--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote: and I respond...it is not about what word you use to connect brain and mind. It is about the logic of the connection put forth > What do brains "cause"? It follows, from what I wrote above, I don't know out of context. The next sentence provides one > The state of being a subject (having a mind)... Now connect the dots, the brain working the emergence of the subject. Just exactly how and where do these connect? > Or caused a panoply of things memories, etc. Connect the brain tissue and the memory. > The point is that the model I have been advocating here, > for explaining mind, sees mind as a function of a > highly complex system running on the physical platform of a brain. It strikes me now that I can adopt that model too. A highly complex brain system which I use for various purposes, often out of awareness. My advantage: I posit no causal link: Consequences... 1. The question of how brain produces mind is irrelevant. I start with the person and say how he uses his brain. 2. The question of how a causally described machine can yield an intent is inappropriate. I start with an intention being who uses a causally described machine the same way I use my car. > AI researcher's research into what it is physical platforms > like brains need to do in order to produce a mind. Are based on what brain activity correlates with people's mental activity. The A! folks start with a concept of a person and attempt to replicate it. > We know that it feels like we have choice to us. If that is simply caused by the brain, then "choice" is ilsuory. > Nevertheless, unless we realize that an account of thinking things > must originate in an account of unthinking things > we end up with a need for a homunculus in our explanation of how mind I was thinking this morning that this was what you were thinking. Two points, quickly. 1. Even if we originate our account in terms of unthinking things, it is still an account of and by a thinking thing. So there is no alternative but starting with a person thinking. Physics is written as if it were the "view from nowhere." Psychology can't tolerate it. This needs elaboration. 2. The person, where we start, is not an homunculus, a detached spirit. It is not a thing of any substance. It's materialism, which can't get past substance, that attributes the homunculus that begins with the person. more later... bruce ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/