> neither I nor Searle nor the CRT presume anything more than > the basic fact of philosophy of consciousness: there is subjective > experience in an objective universe. Right. Searle starts with the simple observation that people have subjective, qualitative experiences. When he asserts the ontological irreducibility of these mental phenomena, he means simply that people really do have such things as toothaches - that such things as toothaches really do exist in the world. And of course he's right; we know this before we start doing philosophy. Eliminativists like Dennett defy common sense. Dennett essentially denies the reality of toothaches, and of all qualia, and further denies intentionality as an intrinsic feature of human minds. As I've tried to explain to Stuart, eliminative materialism seems to me motivated by a fear of the Cartesian ghost. Because they accept the Cartesian categories, these philosophers believe they cannot acknowledge the obvious irreducible reality of mental states without admitting a ghost into the machine. So they go to great lengths to deny the obvious, then label those who don't do the same "Cartesians". -gts ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/