[Wittrs] Re: Defining Consciousness -- Can we, and if so what is it?

  • From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2009 18:14:25 +0100

Stuart wrote:
> Cayuse wrote:
>>> Stuart wrote:
>>> I'm using "mind" as we normally do: "When I think of X, I have X in mind"; 
>>> "My mind is all confused"; "I have a certain image in my mind"; "A person 
>>> who is brain dead no longer gives evidence of having a mind"; etc. 
>> 
>> Perhaps, then, you should start a thread entitled "Defining Mind -- Can we, 
>> and if so what is it?" and then you can go on to discuss how brains make 
>> minds. My interest is in consciousness, particularly as Nagel describes his 
>> use of the word, which I considered pertinent to this thread as described in 
>> the subject line.
>
> I'm back now (as you can see). Will try to be relatively quick.
>
> I use "mind" and "consciousness" in a linked way. A mind is sometimes 
> conscious (meaning aware) and sometimes not (meaning unaware). However what 
> it always is is determined by it's having certain features which we call, in 
> the aggregate, "consciousness" (and which are not necessarily coterminous 
> with being conscious, meaning being aware, since there are many aspects of 
> our mind of which we are not always aware).
>
> So when I speak of "consciousness" I mean those features that minds have 
> which distinguish them from other things in the world, i.e., the features 
> which constitute what it means to be a subject to have what has elsewhere 
> been dubbed subjective experience.
>
> How you got out of any of this "the microcosm", even granting Wittgenstein's 
> somewhat unarticulated use of THAT term in the TLP, still eludes me. But I'm 
> certainly prepared to entertain this variation. The problem is you aren't 
> willing to explain it except to say 1) Wittgenstein used it that time in the 
> TLP (and agree there's no record he ever did thereafter and 2) that it can 
> have no meaning because it has no grammar.
>
> All well and good but then what's the point, in a discussion about 
> consciousness and mind in invoking the term and arguing for its equivalence 
> with, say, "consciousness"? 

It's the other way around. I invoke the term consciousness as used by Nagel and 
propose an equivalence to what W called the microcosm. I have deliberately 
avoided talking about mind since both words (consciousness and mind) are 
sources of much confusion, and to conflate them is compound the confusion. 
Consequently I will stick to the word consciousness and the claim that Nagel's 
use of the word finds a resonance in the TLP. Hopefully you can see why I 
consider your question "And what has microcosm as a concept (if it can even be 
one?) to do with understanding how brains make minds?" to be going off at a 
tangent.



>>>>>> Thoughts (etc.) take their place in the microcosm, but I don't know what 
>>>>>> it means to speak of an observer of thoughts (etc.)
>>>>> 
>>>>> We observe them, albeit not with our sensory apparatus but by attending 
>>>>> to them (which may include attending to our sensory inputs). 
>>>> 
>>>> What is this "me" that putatively "observes thoughts"?
>>> 
>>> The "I" who is speaking about it.
>>
>> What is this "I" that is putatively "speaking about it"?
> 
<snip> 
> By "I" we usually mean the locus of experiencing whatever is experienced. 

"There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas" 
(5.631). 
"I" is just another thought, and thoughts don't think or observe other thoughts.



> We have our experiences within a context that includes various relations to 
> the things around us 


There is no subject that "has experiences".



>>>>>>> How can it be nonsensical if we can shut down a brain and end 
>>>>>>> consciousness 
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't know how you can make any such claim about consciousness when 
>>>>>> the idea has not been derived from empirical data (unless you're 
>>>>>> stipulating it to be a behavioral trait).
>>>>>
>>>>> Do you think consciousness happens without brains (or some equivalent)? 
>>>> 
>>>> It would be nonsensical to make any such claim.
>>> 
>>> Yes because it goes against every bit of evidence we currently have. 
>>
>> Since consciousness admits of no empirical evidence, there is nothing to go 
>> against.
>
> Evertime we meet another person and interact with them and treat them as 
> being like us (rather than a rock or a cleverly bilt automaton) we have had 
> empirical evidence. 

We have an instinct called empathy. In all probability it was not eradicated 
(in the process of natural selection) because, as a behavioral trait, it 
confers benefits upon a population. But imagination takes this instinct a step 
further than mere overt behavior, enabling a picture of "what it's like to be 
somebody else" (another microcosm, or another instantiation of consciousness). 
The upshot is that we have no empirical evidence for consciousness at all, but 
rather we imagine it to be there.



>>>> In the absence a causal mechanism, all you have is a prejudiced picture of 
>>>> how the world is.
>>>
>>> All anyone has is a picture. All mechanisms, all relations are interpreted 
>>> in terms of our pictures.
>>
>> So do you have a picture of a causal mechanism by which the brain produces 
>> consciousness?
>
> That's a scientific question which many are working on (and part of what we 
> have been discussing here -- see Edelman, see Minsky, see Hawkins, see 
> Dennett). 


To consider it a scientific question is to imagine taking up a position outside 
of consciousness, from which consciousness can be viewed as a process or as an 
object entering into relation to other objects. No such "external view" is 
possible. At best all we can say is that we imagine others to be conscious, and 
that this imagined consciousness is imgined to be correlated with brain 
activity. Consciousness my be studied scientifically only if the word is used 
to denote something empirical like overt behavior or brain activity, in which 
case the use that Nagel makes of the word gets overlooked.



>>>> And in the absence of any such differential, there are no grounds for 
>>>> adopting any particular metaphysical picture.
>>>
>>> We all have pictures. Even Buddhism which, at its bottom, wants to banish 
>>> pictures, proceeds on the basis of them.
>>
>> Yes we do, and under these circumstances, such pictures are nonsensical. 
>> There are no grounds for favoring any particular picture from a collection 
>> of nonsensical pictures, so any such choice amounts to nothing more than a 
>> prejudice.
>
> "Prejudice" has a number of meanings and this usage of yours takes from the 
> pejorative sense we usually associate with the term and applies it to the 
> fact that we always have, must have pictures or things don't work (see 
> Wittgenstein's last book, On Certainty). But if we must have such pictures 
> then the point is to have the best ones, those that help us to succeed in the 
> world in which we find ourselves. So there are tests and even failures. That 
> doesn't change the fact though that without an overarching framework, a 
> picture of things, nothing makes sense (there's unintelligibility for you).


I'm using the word prejudice to refer to the situation where a logically 
possible scenario is eliminated in the absence of empirical evidence to the 
contrary.



>>>> the claim that brain activity is the cause of the microcosm is one of 
>>>> those metaphysical pictures.
>>>
>>> No it's a scientific point which, of course, presumes a certain picture but 
>>> it's also a picture that clearly works.
>>
>> It can't be a scientific point when the concept of consciousness has not 
>> been derived from empirical data.
>
> Who says it hasn't? That's what all the scientific debate is about. Of course 
> there are important conceptual questions (which really boil down to exploring 
> word usages) involved, too. But since science isn't working with your 
> substitution, there is nothing to close off the empirical aspect here at all.


Consciousness may be studied scientifically only if the word is used to denote 
something empirical like overt behavior or brain activity, in which case the 
use that Nagel makes of the word gets overlooked.



>>>> You can't do science unless you can test your hypothesis, and the 
>>>> hypothesis that "brain activity causes the microcosm" is not testable.
>>>
>>> First, "the microcosm" is not science because it is a word that has no 
>>> meaning based on your own denial that it is something we can speak of.
>>
>> I agree that we can't do science with the idea of the microcosm.
>
> And we can't intelligbly make the substitution either because the word, per 
> your own statement, has no grammar. 


It is imagined that another person is associated with a microcosm (an 
instantiation of consciousness on Nagel's use of the word). If this imagined 
scenario is correct then other instantiations of consciousness will likely also 
imagine the same thing. "Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can 
talk about the self in a non-psychological way." (5.641)



>>>> W wanted to leave it at that, but I find it such an interesting subject 
>>>> that I'm not about to let the limitations of language put me off. What 
>>>> must be acknowledged, though, is that we can't do science with it.
>>>
>>> What is interesting about something you can't speak about?
>>
>> "[...] that it exists." (6.44)
>
> Why?

Because my habits of thought demand that it be placed in within a bigger 
picture, and any such picture can have no sense.



>>> How shall you inquire?
>>
>> I make no personal inquiry, but I will point out that there is a use of the 
>> word consciousness that is relevant (in accordance with the subject line of 
>> these posts).
>
> That use seems to have no use since it has no grammar and points at no 
> referent in the world.

And so we can't do science with it.



>>> What can you ask? What possible answers could you ever obtain?
>>
>> "When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put 
>> into words. The riddle does not exist." (6.5)
>
> But we can ask how brains do what they do and how minds occur in brains. THAT 
> is not a riddle. It's a scientific question.

I'm not discussing mind but consciousness.



>>> If something is non-sense, then why concern yourself with trying to get it?
>>
>> I have no concern about trying to "get it".
>
> Then why insist on a substitution of terms that merely results in throwing 
> sand in the gears?

I'm not "insisting on a substitution of terms", but rather taking an interest 
in Nagel's definition of consciousness (consistent with the subject line of 
this thread) and pointing out a resonance in the TLP.




> And why feel "consternation" about it if you don't want to "get it"?

There is nothing that has a choice about it.



>>>> Oh but I do want to talk about it, regardless of W's reluctance to do so. 
>>>> I'm suggesting that there is a use of the word consciousness that pertains 
>>>> to the fact that the idea of the microcosm arises as part of the content 
>>>> of the microcosm. Furthermore, that Nagel is alluding to just such a 
>>>> picture when he stipulated consciousness to be the "what it's like to be 
>>>> me".
>>>
>>> But how can you suggest anything about a word that denotes nothing 
>>> conceivable?
>>
>> The word denotes nothing conceivable, but it is conceived all the same. This 
>> is the beginning of all the nonsense that is spoken about it.
>
> How can something that denotes nothing conceivable be conceived all the same? 


What is conceived is "the all" (as some people want to put it), and in that 
very act it gets objectified (this is the beginning of all the nonsense that is 
spoken about it).



>>>> It was W that decided there was nothing to be said, and it is here that I 
>>>> part company with him.
>>>
>>> Well what can you say about it beyond what he said?
>>
>> That there is a use of the word consciousness that pertains to the fact that 
>> the idea of the microcosm arises as part of the content of the microcosm.
>
> But how does this use tell us anything much if the recommended term has no 
> grammar and no referent? 

It tells us that any scientific investigation of it is on a hiding to nothing.



> And why propose it in a thread aimed at discussing what consciousness is as 
> it pertains to brains, i.e., how psychology arises from physics? 


I proposed it in a thread entitled "Defining Consciousness -- Can we, and if so 
what is it?"



>>>>> I wonder, are any others who may be following this discussion feeling 
>>>>> this "consternation" you cite?
>>>>
>>>> I'm not in a position to answer that question, but I'm sure that other 
>>>> people have felt this way and that people are still doing so. As you 
>>>> pointed out yourself, it gives rise to the principal question of ontology: 
>>>> "why is there something rather than nothing at all?" The fact that this 
>>>> question has been addressed by so many philosophers is an indication that 
>>>> I'm not the only person for whom the issue of the microcosm is a cause for 
>>>> consternation.
>>>
>>> True. But the fact that anyone feels any particular way is not an argument 
>>> that that feeling is important generally (beyond the person or persons who 
>>> feel that way).
>>
>> I'm making no claim that the feeling is important generally.
>
> Then why bring it up?

Because it's there as a result of the situation that W outlines in the TLP.



>>>> You seem to be under the impression that I'm somehow directing you to feel 
>>>> consternation. Not so. You either feel it or you don't, and it's perfectly 
>>>> okay with me if you don't. However, it doesn't seem perfectly okay with 
>>>> you that I do. Why is my state of consternation such an issue for you?
>>>
>>> I have no problem with how you feel. But you are arguing that this feeling 
>>> is important to the general understanding and definition of consciousness 
>>> and I am trying to see how.
>>
>> I'm making no such claim.
>
> Then there's no reason to even be talking about feeling consternation.

I spoke of it because it's there as a result of the situation that W outlines 
in the TLP.

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