[Wittrs] Re: An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 04 May 2010 13:30:16 -0000
I must be a glutton for punishment!
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
<snip>
>
> let's see if you've made relevant points, shall we?
>
> >>[1] the hypothesis that syntactic operations are identical to
> >>understanding is refuted by the absence of understanding in the CR
> >>despite the presence of syntactic operations in the CR.
>
> >This shows that syntax is not the same as semantics.
>
> do you admit or deny that the hypothesis is refuted?
>
Do my words look like a denial to you?
But if it will help you to reach a real understanding of what I have been
saying, I will be even more explicit: I admit that the hypothesis you state
above, that "'syntactical operations are identical to understanding' is refuted
by the absence of understanding in the CR" is true.
Of course my claim has nothing to do with asserting that this "hypothesis"
isn't refuted and, indeed, I have never asserted anything contrary to it.
> >>[2] the hypothesis that syntactic operations constitute understanding
> >>is refuted by the absence of understanding in the CR despite the
> >>presence of syntactic operations in the CR.
>
> >This hinges on the use of "constitutes" which can be taken in a causal
> >sense or in an identity sense.
>
> focus, Stuart. we're not writing a dissertation on the conflationary
> possibilities of ordinary english;
"We" are expressing a claim in ordinary English above. You have claimed that
the third premise, interpreted as a claim of constitution, is "refuted" by the
absence of semantics in the system called the CR. I have said that THAT depends
on what we mean by "constitution".
As you know (or should know) I have said numerous times that "constitution" can
be read as asserting identity or causality (and have given dictionary
definitions showing both uses). I have also explained, numerous times, that
Searle speaks of a constitutive claim as causal and I have said it is THAT
sense of causal that I think is at work here.
Now given all this, when I say "This hinges on the use of 'constitutes', which
can be taken in a causal sense or in an identity sense", what I am saying
should be apparent to you. But if it isn't, I'll say it again and try to be
even clearer:
The hypothesis represented by the third premise "syntax does not constitute and
is not sufficient for semantics", read as a claim of identity, is conceptually
true (as Searle suggests), because we have already agreed that syntax is not
the same as semantics.
However, when the terms in the premise are read as making a claim of causality
(or of non-causality, as in this case), the hypothesis consisting of them would
not be seen be conceptually true because of the problem that I further
elaborate below, i.e., that if semantics (here used as a proxy word for
whatever we mean by understanding of the sort we have) is a function of a
system rather than any constituent element of the system, then what syntax is
not (i.e., it is not semantics), is irrelevant to what syntax, arranged in the
right way, can do. (Causing, of course, being an instance of doing.)
>so, let's just informally define
> 'constitutes' as 'counts as'.
Then you are defining it as identity rather than as causal. See above for the
implications as to that.
> 'A constitutes B' means 'A counts as B'.
> for example, 'usually, water is constituted by H20 plus impurities; but,
> pure H20 also constitutes water' means that pure H20 counts as or is an
> instance of water.
>
> using this definition of 'constitutes', do you admit or deny that the
> hypothesis is refuted?
>
I deny it, absent adequate explication of the terms and then one reading would
(the claim of non-identity) refute and one (the claim of non-causality) would
not.
My point throughout has been that, just as the aggregate of features (including
wetness, liquidity, etc.) that we call "water" are caused by the aggregate of
elements (using the ordinary English sense of "elements") called H2O molecules,
in terms of the things they do when aggregated, so semantics (meaning whatever
it is we think of as understanding) may well be caused by a certain kind of
aggregation of "syntactical" operations.
The claim of some (like Dennett) is that such processes can do it in the right
configuration (and I am inclined to agree). But the issue of your hypothesis
and the claim of refutation is not whether they can or cannot do it but whether
the failure of these kinds of processes TO DO it in the CR (as specked by
Searle) counts as a refutation of the claim that they can.
And to that I will again say that it does not. Why? Because the causal question
remains open as long as we are not speaking about an identity relation. The
issue is not decided by the failure of the syntax to BE (as in BE IDENTICAL
WITH) semantics, either singly or in the aggregate (as represented by the
system we call the CR).
If the issue is like water and its molecules (causal via constitution) as I
have suggested and which is at least logically possible, then failure to find
semantics in the CR only supports a claim that the CR, itself, is an inadequate
system, not that it is made up of inadequate elements.
> you could also evaluate the hypothesis using some other definition of
> 'constitutes' that did not conflate constitution with identity
> (considered in [1]) or causation (considered in [2]).
>
As we have seen, "constitutes", as with many terms, has a wide range of
meanings (see the dictionary citations provided here earlier).
It's because Searle does not specifically say "syntax is not the same as, and
cannot cause, semantics" that he is able to get away with claiming that his
famous third premise is conceptually true AND supportive of a non-causal
conclusion. That is, his wording allows a dual reading of the statement.
If one does make the conversion to a more explicitly causal reading, however,
what we see is that the third premise is no longer conceptually true at all and
that, for it to be taken to be true, one has to go further and assume that for
the CR to understand, some constitutive element within it must be or must have
understanding. THIS amounts to presuming that understanding cannot be reduced
to anything that is not, itself, understanding, which is, finally, a dualist
claim because it makes understanding ontologically basic.
But the dualist presumption, aside from the fact that Searle, himself,
explicitly denies being dualist, amounts to our being asked to take an extra
step which we have no good evidence for and, therefore, no good reason to take.
That is, there is no evidenciary reason why we need to assume such a
presumption in order to explain the occurrence of mind in the world (nobody has
seen ghosts or has confirmed the occurrence of minds without bodies beyond many
hearsay claims, etc.) while there certainly is good reason not make such a
presumption because doing so would violate Occam's Razor, especially given that
there are other perfectly reasonable (if as yet empirically unproved)
explanations available to us including that offered by Dennett.
But if you don't like Dennett's then even Searle's underexplicated naturalistic
explanation of minds coming from brains will do (even if Searle, himself,
doesn't notice that this account puts him in self-contradiction with his own
CRA).
> >>[3] the hypothesis that syntactic operations cause understanding is
> >>refuted by the absence of understanding in the CR despite the presence
> >>of syntactic operations in the CR.
>
> >This shows that you misunderstand the point about causality. If the
> >causality results from something at the system level, then the absence
> >of understanding in the CR (one particular kind of system), says
> >nothing about the capabilities of some other kind of system (one that
> >is more complex, more robustly specked) to accomplish what the more
> >limited CR system cannot accomplish.
>
> the hypothesis stated in [3] concerns understanding as Searle defines
> understanding; the CR as specked by Searle; and, causation as scientists
> would use it to describe an event (a spark caused the explosion).
>
There are many uses of "cause" and I have already told you the use I am relying
on which is a perfectly legitimate and scientific one. (If you ask a physicist
what causes the feature of wetness we find in water, he or she will give you an
explanation that amounts to describing water's features in terms of molecules
at the atomic level.)
Moreover, Searle, himself, never really defines what he means by
"understanding". He does assert that it includes being aware of what one one is
engaged with but Dennett certainly doesn't deny that. Your suggestion,
elsewhere, that Dennett simply has redefined "understanding" is mistaken. Yes,
Dennett offers a different kind of account of understanding, which includes a
different way of conceptualizing it, but that IS the point here, isn't it?
Searle, by refusing to countenance a reduction of understanding (or any of the
other features of consciousness) to anything that is not already what is being
reduced, simply holds onto an ontologically separatist view which, despite his
denials, amounts to nothing less than a dualist picture of the mind. Dennett,
on the other hand, is offering a way to account for the same features by
explaining the phenomenon in what amounts to physical terms.
> speculating about alternate definitions and alternate conditions in the
> CR constitutes evasiveness as to the question at hand: would a
> non-dualist (such as yourself) claim that there already is understanding
> (as Searle defines understanding) in the CR (as specked by Searle).
>
> Joe
That is an absurd question since I have already answered it here numerous
times. But let me save you the trouble of looking it up and repeat what I have
often said before:
I am not denying the CR lacks understanding. I fully concur that it does! But
that is a point about the robustness of the system we call the CR (see Dennett
on the matter of "more of the same"). It is not a point about the CR's
constituent elements.
To recall, for the nth time, Peter Brawley's point, made over on the Analytic
list: The CR is like a bicycle when we're seeking an airplane. That is,
expecting the CR to be conscious is like building a bicycle and expecting it to
fly!
For some strange reason this more than obvious point seems to elude you. You
keep coming back to the fact that the CR, itself, lacks understanding as a way
of proving that nothing in it can ever produce understanding. While I will
admit (and have often admitted) that we don't know, a priori, that the CR's
constituent elements are the right sort to do it, we also don't know, a priori,
that they aren't (contra the CRA's effort to trade on a claim of conceptual
truth via its third premise).
The only a priori reason the CR's constituents might not be is, if to produce
understanding, they must already have understanding as all or part of what they
are.
That is if, to be an instance of understanding, understanding had to already be
present in one or more of the CR's constituent features, then it would make
sense to suppose that the absence of understanding in the CR tells us something
about what ANY other configuration of the CR's constituent processes could
accomplish.
But there is NO reason to think that understanding is such an ontologically
bottom-line feature and good reason to think of it as a system level feature,
in which case the problem with the CR lies in its specs, not in its building
blocks.
But, alas, I don't entertain any hopes you will see or acknowledge this point
now anymore than you have the thousand times in the past that I have made it.
Instead I expect you will soon come back with yet ANOTHER version of your claim
that the CRA's third premise is demonstrated by a consideration of the CR
itself. At some point, I expect, we just scrape bottom -- and since we are once
again reduced to repeating ourselves, shouldn't we assume that that is where we
have now reached in this exchange?
SWM
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