[Wittrs] Re: An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: "BruceD" <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 08 May 2010 04:13:20 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:
Joe wrote: identity, constitution and causality are three distinct
concepts.
> This just reflects a failure to understand Wittgenstein's point...
i.e., that words mean what they mean based on how they are used.
Stuart, Joe is pointing out 3 distinct concepts with the use of 3 words.
Your response is about the words, how each of their use do vary. But you
did not respond to his point, viz., the 3 concepts are potentially
distinct in the context of our discussion of brain/mind. So, are they or
they not distinct, as such? I imagine you will answer "Yes" but Searle
runs the 3 together in the 3rd premiss. that seems to be your point.
> My point is that "constitution" can be read as either a causal or an
identity claim.
> The ambiguity CAN be eliminated by simply recasting the third premise
as either one or the other:
> 1) Syntax is not the same as semantics and is not sufficient for
allowing us to claim an instance of semantics is present
I take this to mean: An entity can follow rules (syntax) without
awareness of the rules (semantics).
> 2) Syntax cannot cause semantics.
I read this not to mean: Future research will demonstrate this point.
Rather, placing these two concepts in a causal relation is a conceptual
nightmare.
> ...the first version would not have sustained...that what is syntax
cannot cause what has semantics
> because non-identity does not imply non-causality
Right! Often non-identity offers the possibility of causality. But not
in this case. There is something about the concepts of syntax and
semantic that doesn't tolerate a causal relationship.
> while the second version requires an added assumption about
"semantics",
> i.e., that it cannot be caused by anything that isn't, itself,
already semantical in nature.
Didn't he just say "not syntax" and leave the possibility for other
sorts of causation? But, for the sake of discussion, let's say he held:
"being aware of the rules is not reducible to the rules.
> Making THAT added assumption opens one up to the charge of dualism
A Dualism of what? Isn't he simply saying: While some accounts of the
world can be reduced to a core sentence, we quickly get to the point
where the core sentences can't be reduced to one another. To return to
the beginning: identity, constitution and causality are three distinct
concepts for us because we don't expect to find a core sentence that
expresses all 3.
bruce
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