[Wittrs] Re: An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 05 May 2010 01:34:54 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart writes:
>
> "I have also explained, numerous times, that
> Searle speaks of a constitutive claim as causal and I have said it is THAT
> sense of causal that I think is at work here."
>
> So, when in the third premise Searle states that syntax is _neither_
> constitutive of _nor_ sufficient for semantics, it's as if we can read him as
> merely saying the same thing (two noncausality claims for the price of one)
> even though there is a "neither/nor" there?
>
The text works both ways (as either/or or this and that). That's the point
about it being ambiguous.
> I don't buy that. I also, a fortiori, can't buy the two-for-one sale on both
> being identity claims. So, six years ago I thought you were having trouble
> reading English or were flaming, i.e., it just seems obvious, contra Gordon,
> that "insufficient for" is to be read as "insuff. to cause" and "doesn't
> constitute" is being used as a type of nonidentity claim.
>
Note that you think that "insufficient for" works as a "non-causal claim". I
do, too, of course though, for my part, I think it works both ways (allowing
both non-identity and non-causal readings). Now Gordon says he sees only a
non-identity claim on both sides of the premise while Joe avers that he sees
something entirely different from either identity or causality being invoked by
the use of "constitutes".
So what we have here are four different people reading this four different
ways. Doesn't THAT suggest to you that the text is ambiguous? And doesn't it
also suggest that, if so, then the distinction between the causal and identity
issues IS being blurred by the way the third premise is phrased since, between
four people, we can get so little agreement as to the way the simple statements
contained in the third premise should be interpreted?
Doesn't that, alone, support my point that the text is sufficiently ambiguous
as to be equivocal in its usage?
> Stuart writes:
>
> "...if semantics (here used as a proxy word for whatever we mean by
> understanding of the sort we have) is a function of a system rather than any
> constituent element of the system, then what syntax is not (i.e., it is not
> semantics), is irrelevant to what syntax, arranged in the right way, can do.
> (Causing, of course, being an instance of doing.)"
>
>
> So, what do you mean by "syntax"? Computation or physics?
>
You know what I mean, Budd: processes running on a physical platform which, in
the case of computers at least, are computational processes running on
computers.
> Hypothetical Dilemma (may be a false dilemma):
>
> 1. If syntax is conflated with physics, you and Searle win because both are
> talking of systems that need not essentially be characterized as S/H
> systems--a real machine uber-mensche enough to cause semantics. This is why
> I often remind you that by conflating syntax with physics, you are really
> sharing Searle's main position, just in a circuitous way! ;-)
>
Searle denies that computational processes running on computers can be
causative of consciousness in the way he says brains are. That is, he denies
precisely what Dennett proposes. Since I agree with Dennett that the
computational model is a viable one for explaining consciousness, I am in
disagreement with Searle and he, assuming his denial of Dennett's thesis also
applies to what I have said about this, is in disagreement with me.
You don't resolve this by simply proclaiming that, really and truly, I and
Dennett are actually agreeing with Searle but we just don't know it because,
besides everything else, Searle doesn't seem to know it either, and he ought to
be the most authoritative spokesman about who is really in agreement with his
views and who's in disagreement, no?
> 2. If syntax is taken to be formal, as Searle really has it, then no amount
> of arrangement of formal elements does a S/H system make to be an extra
> causal factor other than the uninterpreted electricity minus the formal
> syntax. And that "other than" part lands us back in 1. above.
>
Searle does sometimes sound as though he is only talking about something
abstract when speaking of computer processes. Of course, insofar as all he
means is the algorithms some programmer has in mind or the notations that
record those algorithms, he would be right. But no one in AI thinks that AI
(strong or weak!) is about unimplemented programs like this. And, indeed, we
have seen in discussions here that Searle himself speaks of "implemented"
programs. Once they are "implemented" the physical processes are what matters,
not the abstraction of some set of algorithms. And then the machines
implementing them, because they are as physical as brains, have all the causal
powers Searle ascribes to brains based on their physical reality.
> So, win, win!
>
No, no.
> Stuart writes about his point all along:
>
> "> My point throughout has been that, just as the aggregate of features
> (including wetness, liquidity, etc.) that we call "water" are caused by the
> aggregate of elements (using the ordinary English sense of "elements") called
> H2O molecules, in terms of the things they do when aggregated, so semantics
> (meaning whatever it is we think of as understanding) may well be caused by a
> certain kind of aggregation of "syntactical" operations."
>
> Well, are they really syntactical?
We have agreed, by stipulation, that we will call computational processes
running on computers "syntax", using Searle's vocabulary. Whatever they are, of
course, it doesn't matter what we call them but, since we have agreed that we
are speaking about computational processes running on computers, we must see
that they are just what they are and that they don't become more abstract by
virtue of the application of a particular nomenclature.
Since they amount to physical events occurring in certain sequences in a
certain arrangement on a physical platform, they are no less real and causal
than brain processes.
> And what can you mean, other than Searle's claim that syntax is formal?
See above.
> That syntax is not formal and we don't have a distinction between S/H systems
> and nonS/H systems? Well, then you agree with Searle's main philosophical
> position because you have taken the whole meaning of functionalism out of the
> equation.
>
Too bad Searle doesn't realize that Dennett's thesis really affirms his!
> The most you get to do is make a really bad case for Searle being wrong to
> distinguish between S/H and nonS/H--and this is supposed to show that
> Searle's position is implicitly dualist?
>
No, that's a different argument, i.e., it has to do with how one gets to the
conclusions of the CRA based on the thought experiment of the so-called CR.
> It's like I said all along. You fail to read the third premise as two
> independent thoughts.
>
Or everyone seems to read it in his or her own way! And then we have the
problem of ambiguity all over again, and, hence, equivocation.
> A larger failure is not recognizing the distinction between S/H and nonS/H.
You've already said this and I've already answered it.
> Failure to note the distinction nets you Searle's position, actually.
Too bad somebody forgot to tell Searle, though!
> Failure to note the distinction also offers a way of "showing Searle's
> position to be implicitly dualist since then you have discovered a way for
> interpreting Searle as denying what he claims--i.e., if he's denying
> computers something he doesn't deny brains, AND, if Stuart gets us to be
> blind to the distinction Searle draws between S/H and nonS/H, then....
>
A false distinction as I've already explained above and many times before . . .
> The proof is that you consider the third premise in terms of two
> possibilities other than the possibility I suggest flows from understanding
> simple English, namely, two independent thoughts comprise the third premise.
> One is a sort of nonidentity claim (does not constitute) and the other a
> noncausality claim (insufficient for ...because not even a candidate IF one
> doesn't conflate syntax with physics, yada yada, AND IF one is sensitive to
> Searle's distinction between S/H and nonS/H systems.
>
But the non-causality claim hinges on the assumption that understanding cannot
be explained as a system-level feature and can only be understood as a bottom
line feature somewhere in any conscious system. But that is to claim it is
irreducible to anything other than itself and that, finally, implies dualism.
> If you would like to show Searle wrong to distinguish between S/H and nonS/H,
> go ahead.
I've already made the case that this is a faux distinction!
> I'm not disagreeing that that might be something you might try (I wouldn't
> even). But even if successful, you STILL wouldn't have any good reason to
> suggest that Searle's biological naturalism is a form of dualism.
>
Not his "biological naturalism" but his CRA.
> If you don't agree, I'm going to refer you to my shoe. :-)
>
>
>
> So, anticipating the broken record, Stuart writes:
>
What you take to be a "broken record" just reflects the continuing need for me
to re-explain the points I have made in the light of their misinterpretation by
some here.
> "But, alas, I don't entertain any hopes you will see or acknowledge this
> point now anymore than you have the thousand times in the past that I have
> made it. Instead I expect you will soon come back with yet ANOTHER version of
> your claim that the CRA's third premise is demonstrated by a consideration of
> the CR itself. At some point, I expect, we just scrape bottom -- and since we
> are once again reduced to repeating ourselves, shouldn't we assume that that
> is where we have now reached in this exchange?"
>
> I think the crux is whether we can all understand how S/H systems work and
> how nonS/H systems are different even if they (along with your favorite
> vagina) can be given a computational description. But I don't suppose you
> like that distinction either?
>
> Cheers,
> Budd
>
My wife would find it rather offensive, I'm afraid. (Good thing she doesn't
have occasion to read these lists.) Personally, I think it is gratuitous and
unhelpful, at the least.
SWM
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