[lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 18:52:18 +0100
There are so many operative systems of rules that are nothing at all like
contracts that it's hardly worth even pointing out. Suffice it to mention
the drafted military and the prison. A contract supposes a capacity to make
a voluntary decision to enter an arrangement and uphold it. Most people
don't make such a voluntary decision to enter a society, except perhaps in
the case of immigrants, and even that is often dubious. Moreover, even with
contracts that are entered voluntarily, one often finds that they are not
voluntarily upheld later on, and need to be enforced by the legal system.
Really if the best Grice could do is some version of the Roussian social
contract, he needn't have bothered.
O.K.
On Sat, Mar 21, 2015 at 2:33 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> As G. J. Warnock says in "Object of Morality:
>
> If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?
>
> Hart speaks of approximative equality and focuses on rules. A system of
> rules, when operative, is like a contract -- only different. Those who hold
> this position are labelled contractualists.
>
> i. Grice was a contractualist.
>
> ii. Grice was a quasi-contractualist.
>
> Vide, Kalin: "Grice's contractualism".
>
> The apparent contradiction of (i) and (ii) is easily resolved.
>
> (i) refers to Grice, the moral philosopher at UEA/Norwich, in "The grounds
> of moral judgement" (and criticised by Kalin).
>
> (ii) refers to the Oxonian moral philosopher. He is enough of a
> rationalist, he says, to want to go beyond a mere quasi-contractualist
> interpretation
> of the cooperative principle and its attendant maxims.
>
> In a message dated 3/19/2015 5:48:48 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx was discussing urinary frequency and
> egalitarianism.
>
> "It's not that difficult: as someone somewhere said "Equality is about
> treating the same the same and treating what is different differently". ...
> there is a logical distinction here and that it is also the legal
> distinction
> here."
>
> I wonder if the keyword is EGALITARIANISM. We know Hart went as far as
> talking of approximative equality, as a way 'artifice' trumps 'nature' (as
> someone rephrased it).
>
> And we know Grice made joke of Immanuel Kant by calling what Kant was up to
> a big manual, an IMMANUEL, that would have generality of three types:
>
> conceptual: you cannot formulate a law (qua coercive order) in TOO
> DIFFICULT conceptual terms that are elucidated only by your average
> Oxonian legal
> philosopher (as Hart wasn't).
>
> formal: laws applies to ALL to which laws apply. More formally: there will
> be no way of singling out a special subclass of addressees, and so laws
> enjoy formal generality, too.
>
> applicational: no law will prescribe a certain kind of conduct in
> ircumstances in which _any_ addressee would not be likely to be subject.
>
> (but then Grice is a moral philosopher and not necessarily a legal
> philosopher).
>
> Equality of opportunity requires that purchasers of goods and services, for
> example, should be responsive only to the price and quality of the goods
> offered to them for purchase (and not, for example, to the ethnicity or
> sex
> or sexual orientation of the maker or seller of the good). This
> last-mentioned requirement of equality of opportunity might not be
> included within
> formulations of the norm that are intended to be enacted as LAW and
> enforced
> by criminal or CIVIL LAW procedures. But to implement equality of
> opportunity, an orientation of the hearts and minds of members of society
> is needed,
> NOT MERELY LEGAL ENACTMENTS, and even Hart would agree with this. Equality
> of opportunity would be subverted if the laws effectively PROHIBITED
> economic firms from basing decision making on factors other than expected
> profitability but consumers would not purchase products that embodied the
> skilled
> labour of members of allegedly dispriviledged groups, so that their market
> opportunities are stunted. Moreover, THE LAW ALSO might indeed require
> firms to hire the best qualified applicant, meaning the one best able to
> perform the role being filled, even if hiring the best qualified in this
> sense
> would not be profit-maximizing, due to recalcitrant consumer prejudice.
>
> Marx has a saying on this (cfr. Grice on "Ontological Marxism: if they
> work, they exist"). But Marx -- that's Karl, Geary -- would resist the
> description of this norm as a principle of justice or moral rights. One
> consideration in his mind may be that moral rights ought to be enforced,
> but when it
> is feasible and desirable to implement higher-phase communist
> distribution,
> the implementation can be carried out successfully WITHOUT ANY LEGAL or
> informal COERCION, and hence should not occur through any process of
> social
> enforcement. Or so Marx thinks.
>
> People's compliance with LEGAL RULES and basic norms of Griceian
> cooperation supplies these crucial goods to all, and thus obligations of
> reciprocity
> are triggered in all recipients. At this point a so-called luck
> egalitarian consideration enters the argument.
>
> The egalitarian ethos with its demands on individual daily conduct is NOT
> supposed to be LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE. Rather it is supposed to be a social
> norm backed by informal sanctions and rational persuasion.
>
> So it is still mysterious how the involvement of the will of those coerced
> by THE LAWS and public policies of a functioning state might be thought to
> trigger the application of special egalitarian justice obligations that do
> not apply except among those caught in the particular web of coercion.
>
> But Hart _knew_ that.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Speranza
>
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>
>
>
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