[Wittrs] Re: Defining Consciousness -- Can we, and if so what is it?

  • From: "Stuart W. Mirsky" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 14:42:32 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart wrote:
> > Cayuse wrote:
> >> Consider the case of correlated tsunamis on the east coast of America and 
> >> on the west coast of Africa. It would be absurd to claim that one of these 
> >> tsunamis is the cause of the other. It would be equally absurd to claim 
> >> that this correlation is "evidence" for the idea that one of these 
> >> tsunamis is the cause of the other. The only way we can include causation 
> >> in this scenario is by postulating that both of these tsunamis are 
> >> different effects of a single prior cause (e.g. an earthquake at the 
> >> mid-Atlantic ridge). Now consider the case of consciousness and brain 
> >> activity. This case is not like the case of an undersea earthquake and a 
> >> subsequent tsunami since there is a clear causal mechanism connecting such 
> >> an earthquake to a tsunami. The best we can claim in the case of 
> >> consciousness and brain activity is a correlation (like the case with the 
> >> two tsunamis) since no causal mechanism has yet been established. 
> >> Consequently, in the absence of a causal mechanism, the claim that "brains 
> >> produce consciousness" is prejudging the issue. 
> > 
> > Some correlations are strong, some weak. Some indicate a causal relation, 
> > some don't. We recognize the former based on a picture of the facts and how 
> > they fit into the larger picture of the world we hold.
> 
> 
> So far so good, but in the case of the microcosm I would caution that it is 
> nonsensical to have a "larger picture of the world".
> 

Why? And what has microcosm as a concept (if it can even be one?) to do with 
understanding how brains make minds? 


> 
> > While with consciousness there is no particular thing or event we can 
> > observe (but only a range of events and phenomena we recognize as being 
> > aspects of consciousness), behavior and mental phenomena are observable. 
> > Where do these come from?
> 
> 
> I don't know what you mean by "obervable aspects of consciousness", or by 
> "observable mental phenomena".
> 

"Observable": The actions of entities that indicate awareness, understanding, 
recognition, and the elements we associate with a mental life.

"Mental": The mental life we recognize in ourselves, e.g., thoughts, memories, 
images, ideas, beliefs, sensations, feelings, insights, etc. (Think of my 
several recent examples: the mental imagery heralding the dawn of understanding 
of some strange statements, the sensation of having a heart attack, the 
sensation of losing one's vision and gaining it back again, the mental image of 
a thing in a moment of lucid dreaming precipitated by blacking out.)  


> 
> <snip> 
> > One can see the correlations as evidence of causality if one subscribes to 
> > a physical picture of things. Or one can deny it if one prefers an idealist 
> > or dualist picture and hold out for some other explanation or none at all. 
> 
> 
> I'm not claiming that brain activity does not cause consciousness, but rather 
> that both of these pictures are nonsensical.
> 

And that needs to be defended. How can it be nonsensical if we can shut down a 
brain and end consciousness or, if science should succeed, we can create what 
is, in effect, an artificial brain? What is the point of crying "nonsense" 
under such conditions? One can perhaps do it in the absence of artificial 
brains (until that absence is eliminated) but how can anyone imagine that it's 
nonsensical to speak of the causal relation between brain and mind in a 
scientific and even a common sense context.

Of course in a Buddhist context eveything, even existence is nonsense. But then 
"nonsense" means something very different than in a philosophical or even 
ordinary language sense.   


> 
> <snip>
> > You asked me to "defend" the claim that brains cause minds. There is no 
> > need to. If one subscribes to the picture that I subscribe to (that the 
> > world is physical), the strong correlation is all the evidence one needs. 
> > If one doesn't so subscribe, then one can see some other relation here.
> 
> 
> In the absence a causal mechanism, all you have is a prejudiced picture of 
> how the world is.
> 
> 

All anyone has is a picture. All mechanisms, all relations are interpreted in 
terms of our pictures. If it's not one picture, as Roseanne Rosannadana might 
have said, it's another. But not all pictures are equal. Some enable us to do 
better in the world (though some may simply not do us a lot of harm while being 
idiosyncratic, which is the case with most competing metaphysical claims 
precisely because metaphysics is premised on explaining everything AS IT IS). 

We can get away with being idealists or dualists in the world under most 
scenarios (so long as these don't include a belief that mind will alter matter 
in any way that does not involve the medium of physical agency, unless, of 
course that does happen though I, for one, have never seen evidence of it).

But if we are out to accomplish certain fairly specific things, say understand 
how brains work or build artificial intelligence, then, if dualism or idealism 
are incorrect, we won't make much progress. So at a certain level, when we 
reach a certain point, the pictures we hold do matter. No doubt we developed 
improved pictures as part of our evolution as well.

  
> <snip>
> > But that resolves nothing since this still leaves no way to differentiate 
> > between the competing metaphysical pictures.
> 
> And in the absence of any such differential, there are no grounds for 
> adopting any particular metaphysical picture.
>


We all have pictures. Even Buddhism which, at its bottom, wants to banish 
pictures, proceeds on the basis of them. 

 
> 
> > If all the pictures can account for the full range of phenomena of the 
> > world then are they all equally true? Or equally false? Wittgenstein 
> > redirected his attention to something more concrete, and wisely so. As to 
> > whether brains cause minds, there is nothing to discuss, especially if you 
> > want to talk about "the microcosm" since you have already said that THAT is 
> > beyond discourse (so citing it is no answer, either).
> 
> 
> To claim brain activity as the cause of the microcosm is to adopt a picture 
> that is nonsensical.
> 
> 

That is backed up by nothing and cannot be backed up, apparently, since you 
have defined "microcosm" as something we can't speak about. As to the assertion 
of nonsense, it is not demonstrated though, frankly, one could argue that it is 
more nonsensical in today's world to doubt the notion that brains are the cause 
of minds' occurrence in the world. But this sense of "nonsense" is probably not 
the same as what you have in mind.

Anyway, I think much of the bad press Wittgenstein often gets arises from this 
tendency to make grand, albeit unsupported, pronouncements based on claims like 
this one, that there is nothing that can be said. I don't think Wittgnstein's 
thinking is sufficiently captured by this approach. If there's nothing that can 
be said, then there is nothing that can be said. Therefore . . .   


> > Well there must be a lot that is beyond discourse given the fact that 
> > language is inherently bounded and can only go so far. More, if "the 
> > microcosm" is the "all" it is not much of an object at all or, rather it is 
> > too much of one for language to refer to. 
> 
> 
> Yes!
> 
> 
> <snip>
> > What is really unintelligible, I think, is trying to discuss and debate 
> > competing metaphysical pictures of the world.
> 
> Agreed, but the claim that brain activity is the cause of the microcosm is 
> one of those metaphysical pictures.
> 

No it's a scientific point which, of course, presumes a certain picture but 
it's also a picture that clearly works. 


> 
> > If you want to do science you pick the picture that best suits science. 
> 
> You can't do science unless you can test your hypothesis, and the hypothesis 
> that "brain activity causes the microcosm" is not testable.
> 
> 

First, "the microcosm" is not science because it is a word that has no meaning 
based on your own denial that it is something we can speak of.

Second, that brain activity causes mind (which you replace with "the 
microcosm") IS testable.

So now we have this funny situation where you have altered the language of the 
claim in order to produce a nonsense statement. But THAT isn't what science is 
concerned with.   


> >> It is nonsensical to adopt an idealist or a materialist or a dualist 
> >> position. 
> >> Nothing can be known about any putative domain beyond the microcosm.
> >
> > And "the microcosm" cannot be spoken of (and so has no meaning in language 
> > as the later Wittgenstein would have noted) so what is there to say about 
> > that? 
> 
> W wanted to leave it at that, but I find it such an interesting subject that 
> I'm not about to let the limitations of language put me off. What must be 
> acknowledged, though, is that we can't do science with it.
>

What is interesting about something you can't speak about? How shall you 
inquire? What can you ask? What possible answers could you ever obtain? If 
something is non-sense, then why concern yourself with trying to get it?

 
> 
> >>> What is your primary interest then?
> >>
> >> It's in the title you gave to this thread.
> >
> > But you don't want to talk about it but, rather, about "the microcosm" 
> > which, you tell us, cannot be spoken of. So then what?
> 
> 
> Oh but I do want to talk about it, regardless of W's reluctance to do so. I'm 
> suggesting that there is a use of the word consciousness that pertains to the 
> fact that the idea of the microcosm arises as part of the content of the 
> microcosm. Furthermore, that Nagel is alluding to just such a picture when he 
> stipulated consciousness to be the "what it's like to be me".
> 
> 

But how can you suggest anything about a word that denotes nothing conceivable?

> 
> >> That's what I've been trying to do all along, and I take full 
> >> responsibility for my evident lack of success. Articulation is not one of 
> >> my strong points.
> >
> > I suspect it's because of what you are endeavoring to articulate. If you 
> > have already decided there is nothing to be said, why try to say anything? 
> 
> It was W that decided there was nothing to be said, and it is here that I 
> part company with him.
> 

Well what can you say about it beyond what he said?


> 
> >>>> Having reached the conclusion that he did in TLP7, there is nothing left 
> >>>> to be said about it.
> >>> 
> >>> And yet he came back to philosophy after abandoning it. If there was 
> >>> nothing left to say, why come back and start saying again? 
> >>
> >> There's plenty of philosophy to be getting on with, without getting 
> >> embroiled in that which cannot be spoken about.
> > 
> > And what cannot be spoken about cannot be known or integrated in any claims 
> > of knowledge. 
> 
> What I meant was that, having concluded that there was no more to say on the 
> subject of the microcosm, W went on to address those aspects of philosophy 
> that there was more to say about. So it shouldn't be any surprise that "he 
> came back to philosophy", but this is just exhuming the issue that we've 
> already done to death.
> 

Yes. As I noted, his entire later approach denies the earlier one. It's not 
just that he ceased to use the word "microcosm" but that his later approach 
specifically involves guiding us away from such ways of speaking, from thinking 
that a word always reflected (referenced) something in the world (eithe 
something really there or something that we could coherently envision).   


> 
> >>>> To turn this consternation into a question is a mistake. 
> >>> 
> >>> To presume there is "consternation" is a mistake. 
> >>
> >> I can assure you that it is no presumption.
> >
> > How? I take it you mean you can speak for yourself. 
> 
> Yes, that is how.
> 

But that something causes you consternation does not suggest that it causes 
that more generally or that what you feel is anything more than a function of 
one's own psychology. 

> 
> > But that any of us are psychologically uneasy in any way doesn't mean 
> > either that others of us are or must be or that being so must lie at the 
> > heart of all the most serious concerns we might find ourselves wanting to 
> > address. Why, if you find defining consciousness (as header of this thread) 
> > interesting, would you then conclude or presume that it overlays a deeper 
> > phenomenon of "consternation"?
> 
> 
> I can't make any sense of the above. 
> 

What has defining "consciousness" to do with a feeling of consternation, either 
generally or specific to one person?  

> 
> > I wonder, are any others who may be following this discussion feeling this 
> > "consternation" you cite?
> 
> I'm not in a position to answer that question, but I'm sure that other people 
> have felt this way and that people are still doing so. As you pointed out 
> yourself, it gives rise to the principal question of ontology: "why is there 
> something rather than nothing at all?" The fact that this question has been 
> addressed by so many philosophers is an indication that I'm not the only 
> person for whom the issue of the microcosm is a cause for consternation.
> 

True. But the fact that anyone feels any particular way is not an argument that 
that feeling is important generally (beyond the person or persons who feel that 
way).

> 
> > And what is it precisely we are to feel consternation about? That we ARE 
> > conscious? That we won't always be? That it's unclear how being conscious 
> > fits into the broader scheme of things?
> 
> You seem to be under the impression that I'm somehow directing you to feel 
> consternation. Not so. You either feel it or you don't, and it's perfectly 
> okay with me if you don't. However, it doesn't seem perfectly okay with you 
> that I do. Why is my state of consternation such an issue for you?
> 

I have no problem with how you feel. But you are arguing that this feeling is 
important to the general understanding and definition of consciousness and I am 
trying to see how.


> 
> > What does this sense of "consternation" you cite have to do with "defining 
> > consciousness -- can we, and if so what is it?"
> 
> It's a realization of a particular use of the word for which there is great 
> difficulty in trying to apprehend through language.
>

I'm sorry but I don't yet see how this realization or use affects the points I 
have made about brains and consciousness. We can define brains pretty well and 
can do something similar, albeit with more fuzziness, for minds and 
consciousness. What's the problem? Maybe I am just being thick here but I 
really don't see where you're taking us unless its down a Buddhist like path, 
which is okay but a very different game (in later Wittgenstein terms) than 
science.  

SWM

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