--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote: >> The music and video still play, whether or not there is a human >> around lending intentionality. > would they be playing if there had never been any human > intentionality to establish the programming conventions on which > those devices operate? That's a quite different issue. And, incidently, it is one of the reasons that I am skeptical of computationalism. > Searle's point is that neither the man in the CR nor the CR as a > system acquires the subjective experience of understanding just by > manipulating symbols according to rules. Searle's argument establishes the first (though that was never a real issue). It fails to establish the second. > are you claiming that if we stop focusing on the CPU we'll see that > the system as a whole has subjective experience? No, I don't claim that. I claim only that if we stop focussing on the CPU, we will see that nothing at all is proved about whether the system as a whole has subjective experience. > the so-called 'Systems Reply' does not even attempt a response to > Searle's point: there is no subjective experience of understanding > Chinese in the CR. The Systems Reply is responding only to Searle's claim that he has disproved that there could be intentionality. The AI folk do recognize that a positive claim of achieving intentionality will require experimental demonstration, and they acknowledge that they have not achieved that. Back to an earlier point: > would they be playing if there had never been any human > intentionality to establish the programming conventions on which > those devices operate? The AI people say very little about how one of their AI systems would go about establishing conventions. For that matter, I see very little mention of this in what I have read on scientific epistemology. Yet establishing conventions is a fundamental part of scientific progress. So, yes, I do see this as a problem both for AI and for epistemology. Regards, Neil