[Wittrs] Re: An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 13:33:13 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> if, for some reason that remains obscure, we limited arguments in favor
> of the third axiom to those that you admit are based on the CRT; then,
> even assuming that you successfully contest all those arguments you are
> willing to consider, the most that you would be able to claim is that
> the CRA is not supported by any of the arguments you are willing to
> consider. you would not be entitled to claim that the CRA fails.
>
> you can't have it both ways.
>
If the CRA does not support its conclusions, if they don't follow from its
premises, then the CRA fails. That's what it means for an argument to fail.
Whether there is some other argument for the same conclusions that doesn't fail
(because it does logically demonstrate its conclusions) is a different question.
> >Searle is giving us an argument that he says demonstrates, via logic,
> >that Dennett's thesis could not succeed. Searle is arguing against the
> >possibility of "strong AI" while Dennett's thesis is only an argument
> >in favor of the possibility. So Dennett's is open to empirical
> >consideration while Searle's is not.
>
> given that Dennett changes the definition of 'understanding' so that he
> can attribute understanding to a system that lacks subjectivity and
> subjective experience, Dennett's thesis (such as it is) is utterly
> irrelevant to claims that there is no understanding in the Chinese Room.
>
That is simply false. Dennett does not deny subjective experience. He denies
certain ways of talking about it and certain ways of explaining it which, of
course, is the point of his thesis.
> >As I have noted, the CR does not show that semantics qua understanding
> >cannot be understood/explained on a system level and, if it can be so
> >understood, then the third premise does not show that "syntax does not
> >constitute and is not sufficient for semantics".
>
> as I have noted, the CRT is agnostic as to theories purporting to
> explain subjectivity and experience; so, until you offer a coherent
> explanation for why you think otherwise, I may or may not be able to
> explain why you are mistaken.
>
I think you just don't get the point about the system level nature of
understanding.
> >The equivocal statement Searle formulates as his third premise serves
> >to mask the problem by making a non-identity claim seem to support a
> >non-causation claim.
>
> this is a good example of the way to conduct philosophical discourse as
> if it were a three-card monte scam played with words instead of cards.
>
Note the fact that I zero in on his actual words, his text. One can't get more
precise than that.
> the three claims (causation, constitution and identity) represent the
> three cards. the target card (a.k.a. the money card) is whatever claim
> is the topic of interest at the moment.
>
The point is to figure out what he means. Unfortunately in Searle's case, and
especially in regard to his CRA, this isn't easy because of his use of various
terms in sometimes idiosyncratic ways. But that is part of the problem, isn't
it? And we need to unpack his terms to get at his meaning (or elision of
meanings as in the case of the third premise).
> now Searle picks the claim of constitution as the topic of interest by
> saying 'syntax does not constitute semantics'. consequently, we would
> expect to find that the meaning of constitution would be 'under' the
> card (would be the subject of the discourse); but, the dealer (you,
> Stuart) moves what you call the meaning of identity so that it appears
> to be the subject of discussion.
>
Feel free to recast the text in a way that allows a different reading and we
can go over that, too.
> the cheating consists of linguistic sleight of hand. the meaning of
> 'identity' that is consistent with the is of constitution (and, often,
> with claims of constitution not using 'is') is not identical to the
> meaning of 'identity' that is consistent with Leibniz's Law.
>
That's certainly true but the idea of "conceptually true" is dependent on the
notion of logical identity (a thing is the same as itself). Thus Searle's claim
of conceptual truth here is misleading.
> >>>1) His claim that the premise is "conceptually true" (which is only
> >>>the case for the denial of identity);
>
> once the switcheroo is detected, it is clear that the first clause of
> the third premise is true --- as a claim of non-constitution --- even if
> it is also true when misread as a claim of non-identity.
>
But it is not conceptually true if it's not read as a claim of non-identity.
And the only other kind of truth is something that has been logically proved
(derived from some other premises) or that is empirically established and
explained in a way that is consistent with such empirical facts. My point, of
course, is that Searle eschews empirical inquiry here in favor of logic but
then fails to logically establish the truth of his premise unless one elides,
with him, the notion of logical identity with a less rigorous kind (the kind
that can also be read as causal in Searle's own lexicon).
> * * *
>
> now, Stuart, before we leave the topic of three-card monte as a model of
> philosophical discourse, let me ask you one question.
>
> you say that Searle makes a claim of non-causation in the third axiom;
> and, I agree that he does; but, I take that to mean causation in the
> true sense (pertaining to the notion of cause and effect that scientists
> use and that descends from Aristotle's category of efficient causation).
>
> my question is: when you say that Searle makes a claim of non-causation
> do you have a different notion of causation in mind?
>
>
> Joe
I have offered an explanation many times here about how Searle uses "cause"
with regard to water and wetness. But I think Searle doesn't think in these
terms when we get to the idea that brains do cause minds while computers don't!
However, because he is vague on what brains actually do that is causal
(papering over the implicit contradiction between THAT claim and the CRA), he
fails to explicate what he means by 'cause' here with regard to syntax and
semantics and computers and minds. THAT is certainly part of the problem with
his argument.
After all, if he once recognized that his claim of causality for water's
wetness might apply, he would not find it so easy to blithely blow off the
possibility that the CR is underspecked and that that's the real problem with
his argument.
SWM
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