[Wittrs] Re: An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 03 May 2010 17:16:35 -0000
My response to this, too, was lost this morning. A briefer response follows:
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> it seems that we both agree that there is no understanding (as Searle
> defines 'understanding') in the chinese room (as described or 'specked'
> by Searle); and, that there are syntactic operations happening in the
> chinese room.
>
> given that, certain conclusions follow:
>
> [1] the hypothesis that syntactic operations are identical to
> understanding is refuted by the absence of understanding in the CR
> despite the presence of syntactic operations in the CR.
>
This shows that syntax is not the same as semantics.
> [2] the hypothesis that syntactic operations constitute understanding is
> refuted by the absence of understanding in the CR despite the presence
> of syntactic operations in the CR.
>
This hinges on the use of "constitutes" which can be taken in a causal sense or
in an identity sense.
> [3] the hypothesis that syntactic operations cause understanding is
> refuted by the absence of understanding in the CR despite the presence
> of syntactic operations in the CR.
>
This shows that you misunderstand the point about causality. If the causality
results from something at the system level, then the absence of understanding
in the CR (one particular kind of system), says nothing about the capabilities
of some other kind of system (one that is more complex, more robustly specked)
to accomplish what the more limited CR system cannot accomplish.
> so far, you've not challenged any of these claims; nor, the observation
> that each claim is independent of the others.
>
I have repeatedly made the same points as I have just again made above.
Apparently you just don't get them.
> you have, however, championed Dennett's suggestion that the specks of
> the CR might be increased; but, since Dennett changes the definition of
> 'undertanding',
He offers a different way of understanding it, of conceiving it, true. But that
is not a redefinition of "understanding" because he still allows for the same
elements: the features of our mental life that occur with any instance of our
understanding. What he offers is a way of understanding this concept as a
function of physical processes in an elaborate and highly interactive system.
> it is seems reasonable to infer that Dennett is not
> claiming that the more robust specifications will generate understanding
> as Searle defines understanding.
>
Dennett certainly thinks Searle misundertands what we mean by understanding and
that IS the crux of the issue between them, and between us (at least to an
extent).
> if you want to focus on an issue, this is a good one. explain why anyone
> would consider the third axiom false or unproven just because Dennett
> claims that a more robustly specked CR would be able to achieve
> something ... other than understanding as Searle defines understanding.
>
> Joe
See my response above to your three possibilities for starters. Better, ask why
would anyone consider the third premise true or proven based on the CR alone?
It all boils down to what we mean by "mind", "consciousness", "understanding",
etc., etc. It's all about competing conceptions and which works better to give
us an account for how minds come to be in an apparently physical universe.
But this has been the crux of my argument since the beginning. Perhaps you are
finally awaking to it?
SWM
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