[Wittrs] Re: Read the Third Axiom without the Equivocation
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 12 May 2010 11:59:51 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
> the question is not whether Dennett denies subjective experience. the
> question is whether he has changed the definition of 'understanding'. if
> he has, his thesis (whatever it is) is irrelevant to the question of
> whether syntax can cause understanding as Seale defines 'understanding'.
>
Ah so "today's" question is now something different than "yesterday's"? Well,
of course I have answered this question too, i.e., he has offered a different
way of understanding understanding, of conceptualizing it, of explaining it.
But, insofar as "understanding" includes what we have often referred to here
and elsewhere as being aware of what we are doing in understanding anything,
having that sense of subjective recognition, etc., etc. (which is to say having
a subjective experience moment with each instance of understanding), Dennett
does not deny any of that.
Of course he says understanding is 'this' rather than 'that'! Of course he says
understanding is a system level feature (or phenomenon or whatever term you
happen to prefer at the moment) rather than one that occurs as an irreducible
aspect or property of one of the system's constituents. That, after all, is the
point of his thesis, i.e., that complexity matters, that "more of the same" is
relevant.
But this isn't to redefine understanding as being anything different than what
we call "understanding" in ourselves. It's to explain its nature, how it comes
about, etc., etc., etc.
> >>>The equivocal statement Searle formulates as his third premise serves
> >>>to mask the problem by making a non-identity claim seem to support a
> >>>non-causation claim.
>
> >>this is a good example of the way to conduct philosophical discourse
> >>as if it were a three-card monte scam played with words instead of
> >>cards.
>
> >Note the fact that I zero in on his actual words, his text.
>
> zero in on the fact that 'syntax does not constitutes semantics' makes a
> claim of non-constitution rather than a non-identity claim.
>
I've already shown how we unpack the terms. You don't want to accept that
particular unpacking. I think it's pretty clear you're wrong but then that's
just my opinion. Others here will make up their own minds.
> >One can't get more precise than that.
>
> much more important than a precision recital of the written word is an
> accurate paraphrase of the meaning associated with the word in question.
>
Absolutely! Yours, insofar as you insist on separating the three terms in some
absolute way, is mistaken.
> >>the three claims (causation, constitution and identity) represent the
> >>three cards. the target card (a.k.a. the money card) is whatever claim
> >>is the topic of interest at the moment.
>
> >The point is to figure out what he means. Unfortunately in Searle's
> >case, and especially in regard to his CRA, this isn't easy because of
> >his use of various terms in sometimes idiosyncratic ways. But that is
> >part of the problem, isn't it? And we need to unpack his terms to get
> >at his meaning (or elision of meanings as in the case of the third
> >premise).
>
> I've already done that for you by constructing the three scenarios that
> evaluate the possible relations between syntax and semantics (but,
> hopefully, with a reduction in the potential for conflation and
> equivocation).
>
Your approach is mistaken as I've already argued. No sense doing it again.
> deal with scenario 3.
>
> explain how the hypothesis in question is not falsified.
>
I have but, since this seems to be your sticking point, I shall reiterate:
You claim that if we are seeking a causal relation between the CR and
understanding, the failure to find understanding in the CR refutes the
possibility that the constituents of the CR are causally responsible for
understanding.
But note:
If understanding is a system level "phenomenon" (I grant you your preferred
term here though, frankly, any number of other terms will do including
"feature", "property", "characteristic", "outcome", etc.), then the failure of
understanding to be locatable in the CR says nothing about the CR's
constituents but, rather, something about the CR as a system.
Therefore there is no refutation because you are directing our attention to the
wrong issue.
> >>now Searle picks the claim of constitution as the topic of interest by
> >>saying 'syntax does not constitute semantics'. consequently, we would
> >>expect to find that the meaning of constitution would be 'under' the
> >>card (would be the subject of the discourse); but, the dealer (you,
> >>Stuart) moves what you call the meaning of identity so that it appears
> >>to be the subject of discussion.
>
> >Feel free to recast the text in a way that allows a different reading
> >and we can go over that, too.
>
> you already know how I read the third axiom and you have already
> acknowledged that my reading removes the equivocation you claim to see
> in the third axiom.
>
And you already know my responses, i.e., that, though we can restate the third
premise more clearly (to wring out the ambiguity), Searle manifestly did not do
so and relied, instead, on an ambiguous way of stating what he wanted to say.
THAT ambiguous method serves to mask the requisite presumption of
irreducibility in semantics qua understanding qua consciousness that is
embedded in the argument. Once it is noticed, the argument's weakness becomes
glaringly apparent.
Your proposed restatement only leaves exposed the still unresolved question: to
what extent must the third premise be seen to be true? If the causal claim is
not true, of course, that is, if it is neither conceptually true and nor true
based on demonstration by the CR (because [see above] it requires the
presumption that understanding is a process level feature within the the CR
system, while there is no reason to assume that THAT is the case and plenty of
reason to think it might not be), then the third premise is not demonstrated to
be true, in which case it does not support a claim that the conclusions derived
from the premises in the CRA are true! Why? Because an argument's premises must
be true if the conclusions derived from them must be.
Note that this is not about the syllogistic form itself, which you have wrongly
asserted is at issue, but about the argument which is presented in that form,
i.e., it is about the content of the claims, the meanings of the terms and how
they relate to one another. And they do not fulfill the relational requirements
in the syllogistic form to render a true conclusion.
Recap: If the premises of the CRA do not sustain their conclusions (the
statements derived from them) then the CRA fails as an argument, regardless of
whether there are any other arguments for the same conclusion(s) that might
succeed!
And now we have taken another turn on the never ending merry-go-round of this
"debate". Shall we buy yet another ticket and go round and round again?
> so, in the unlikely event that you are interested in an alternate
> reading of the text, re-read the third axiom without the equivocation(s)
> you say you see in it.
>
> Joe
I already have. But you can lead a horse to water, as the old saying goes, but
you can't make it drink.
SWM
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