufficient to cause."
> >
>
>
> I'm sorry Budd but on my view you have no real grasp of the CRA (or the points I made about it which your comment above once again amply demonstrates). Perhaps if you demonstrate a better understanding of this stuff down the road I'll address these things with you again but there's really no point in going back and forth over the same stuff yet another time with yet another audience to bore or agitate. Either you don't understand Searle or I don't, and you are already on record misreading a whole slew of things about Searle's argument (which has been adequately demonstrated in the past on Analytic). Perhaps the most egregious of your confusions was your complete misreading of Searle's terms "strong AI" and "weak AI" which are what his whole argument is about.
>
> After that particular faux pas (along with others, of course), I'm surprised you still think you can speak authoritatively on any of this.
>
>
> > Then you made it sound as if Searle needs to have semantics cause semantics if syntax couldn't.
> >
>
> ???
>
> > I couldn't help but think you got Searle wrong on purpose just to see how irritated you could make another. Or I thought you just couldn't read English.
> >
>
>
> Or you can't think very clearly.
>
>
> > Note that Searle wasn't too happy with Hofstadter completely fabricating a quote to argue with....
> >
>
> Are you trying to channel Searle or make an argument?
>
>
> > You happily went on with that sort of line when saying that Searle's view (of computers) is too simplistic. Then Peter pinned you down
>
>
> Peter was wrong. That you can't see it and he wouldn't admit it is beside the point.
>
>
> > to talking about either more hardware or more computation and then you waffled
>
> Echoing Peter's baseless charge of "waffling" means nothing coming from you since you can't understand Peter's points anymore than you get Searle's . . . or mine. But you are rather good at picking up and repeating terms ad infinitum.
>
>
> >to the point of doing something Searle notes his CRA has no answer for, namely, some other thesis besides strong AI. It was a change in topic and that's why we at Analytic made clear that you might be simply embracing Searle's position some of the time when thinking you're at odds with it.
> >
>
> The strong thinkers at Analytic may not have agreed with me or liked my style of posting very much, but you certainly should not place yourself in their number or presume to speak for others beside yourself. Try giving some arguments for what you say once in a while rather than just confining yourself to narratives referencing what you believe others have said.
>
>
> > We tried and tried....
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Budd
> >
> >
>
> One of the things I liked about leaving Analytic and joining Sean's list, Budd, was that it freed me from the torture of having to read your posts which are invariably full of ad hominems, baseless charges and obscurantist misreadings and confusions, and rarely, if ever, contain substantive or closely reasoned points. This post is par for that course.
>
> (Sorry Sean but if Budd is here and going to post the same old junk again for a new audience, I don't see how I can simply ignore him.)
>
> SWM
>
> =========================================
> Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
>

=========================================
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... Hi all.

Could I have some input from the "mind debaters" about whether this community wants standards for their discussion? I'm concerned that the poor habits that dominate the Analytic list are going to come over here (on AMR), and that they will have the same effect: namely, to drive away all but the 5 people who like bloodthirst as much as they do the preaching.

Currently, the way Wittrs is configured, AMR has virtually no standards. The only thing I check it for is people who might have some axe to grind regarding Wittgenstein (Popperians, perhaps). I don't check it for anything else. What are your thoughts? 

My preference is to avoid intentionally moronic and sophomoric discussion here. Innocently moronic and misconceived I can handle. But I do not want the dogs of analytic coming over here to get in some barking contest. I would want this community to discuss and avoid talking to people with whom discussing isn't mutually beneficial. 

So, tell me, what are the wishes of the people in this "mind debate?" Should "fouls" be resurrected? Should nothing at all be done? Discuss publicly please.

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

----- Original Message ----
From: gabuddabout <gabuddabout@yahoo.com>
To: wittrsamr@freelists.org
Sent: Wed, December 30, 2009 7:43:20 PM
Subject: [Wittrs] Re: Response for Budd

Stuart is a flamer.

Stuart below doesn't address anything I wrote recently concerning Dennett and Searle.  Notice that his first response doesn't even pretend to address the claim I made, which is true by the way.  He knows it.  And flames.

So I'll be happy to let Stuart know that strong AI is the claim that the appropriately programmed computer literally has a mind.

Stuart is the one who isn't up to speed on the original target article.

He mindlessly repeats the systems reply which is not even strong AI any longer.

Ergo, it is often the case that while apparently disagreeing with Searle he holds the same position.

Unless he is a dualist which, btw, is endemic to strong AI because strong AI isn't intrinsicaslly about the hardware at all.

Now for Stuart's waffling:

He will either hold strong AI or not.

The systems reply is not made from withing the strong AI position.

If the subject is changed, Searle's CRA no longer applies.

Stuart in the past wanted it both ways, i.e., that Searle's argument against strong AI had dualistic tendencies and that the systems reply is effective against the CRA whent such a reply is a change of subject.

I don't suppose many of the eight or nine here are as quick to understand what I just wrote above.

But it is well-rehearsed, coherent, and right on the money.

Stuart can lie about what I understand if he likes, but to be honest, a mistake I made concerning strong AI was the result of his twisting and turning vis a vis strong AI (he kept on thinking the systems reply is motivated by strong AI when in fact it is in contradiction to it.

So there's a thesis some may want to dispute.  Here it is:

The systems reply to the CRA is inconsistent with strong AI; and Searle admits that if one changes the subject (like the Churchlands do in the form of saying that further technology may vindicate strong AI--which is a conflation of the formality of programs with brute physics), then the CRA is powerless to refute such and Searle isn't interested in refuting the thesis he already holds, namely, that AI is possible.

If one likes, one can go to the Analytic list and witness Peter being gracious enough to allow for some very long threads where Stuart is given ample opportunity to make his case.  He waffled between strong AI and the further technology (of hardware or software?) approach of the Churchlands which is a change of subject matter.

Anyway, I think Stuart a real drip for not responding directly to the very first thing I wrote--instead he hopes he's convincing when saying I might not be up to speed.

Did he correct the title to one of the references given in a very recent post?  No.

Cheers,
Budd

--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
> >
> > --- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
> > >
> > > --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "Cayuse" <z.z7@> wrote:
> > > >> My only quarrel with Stuart is that I don't like people making
> > > > bs statements and then attributing them to me.
> > > >
> > > > ==========================================
> > >
>
> > > Lots of people don't like seeing the implications of what they write made explicit and it seems you are no exception, Cayuse.
> >
> >
> > You too!  I made explicit your lack of understanding English given your reinterpretation of Searle's premise that syntax is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics.  You couldn't read "sufficient for" as "sufficient to cause."
> >
>
>
> I'm sorry Budd but on my view you have no real grasp of the CRA (or the points I made about it which your comment above once again amply demonstrates). Perhaps if you demonstrate a better understanding of this stuff down the road I'll address these things with you again but there's really no point in going back and forth over the same stuff yet another time with yet another audience to bore or agitate. Either you don't understand Searle or I don't, and you are already on record misreading a whole slew of things about Searle's argument (which has been adequately demonstrated in the past on Analytic). Perhaps the most egregious of your confusions was your complete misreading of Searle's terms "strong AI" and "weak AI" which are what his whole argument is about.
>
> After that particular faux pas (along with others, of course), I'm surprised you still think you can speak authoritatively on any of this.
>
>
> > Then you made it sound as if Searle needs to have semantics cause semantics if syntax couldn't.
> >
>
> ???
>
> > I couldn't help but think you got Searle wrong on purpose just to see how irritated you could make another.  Or I thought you just couldn't read English.
> >
>
>
> Or you can't think very clearly.
>
>
> > Note that Searle wasn't too happy with Hofstadter completely fabricating a quote to argue with....
> >
>
> Are you trying to channel Searle or make an argument?
>
>
> > You happily went on with that sort of line when saying that Searle's view (of computers) is too simplistic.  Then Peter pinned you down
>
>
> Peter was wrong. That you can't see it and he wouldn't admit it is beside the point.
>
>
> > to talking about either more hardware or more computation and then you waffled
>
> Echoing Peter's baseless charge of "waffling" means nothing coming from you since you can't understand Peter's points anymore than you get Searle's . . . or mine. But you are rather good at picking up and repeating terms ad infinitum.
>
>
> >to the point of doing something Searle notes his CRA has no answer for, namely, some other thesis besides strong AI.  It was a change in topic and that's why we at Analytic made clear that you might be simply embracing Searle's position some of the time when thinking you're at odds with it.
> >
>
> The strong thinkers at Analytic may not have agreed with me or liked my style of posting very much, but you certainly should not place yourself in their number or presume to speak for others beside yourself. Try giving some arguments for what you say once in a while rather than just confining yourself to narratives referencing what you believe others have said.
>
>
> > We tried and tried....
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Budd
> >
> >
>
> One of the things I liked about leaving Analytic and joining Sean's list, Budd, was that it freed me from the torture of having to read your posts which are invariably full of ad hominems, baseless charges and obscurantist misreadings and confusions, and rarely, if ever, contain substantive or closely reasoned points. This post is par for that course.
>
> (Sorry Sean but if Budd is here and going to post the same old junk again for a new audience, I don't see how I can simply ignore him.)
>
> SWM
>
> =========================================
> Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
>

=========================================
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=========================================
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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
<snip>

>
> So, tell me, what are the wishes of the people in this "mind debate?" Should "fouls" be resurrected? Should nothing at all be done? Discuss publicly please.
>
> Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.

My intention, Sean, is to give such posters a wide berth though I'll admit that when people start needling with ad hominem remarks it has been known to get under my skin. But I think I've made my point with Budd. He is welcome to post here and express his opinions and should be, on my view. For the most part I expect to continue to ignore him, the two exceptions being 1) some egregiously personal and misleading remark(s) yet to be offered; or 2) a sea change in his modus operandi leading to some serious, substantive postings from him that deserve equally serious attention.

Either one is liable to flush me out here and prompt me to respond but for now there is nothing he has posted on this list that seems to warrant my responding.

As you know, I generally don't like censorship and believe we all ought to be able to deal with all levels of comments but you have shown me that: 1) even barking dogs can go too far and disrupt; and 2) there is a better way to operate on lists like these, including taking the high road as much as possible.

If you want to sanction me for my recent response to some of Budd's digs I will accept that as this IS your list. But, at least as things now stand, I have no reason to answer his last post and no plans to do so.

SWM

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:

> Dehaene, for instance, isn't interested in discovering how persons
make persons
> but how brains do what they do to produce what it is we call persons

Brains transmit an electro-chemical charge. Just how do these charges
make a person?

bruce

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:

>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > Dehaene, for instance, isn't interested in discovering how persons
> make persons
> > but how brains do what they do to produce what it is we call persons
>
> Brains transmit an electro-chemical charge. Just how do these charges
> make a person?
>
> bruce
>

Dennett develops a model. So does Dehaene. Nearby, in responding to Joe, I offered a description of these models in a little more depth. You can take a look at that post and see what I have in mind as well. No point in repeating things already said, eh? -- SWM

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:

> > 1. There is no "me" in the causal chain.
>
> Different use of "cause". See the wetness-of-water model.

OK. I touch water. I feel that it is wet. How do you go from molecules
to feeling?

> The causal relation I am referring to, and have been for all this
time,
> is the fact that persons don't respond if their brains don't act in
certain ways.

My brain doesn't act in a certain way. So I can't respond. OK. What is
causally related to what?

bruce

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:

>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > > 1. There is no "me" in the causal chain.
> >
> > Different use of "cause". See the wetness-of-water model.
>
> OK. I touch water. I feel that it is wet. How do you go from molecules
> to feeling?
>

A process of causal signaling gets transformed into the different representational iterations happening in our brains when the different sub-systems interact as per the Dehaene model. This becomes the sensations that you have awareness of when the threshold Dehaene alludes to is crossed. Again, this is not new. I've said it and alluded to others saying it all before.

I suppose one problem here is that, in the end, it comes down to seeing it, i.e., being able to see awareness in this way rather than in some other. The point I have been making is that one CAN account for all the features of consciousness, including having sensations, in this way once one gives up the notion, based on the intuition we have, that being conscious (having awareness) is qualitatively different at its most basic from anything that is strictly physical.

To give it up you have to shake the dualist picture that presumes a fundamental divide which can be done if one considers all the elements that go into the feature of awareness.

What does it mean to be aware of anything? Well look at awareness in ourselves. In being aware we are basically recognizing the presence of what we're aware of, even if we don't necessarily do it in a discursive way, even if we can't always talk about it, even if we can't necessarily conceptualize it or place it in complex frame of reference. My late cat had awareness though she lacked the ability, as far as I could tell, to think about things in the way we humans do.

So we have to ask what it means to recognize anything's presence? Well, we get signals via our sensory equipment from the world outside our bodies, of course, and from our bodies themselves. These signals are recognized by some level of an organism's neurological apparatus. What level?

The apparatus must be sufficiently complex to have several layers of operations going on and intereacting among themselves. What is needed? On the most basic level you need the stream of inputs already mentioned, of course.

Next you need layers of processing which do things with the inputs (sort them, tease them apart, combine them, store them, retrieve, relate them, etc.); then you need the "higher" level that deals with the first level (it builds and relates complex representations from the more basic inputs in an ongoing process).

Presumably there would be multiple layers of such operations, such processing, going on, and these layers will be running in tandem and interacting with (affecting) one another. At some point, to achieve more (to get a mind rather like we have) you will need some representational systems that capture (depict) different, related aspects of the world that generates all these inputs as signals that we pick up plus a representational system (presumably built out of the same raw material) to act as reader.

If Dehaene's thesis is correct, then that reader system is an outcome of the higher level integration that is what he calls the "global neuronal workspace". As more and more coordination kicks in the thinker arises as part of the operating system.

Anyway that's how you feel the wetness of water (and anything else you sense) on this view.

But until you can shake the idea that this is all too physical it will never seem quite right because it looks counter-intuitive. You have to see how physical systems could do this sort of thing and computers are the best model for that, even if it turns out that they can't fully mimic everything brains do or can't do it in the right way (as suggested by Hawkins).

> > The causal relation I am referring to, and have been for all this
> time,
> > is the fact that persons don't respond if their brains don't act in
> certain ways.
>
> My brain doesn't act in a certain way. So I can't respond. OK. What is
> causally related to what?
>
> bruce
>

You'll have to ask that question a lot more clearly before I'll hazard an answer, Bruce, given the rampant possibilities for ongoing miscommunication.

SWM

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

MY GODS! I am going to rip my hair out if I keep seeing this recurring exchange where Stuart references the wetness of water and its molecular structure, Bruce then starts talking about the sensations associated with water missing the point in a manner than seems willfully ignorant, then Stuart fails to clarify his point! Does Stuart HAVE a point? Is he unable to present it? Is he just parroting something and completely ignorant of what's behind it. Maybe he's done this enough times that Bruce isn't being disingenuous but really doesn't get it.

The microstructure of water molecules explain a variety of macroscopic characteristic of water, such as its expanding when it freezes, its crystals (snowflakes) having angles of 60 and 120 degrees, and its surface tension and ability to maintain contact with and impregnate surfaces ("wetting").

The point of this is to draw an analogy for the sort of explanation one is looking for in saying that brains explain consciousness (or whatever).

Whether its a good analogy is highly debatable. I don't think it is, but that's not my point here.

If it is to serve as an ANALOGY then of course one is not using "wetness" to describe a SENSATION we feel when we TOUCH water. It's utterly OBVIOUS that such a sensation CANNOT be explained by the structure of the water molecule ALONE. One also needs an account of the human nervous system.

In THAT case, it's no longer an ANALOGY at all. It shifts to being an EXAMPLE of part of the PROBLEM you all are disputing, viz. how to explain the character of any of our sensations on the basis of our nervous systems.

But unless you are clear about what you mean by "wetness", whether you mean to speak of the physical behavior of liquids or whether you mean to speak of the sensation one experiences when touched by such a liquid, then you're going to continue talking at cross purposes and NEVER GOING TO GET ANYWHERE!

This is just ONE example of the kind of conceptual confusions that lead me to think you may simply both of you be DAMNED to ETERNAL bickering and confusion.

JPDeMouy

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