[Wittrs] Read the Third Axiom without the Equivocation
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 12 May 2010 05:47:48 -0400
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>SWM wrote:
>>>Searle is giving us an argument that he says demonstrates, via logic,
>>>that Dennett's thesis could not succeed. Searle is arguing against
>>>the possibility of "strong AI" while Dennett's thesis is only an
>>>argument in favor of the possibility. So Dennett's is open to
>>>empirical consideration while Searle's is not.
>>given that Dennett changes the definition of 'understanding' so that
>>he can attribute understanding to a system that lacks subjectivity and
>>subjective experience, Dennett's thesis (such as it is) is utterly
>>irrelevant to claims that there is no understanding in the Chinese
>>Room.
>That is simply false. Dennett does not deny subjective experience. He
>denies certain ways of talking about it and certain ways of explaining
>it which, of course, is the point of his thesis.
the question is not whether Dennett denies subjective experience. the
question is whether he has changed the definition of 'understanding'. if
he has, his thesis (whatever it is) is irrelevant to the question of
whether syntax can cause understanding as Seale defines 'understanding'.
>>>The equivocal statement Searle formulates as his third premise serves
>>>to mask the problem by making a non-identity claim seem to support a
>>>non-causation claim.
>>this is a good example of the way to conduct philosophical discourse
>>as if it were a three-card monte scam played with words instead of
>>cards.
>Note the fact that I zero in on his actual words, his text.
zero in on the fact that 'syntax does not constitutes semantics' makes a
claim of non-constitution rather than a non-identity claim.
>One can't get more precise than that.
much more important than a precision recital of the written word is an
accurate paraphrase of the meaning associated with the word in question.
>>the three claims (causation, constitution and identity) represent the
>>three cards. the target card (a.k.a. the money card) is whatever claim
>>is the topic of interest at the moment.
>The point is to figure out what he means. Unfortunately in Searle's
>case, and especially in regard to his CRA, this isn't easy because of
>his use of various terms in sometimes idiosyncratic ways. But that is
>part of the problem, isn't it? And we need to unpack his terms to get
>at his meaning (or elision of meanings as in the case of the third
>premise).
I've already done that for you by constructing the three scenarios that
evaluate the possible relations between syntax and semantics (but,
hopefully, with a reduction in the potential for conflation and
equivocation).
deal with scenario 3.
explain how the hypothesis in question is not falsified.
>>now Searle picks the claim of constitution as the topic of interest by
>>saying 'syntax does not constitute semantics'. consequently, we would
>>expect to find that the meaning of constitution would be 'under' the
>>card (would be the subject of the discourse); but, the dealer (you,
>>Stuart) moves what you call the meaning of identity so that it appears
>>to be the subject of discussion.
>Feel free to recast the text in a way that allows a different reading
>and we can go over that, too.
you already know how I read the third axiom and you have already
acknowledged that my reading removes the equivocation you claim to see
in the third axiom.
so, in the unlikely event that you are interested in an alternate
reading of the text, re-read the third axiom without the equivocation(s)
you say you see in it.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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