[Wittrs] Re: An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 12:56:54 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>>
> one of the many flaws in your critique of Searle's argument that the
> third axiom is true is your failure to respect what Searle is doing.
>
> Searle is making a claim of non-constitution; specifically, that syntax
> does not constitute semantics; and, says that the claim (and the rest of
> the third axiom) is conceptually true on the basis of the CRT.
>
> if you contest or reject the argument that the third axiom, with its
> claim of non-constitution, is true; then, you could claim that Searle
> was wrong to make a claim of non-constitution. you would not, however,
> be entitled to argue (as you do) that
>
The issue is what does he mean by "non-constitution"? Though I can see how
"does not constitute" can be read in a number of ways, the only way that makes
sense in this context is that it means 'is not what we mean by' (which is
another way of saying, as he does in the second part of the premise, "is not
sufficient for" -- thus explaining why he says these two things in the text of
a single premise).
> * Searle claimed that the third axiom is conceptually true.
>
> * the only conceptually true claim possible in the CRT is a claim of
> non-identity
>
> * (therefore) Searle was making a claim of non-identity in the third
> axiom.
>
> the difference is that you're changing the claim he actually makes in
> order to fit your preconceived notions of what Searle claims is
> conceptually true on the basis of the CRT.
>
I'm translating it, yes. But I don't think you can make a claim for "does not
constitute" that departs from the identity issue, "is not" or "is not the same
as".
> you claim that there is a claim of non-causality in the third premise;
> and, I agree; although I disagree as to where it is located.
>
> in any event, in scenario 3, the hypothesis that the relation between
> syntax and semantics is a causal one is refuted by the absence of
> understanding in the CR despite the presence of syntactical operations..
>
Not if the causation is a function of arrangement which Searle simply assumes
out of existence in his scenario of the CR (which is what betrays the dualist
predilection).
> so your claim that the non-causality claim is not conceptually true
> needs some support beyond your affirmation of it.
>
> Joe
>
See the idea that consciousness (or understanding as one of its features) is a
function not of a particular constituent process but of a particular way of
combining particular constituent processes. Insofar as that is not shown to be
logically impossible (which is, in fact, not shown by the CR) then it is not
conceptually true that something reflecting that dynamic cannot be the case.
Thus syntax in the right combination could cause understanding even if the
combination in the CR doesn't do so.
SWM
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