[Wittrs] An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 08 May 2010 18:40:11 -0400
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>SWM wrote:
>>>As you know (or should know) I have said numerous times that
>>>"constitution" can be read as asserting identity or causality (and
>>>have given dictionary definitions showing both uses).
>>and I'm telling you yet again: I'm not doing that.
>It doesn't matter what you're doing. It matters how the words are used
>and, in the present case, what Searle was doing. As I noted, Searle
>says of the third premise that it is "conceptually true". He says it of
>the entire third premise (both sides). At the same time he applies THAT
>premise to support a claim of causality.
>The only "conceptually true" reading is the denial of identity which,
>indeed, the words can be read as, using ordinary English (the terms in
>which the statement is expressed).
>The same words can be used to make a causality claim, which is NOT
>"conceptually true".
>The reason we can slip between the two uses is that "constitutes" (the
>claim of constitution) can be used in BOTH ways (as expressing a type
>of identity or a type of causality).
>It doesn't matter how YOU are using the terms. This is about how Searle
>does and the evidence for his usage lies in his dual claim that:
>1) The third premise is "conceptually true"; and
>2) The third premise has a causality implication (supports a conclusion
>of non-causality).
one of the many flaws in your critique of Searle's argument that the
third axiom is true is your failure to respect what Searle is doing.
Searle is making a claim of non-constitution; specifically, that syntax
does not constitute semantics; and, says that the claim (and the rest of
the third axiom) is conceptually true on the basis of the CRT.
if you contest or reject the argument that the third axiom, with its
claim of non-constitution, is true; then, you could claim that Searle
was wrong to make a claim of non-constitution. you would not, however,
be entitled to argue (as you do) that
* Searle claimed that the third axiom is conceptually true.
* the only conceptually true claim possible in the CRT is a claim of
non-identity
* (therefore) Searle was making a claim of non-identity in the third
axiom.
the difference is that you're changing the claim he actually makes in
order to fit your preconceived notions of what Searle claims is
conceptually true on the basis of the CRT.
you claim that there is a claim of non-causality in the third premise;
and, I agree; although I disagree as to where it is located.
in any event, in scenario 3, the hypothesis that the relation between
syntax and semantics is a causal one is refuted by the absence of
understanding in the CR despite the presence of syntactical operations..
so your claim that the non-causality claim is not conceptually true
needs some support beyond your affirmation of it.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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