[Wittrs] Re: Defining Consciousness -- Can we, and if so what is it?

From: "Stuart W. Mirsky" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2009 04:51:22 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart wrote:
> > Cayuse wrote:
> >> Having reached the conclusion that he reached in the TLP, it would have 
> >> been inconsistent to revisit the notion of the microcosm.
> > 
> > And yet he revisited other notions such as that of the role of language in 
> > relation to the world! And he apparently rethought what it meant to say 
> > that some things were "nonsense" by introducing the importance of grammar 
> > and language games.
> 
> 
> Whatever he chose to revisit, I guess he must have considered that it was 
> "speakable". The issue of the microcosm is notably absent from that category.
> 
> 
> > I very much take him at his word when he said that the "author" of the TLP 
> > had been mistaken. But mistaken about what?
> > 
> > About being able to fully describe the way things are in a series of 
> > logical axioms for instance qua the TLP. And about the role of language and 
> > how it relates to the world and how best to describe it. And about what it 
> > means to be outside the scope of linguistic description. And about what 
> > philosophy really amounts to. And about the role of logic vis a vis 
> > language. And about whether ultimately it's about pointing and kicking away 
> > languages after engaging in metaphysical "nonsense" or about exploring the 
> > ways we think about and say things. 
> 
> I can refer to passages in the PI that uphold what you say above, but can you 
> refer me to any passages in the PI that uphold your specific claim that he 
> changed his views on the issue of the microcosm?
> 



First, I should have written "kicking away ladders" above not "languages". My 
bad.

Second, the fact that he does not again reference "the microcosm" is strong 
evidence in itself though I agree it isn't conclusive and you are obviously 
loath to take it as such. Nearby in another response I explained to you why one 
should take it as evidence though: because a term like "the microcosm" and what 
it appears to reference (albeit never clearly stated either by him or you) are 
both antithetical to the concerns and approach of the later Wittgenstein.

He was concerned in his later years to STOP our playing with language, using 
words in ways they were never meant to be used and in using terms that had no 
clear sense (as "the microcosm" clearly doesn't). Instead of a philosophy of 
pointing to what cannot be spoken of he told us in his later work that 
everything was right in front of us, there are no hidden secrets to be 
revealed, no deeper mysteries to be uncovered. Yes there are complexities in 
the things we know and how we know them but these are dealt with by examining 
and exploring language to see how things fit together.

The later Wittgenstein did not describe language or conceive of it as a mode of 
picturing a non-linguistic world (as in the TLP). He taught us how to explore 
language and understand it as a shaper of our thinking. I think that if you see 
this you'll understand why he abandoned such notions as the subject qua 
microcosm.



> 
> >>> It also seems to me that "microcosm" in this context is a far worse 
> >>> choice than "consciousness" or "subject", the early Wittgenstein 
> >>> notwithstanding.
> >>
> >> I don't like it either, but there it is in the TLP.
> >
> > Well the TLP is not the bible. 
> 
> 
> Sure, but this is a Wittgenstein group. I wouldn't use the word in a Chalmers 
> group or a Whitehead group or a Nagarjuna group.
>

It wasn't his bible either. He disavowed the effort. He poses a unique problem 
both because he does have these two distinct phases where the second phase 
evidently discards the first and because he is so cryptic that we can never 
catch him saying exactly what it is he is disavowing. Instead one has to 
appreciate the later work to understand the deficiencies he himself saw in the 
earlier. 

 
> 
> >> The problem with words like "consciousness" and "subject" is that they are 
> >> already the source of much confusion in philosophy of mind. At least W is 
> >> clear about how he is using the word "microcosm", and I can take that to 
> >> be my starting point instead of some term that is already waist-deep in 
> >> cross-purpose conversations.
> > 
> > If you think he is clear (and I don't in light of the quote) can you offer 
> > a reason why it is?
> 
> 
> Because of the context within which he places it in the rest of section 5.6.
> 

Can you explicate what you have in mind?


> 
> >> What W calls the "microcosm" (and what Nagel calls the "what it's like to 
> >> be me") is simpy "there" (but without being able to point at it!)
> > 
> > What is "there"? And how can something be anywhere if we can't point at it 
> > (or otherwise describe where there is)? 
> 
> How can the microcosm point to itself? It isn't an agent of action. And even 
> if it could, who would it be informing?
> 

So a "microcosm" isn't an agent and it isn't a subject and it most assuredly 
isn't any of those things in the wiki and dictionary definitions I posted. What 
then is it? Is it just a word? If so what work does it do? What are the rules 
of its usage? What is its grammar? Recall that these are the terms the later 
Wittgenstein worked with. Is there not a reason he abandoned his earlier vision?


> 
> > Doesn't this go against the later Wittgenstein's modus operandi in the PI?
> 
> Having reached the conclusion that he did in TLP7, there is nothing left to 
> be said about it.
> 

And yet he came back to philosophy after abandoning it. If there was nothing 
left to say, why come back and start saying again? And if the TLP had it right, 
why say otherwise in his later work? And if the whole tenor and approach of the 
later work is counter to TLP usages like "the microcosm", why presume that he 
didn't have usages like "the microcosm" in mind when he disavowed the TLP?


> 
> >> What gives ground for consternation is "not how things are in the world 
> >> [...] but that it exists" (TLP 6.44).
> > 
> > Why is there something and not rather nothing? Why should that question 
> > even trouble us? Why should the existence of the universe imply mysticsm or 
> > mystery at all?
> 
> To turn this consternation into a question is a mistake. 
> 

To presume there is "consternation" is a mistake. About what must we feel 
consternation and what if we don't?

What kind of mistake do you think it is to recast the comment about existence 
being "mystical" into the well known existential question of "why is there 
something and not rather nothing?" if that question can shed light on the other 
statement?  


> 
> >> There isn't a perceived problem so much as a state of consternation. It 
> >> can be turned into a problem by conceptualizing the microcosm as an object 
> >> amongst other objects, but I think that was what W was warning us not to 
> >> do.
> > 
> > And the later Wittgenstein made a point of saying that philosophy is 
> > puzzles and that the way to succeed in philosophy is to dissolve the pseudo 
> > problems these puzzles made for us and be able to walk away and no longer 
> > worry about such things. This, of course, is another place the later 
> > Wittgenstein diverges from his younger self. I think the onus is on those 
> > who think there was no real divergence to say why (especially since 
> > Wittgenstein himself recognizes the divergence, as did his contemporaries 
> > in the field, many of whom were perplexed, like Russell and Moore).
> 
> I take W's point regarding philosophical problems that turn out to be 
> grounded in grammatical errors, but I don't regard the issue of the microcosm 
> to fall into that category.
>

Perhaps that is because it has no legitimate grammar at all? And if not, it can 
have no meaning and if it has no meaning why is there any reason (or value) to 
reference it as he does . . . and you do? Indeed, isn't THAT kind of thing 
precisely what the older Wittgenstein fought against when he returned to 
Cambridge and why people like Russell and Moore (to a lesser extent) were put 
off and puzzled by his new approach?

SWM
[Wittrs] Re: Defining Consciousness -- Can we, and if so what is it?

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