"The issue is what does he mean by "non-constitution"? Though I can see how "does not constitute" can be read in a number of ways, the only way that makes sense in this context is that it means 'is not what we mean by' (which is another way of saying, as he does in the second part of the premise, "is not sufficient for" -- thus explaining why he says these two things in the text of a single premise)." Let's try your claim out: 1. X is not sufficient for Y. 2. X is not what we mean by Y. You are saying that 1. is another way of saying 2.! (everybody sssshhh on the first premise and the pointless distinction between 1st and 2nd-order properties..) Contrapositively: (yuk, yuk..) 3. Water is sufficient for causing wetness. 4. Water is what we mean by wetness. Anyway, if the point was to tire of the issue, you could have told me first what you or Dennett had cookin' at the lab, rather than argue against such a mensche as Searle. Surely that doesn't go that far. :-) Cheers, Budd ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/