[Wittrs] Re: What Is Ontological Dualism?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2010 13:43:27 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
> > neither I nor Searle nor the CRT presume anything more than
> > the basic fact of philosophy of consciousness: there is subjective
> > experience in an objective universe.
>
> Right. Searle starts with the simple observation that people have subjective,
> qualitative experiences. When he asserts the ontological > irreducibility of
> these mental phenomena,
THAT is dualism. Of course Searle tries to distinguish between causal and
ontological claims but the distinction doesn't work.
> he means simply that people really do have such things as toothaches - that
> such things as toothaches really do exist in the world. And of course he's
> right; we know this before we start doing philosophy.
>
Nor does Dennett deny it. Nor do I. The point is we are prepared to explain its
occurrence in physicalist terms and do not presume that something that is
separate from the physical must be at work.
> Eliminativists like Dennett defy common sense. Dennett essentially denies the
> reality of toothaches, and of all qualia, and further denies intentionality
> as an intrinsic feature of human minds.
>
This is totally false and a woeful misreading of Dennett. He denies the need to
posit some special category of phenomenon called "qualia" to explain the
occurrence of subjective experience but that is hardly to defy the occurrence
or reality of experience! He does deny the need to consider "intentionality" as
a localizable phenomenon but that is just a point about the way we use our
words, not about whether we can or do think ABOUT things.
> As I've tried to explain to Stuart, eliminative materialism seems to me
> motivated by a fear of the Cartesian ghost.
As I've explained to you, Gordon, arguments about putative motives miss the
point and really say nothing about the merits of others' claims.
> Because they accept the Cartesian categories, these philosophers believe they
> cannot acknowledge the obvious irreducible reality of
> mental states without admitting a ghost into the machine.
What seems "obvious" to you doesn't necessarily seem so to others and, in fact,
the mere fact that something seems obvious to you or to anyone else is not an
argument for its being true. As with your confusion of talk of motives with
talk about the merits of a claim, you also make the mistake of thinking your
belief in something is an argument for it.
> So they go to great lengths to deny the obvious, then label those who don't
> do the same "Cartesians".
>
> -gts
>
>
You still haven't once addressed any of the claims I have made on their merits.
SWM
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