[Wittrs] Re: Defining Consciousness -- Can we, and if so what is it?

  • From: "Stuart W. Mirsky" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 16:51:26 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart wrote:
> > Cayuse wrote:
> >> So far so good, but in the case of the microcosm I would caution that it 
> >> is nonsensical to have a "larger picture of the world".
> > 
> > Why? 
> 
> It is nonsensical to speak of what might or might not lie "beyond" the 
> microcosm, so any picture of a world that is "larger than the microcosm" is 
> nonsensical.
> 
> 
> > And what has microcosm as a concept (if it can even be one?) to do with 
> > understanding how brains make minds? 
> 
> That all depends on how you're using the word "mind". If you're using it in a 
> behaviorist sense then the concept of the microcosm has nothing to do with it 
> at all. If you're taking it to be synonymous with the microcosm, then you are 
> trying to understand how brains make microcosms.
> 

But I never mentioned microcosms and, in fact, specifically reject that usage. 
So what has my claim about brains and minds to do with that? 

> 
> >> I don't know what you mean by "obervable aspects of consciousness", or by 
> >> "observable mental phenomena".
> > 
> > "Observable": The actions of entities that indicate awareness, 
> > understanding, recognition, and the elements we associate with a mental 
> > life.
> 
> 
> Actions are observable, as is any other behavioral trait you wish to mention. 
> What I don't understand is how consciousness (or any aspect of it) can be 
> observed.
> 
> 
> > "Mental": The mental life we recognize in ourselves, e.g., thoughts, 
> > memories, images, ideas, beliefs, sensations, feelings, insights, etc. 
> 
> Thoughts (etc.) take their place in the microcosm, but I don't know what it 
> means to speak of an observer of thoughts (etc.)
> 

We observe them, albeit not with our sensory apparatus but by attending to them 
(which may include attending to our sensory inputs). 

> 
> >> I'm not claiming that brain activity does not cause consciousness, but 
> >> rather that both of these pictures are nonsensical.
> > 
> > And that needs to be defended. How can it be nonsensical if we can shut 
> > down a brain and end consciousness 
> 
> 
> I don't know how you can make any such claim about consciousness when the 
> idea has not been derived from empirical data (unless you're stipulating it 
> to be a behavioral trait).
> 
> 

Do you think consciousness happens without brains (or some equivalent)? 

I'm being called away. Any further responses will have to wait. Sorry but the 
world (not the microcosm) beckons.

SWM

> 
> >> In the absence a causal mechanism, all you have is a prejudiced picture of 
> >> how the world is.
> > 
> > All anyone has is a picture. All mechanisms, all relations are interpreted 
> > in terms of our pictures. 
> 
> 
> So do you have a picture of a causal mechanism by which the brain produces 
> consciousness?
> 
> 
> >> And in the absence of any such differential, there are no grounds for 
> >> adopting any particular metaphysical picture.
> >
> > We all have pictures. Even Buddhism which, at its bottom, wants to banish 
> > pictures, proceeds on the basis of them. 
> 
> Yes we do, and under these circumstances, such pictures are nonsensical. 
> There are no grounds for favoring any particular picture from a collection of 
> nonsensical pictures, so any such choice amounts to nothing more than a 
> prejudice.
> 
> 
> >> To claim brain activity as the cause of the microcosm is to adopt a 
> >> picture that is nonsensical.
> > 
> > That is backed up by nothing and cannot be backed up, apparently, since you 
> > have defined "microcosm" as something we can't speak about. 
> 
> No, W did that, and backed it up in the TLP. I just agreed with him. 
> 
> 
> >> the claim that brain activity is the cause of the microcosm is one of 
> >> those metaphysical pictures.
> > 
> > No it's a scientific point which, of course, presumes a certain picture but 
> > it's also a picture that clearly works. 
> 
> 
> It can't be a scientific point when the concept of consciousness has not been 
> derived from empirical data.
> 
> 
> 
>  >> You can't do science unless you can test your hypothesis, and the 
> hypothesis that "brain activity causes the microcosm" is not testable.
> > 
> > First, "the microcosm" is not science because it is a word that has no 
> > meaning based on your own denial that it is something we can speak of.
> 
> 
> I agree that we can't do science with the idea of the microcosm.
> 
> 
> > Second, that brain activity causes mind (which you replace with "the 
> > microcosm") IS testable.
> 
> 
> How do you test for the presence or absence of something that has no 
> empirical aspects?
> 
> 
> >> W wanted to leave it at that, but I find it such an interesting subject 
> >> that I'm not about to let the limitations of language put me off. What 
> >> must be acknowledged, though, is that we can't do science with it.
> >
> > What is interesting about something you can't speak about? 
> 
> "[...] that it exists." (6.44)
> 
> 
> > How shall you inquire? 
> 
> I make no personal inquiry, but I will point out that there is a use of the 
> word consciousness that is relevant (in accordance with the subject line of 
> these posts). 
> 
> 
> > What can you ask? What possible answers could you ever obtain?
> 
> "When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put 
> into words. The riddle does not exist." (6.5)
> 
> 
> > If something is non-sense, then why concern yourself with trying to get it?
> 
> 
> I have no concern about trying to "get it".
> 
> 
> >> Oh but I do want to talk about it, regardless of W's reluctance to do so. 
> >> I'm suggesting that there is a use of the word consciousness that pertains 
> >> to the fact that the idea of the microcosm arises as part of the content 
> >> of the microcosm. Furthermore, that Nagel is alluding to just such a 
> >> picture when he stipulated consciousness to be the "what it's like to be 
> >> me".
> > 
> > But how can you suggest anything about a word that denotes nothing 
> > conceivable?
> 
> 
> The word denotes nothing conceivable, but it is conceived all the same. This 
> is the beginning of all the nonsense that is spoken about it.
> 
> 
> >> It was W that decided there was nothing to be said, and it is here that I 
> >> part company with him.
> > 
> > Well what can you say about it beyond what he said?
> 
> 
> That there is a use of the word consciousness that pertains to the fact that 
> the idea of the microcosm arises as part of the content of the microcosm. 
> Furthermore, that Nagel is alluding to just such a picture when he stipulated 
> consciousness to be the "what it's like to be me".
> 
> 
> 
> >>>> I can assure you that it is no presumption.
> >>>
> >>> How? I take it you mean you can speak for yourself. 
> >> 
> >>Yes, that is how.
> > 
> > But that something causes you consternation does not suggest that it causes 
> > that more generally or that what you feel is anything more than a function 
> > of one's own psychology. 
> 
> It clearly does cause others consternation too, hence the principal question 
> of ontology.
> 
> 
> >> I can't make any sense of the above. 
> > 
> > What has defining "consciousness" to do with a feeling of consternation, 
> > either generally or specific to one person? 
> 
> Upon recognition of the existence of the microcosm, my habits of thought 
> demand that I find a bigger picture in which to place it. But any such 
> picture can have no sense. This leaves me with a feeling of consternation.
> 
> 
> >>> I wonder, are any others who may be following this discussion feeling 
> >>> this "consternation" you cite?
> >>
> >> I'm not in a position to answer that question, but I'm sure that other 
> >> people have felt this way and that people are still doing so. As you 
> >> pointed out yourself, it gives rise to the principal question of ontology: 
> >> "why is there something rather than nothing at all?" The fact that this 
> >> question has been addressed by so many philosophers is an indication that 
> >> I'm not the only person for whom the issue of the microcosm is a cause for 
> >> consternation.
> > 
> > True. But the fact that anyone feels any particular way is not an argument 
> > that that feeling is important generally (beyond the person or persons who 
> > feel that way).
> 
> 
> I'm making no claim that the feeling is important generally.
> 
> 
> >> You seem to be under the impression that I'm somehow directing you to feel 
> >> consternation. Not so. You either feel it or you don't, and it's perfectly 
> >> okay with me if you don't. However, it doesn't seem perfectly okay with 
> >> you that I do. Why is my state of consternation such an issue for you?
> > 
> > I have no problem with how you feel. But you are arguing that this feeling 
> > is important to the general understanding and definition of consciousness 
> > and I am trying to see how.
> 
> 
> I'm making no such claim.
> 
> 
> >>> What does this sense of "consternation" you cite have to do with 
> >>> "defining consciousness -- can we, and if so what is it?"
> >>
> >> It's a realization of a particular use of the word for which there is 
> >> great difficulty in trying to apprehend through language.
> >
> > I'm sorry but I don't yet see how this realization or use affects the 
> > points I have made about brains and consciousness. We can define brains 
> > pretty well and can do something similar, albeit with more fuzziness, for 
> > minds and consciousness. What's the problem? 
> 
> The problem is that the idea of consciousness has not be derived from 
> empirical data, and so the notion that we can "do science with it" is 
> misguided. The only way this notion can be rescued is by stipulating a 
> definition of consciousness that has been derived from empirical data, and to 
> do so would be to completely overlook the issue to which Nagel is adverting.
>

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