[Wittrs] Re: Defining Consciousness -- Can we, and if so what is it?

  • From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 17:46:13 +0100

Stuart wrote:
> Cayuse wrote:
>> So far so good, but in the case of the microcosm I would caution that it is 
>> nonsensical to have a "larger picture of the world".
> 
> Why? 

It is nonsensical to speak of what might or might not lie "beyond" the 
microcosm, so any picture of a world that is "larger than the microcosm" is 
nonsensical.


> And what has microcosm as a concept (if it can even be one?) to do with 
> understanding how brains make minds? 

That all depends on how you're using the word "mind". If you're using it in a 
behaviorist sense then the concept of the microcosm has nothing to do with it 
at all. If you're taking it to be synonymous with the microcosm, then you are 
trying to understand how brains make microcosms.


>> I don't know what you mean by "obervable aspects of consciousness", or by 
>> "observable mental phenomena".
> 
> "Observable": The actions of entities that indicate awareness, understanding, 
> recognition, and the elements we associate with a mental life.


Actions are observable, as is any other behavioral trait you wish to mention. 
What I don't understand is how consciousness (or any aspect of it) can be 
observed.


> "Mental": The mental life we recognize in ourselves, e.g., thoughts, 
> memories, images, ideas, beliefs, sensations, feelings, insights, etc. 

Thoughts (etc.) take their place in the microcosm, but I don't know what it 
means to speak of an observer of thoughts (etc.)


>> I'm not claiming that brain activity does not cause consciousness, but 
>> rather that both of these pictures are nonsensical.
> 
> And that needs to be defended. How can it be nonsensical if we can shut down 
> a brain and end consciousness 


I don't know how you can make any such claim about consciousness when the idea 
has not been derived from empirical data (unless you're stipulating it to be a 
behavioral trait).



>> In the absence a causal mechanism, all you have is a prejudiced picture of 
>> how the world is.
> 
> All anyone has is a picture. All mechanisms, all relations are interpreted in 
> terms of our pictures. 


So do you have a picture of a causal mechanism by which the brain produces 
consciousness?


>> And in the absence of any such differential, there are no grounds for 
>> adopting any particular metaphysical picture.
>
> We all have pictures. Even Buddhism which, at its bottom, wants to banish 
> pictures, proceeds on the basis of them. 

Yes we do, and under these circumstances, such pictures are nonsensical. There 
are no grounds for favoring any particular picture from a collection of 
nonsensical pictures, so any such choice amounts to nothing more than a 
prejudice.


>> To claim brain activity as the cause of the microcosm is to adopt a picture 
>> that is nonsensical.
> 
> That is backed up by nothing and cannot be backed up, apparently, since you 
> have defined "microcosm" as something we can't speak about. 

No, W did that, and backed it up in the TLP. I just agreed with him. 


>> the claim that brain activity is the cause of the microcosm is one of those 
>> metaphysical pictures.
> 
> No it's a scientific point which, of course, presumes a certain picture but 
> it's also a picture that clearly works. 


It can't be a scientific point when the concept of consciousness has not been 
derived from empirical data.



 >> You can't do science unless you can test your hypothesis, and the 
 >> hypothesis that "brain activity causes the microcosm" is not testable.
> 
> First, "the microcosm" is not science because it is a word that has no 
> meaning based on your own denial that it is something we can speak of.


I agree that we can't do science with the idea of the microcosm.


> Second, that brain activity causes mind (which you replace with "the 
> microcosm") IS testable.


How do you test for the presence or absence of something that has no empirical 
aspects?


>> W wanted to leave it at that, but I find it such an interesting subject that 
>> I'm not about to let the limitations of language put me off. What must be 
>> acknowledged, though, is that we can't do science with it.
>
> What is interesting about something you can't speak about? 

"[...] that it exists." (6.44)


> How shall you inquire? 

I make no personal inquiry, but I will point out that there is a use of the 
word consciousness that is relevant (in accordance with the subject line of 
these posts). 


> What can you ask? What possible answers could you ever obtain?

"When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into 
words. The riddle does not exist." (6.5)


> If something is non-sense, then why concern yourself with trying to get it?


I have no concern about trying to "get it".


>> Oh but I do want to talk about it, regardless of W's reluctance to do so. 
>> I'm suggesting that there is a use of the word consciousness that pertains 
>> to the fact that the idea of the microcosm arises as part of the content of 
>> the microcosm. Furthermore, that Nagel is alluding to just such a picture 
>> when he stipulated consciousness to be the "what it's like to be me".
> 
> But how can you suggest anything about a word that denotes nothing 
> conceivable?


The word denotes nothing conceivable, but it is conceived all the same. This is 
the beginning of all the nonsense that is spoken about it.


>> It was W that decided there was nothing to be said, and it is here that I 
>> part company with him.
> 
> Well what can you say about it beyond what he said?


That there is a use of the word consciousness that pertains to the fact that 
the idea of the microcosm arises as part of the content of the microcosm. 
Furthermore, that Nagel is alluding to just such a picture when he stipulated 
consciousness to be the "what it's like to be me".



>>>> I can assure you that it is no presumption.
>>>
>>> How? I take it you mean you can speak for yourself. 
>> 
>>Yes, that is how.
> 
> But that something causes you consternation does not suggest that it causes 
> that more generally or that what you feel is anything more than a function of 
> one's own psychology. 

It clearly does cause others consternation too, hence the principal question of 
ontology.


>> I can't make any sense of the above. 
> 
> What has defining "consciousness" to do with a feeling of consternation, 
> either generally or specific to one person? 

Upon recognition of the existence of the microcosm, my habits of thought demand 
that I find a bigger picture in which to place it. But any such picture can 
have no sense. This leaves me with a feeling of consternation.


>>> I wonder, are any others who may be following this discussion feeling this 
>>> "consternation" you cite?
>>
>> I'm not in a position to answer that question, but I'm sure that other 
>> people have felt this way and that people are still doing so. As you pointed 
>> out yourself, it gives rise to the principal question of ontology: "why is 
>> there something rather than nothing at all?" The fact that this question has 
>> been addressed by so many philosophers is an indication that I'm not the 
>> only person for whom the issue of the microcosm is a cause for consternation.
> 
> True. But the fact that anyone feels any particular way is not an argument 
> that that feeling is important generally (beyond the person or persons who 
> feel that way).


I'm making no claim that the feeling is important generally.


>> You seem to be under the impression that I'm somehow directing you to feel 
>> consternation. Not so. You either feel it or you don't, and it's perfectly 
>> okay with me if you don't. However, it doesn't seem perfectly okay with you 
>> that I do. Why is my state of consternation such an issue for you?
> 
> I have no problem with how you feel. But you are arguing that this feeling is 
> important to the general understanding and definition of consciousness and I 
> am trying to see how.


I'm making no such claim.


>>> What does this sense of "consternation" you cite have to do with "defining 
>>> consciousness -- can we, and if so what is it?"
>>
>> It's a realization of a particular use of the word for which there is great 
>> difficulty in trying to apprehend through language.
>
> I'm sorry but I don't yet see how this realization or use affects the points 
> I have made about brains and consciousness. We can define brains pretty well 
> and can do something similar, albeit with more fuzziness, for minds and 
> consciousness. What's the problem? 

The problem is that the idea of consciousness has not be derived from empirical 
data, and so the notion that we can "do science with it" is misguided. The only 
way this notion can be rescued is by stipulating a definition of consciousness 
that has been derived from empirical data, and to do so would be to completely 
overlook the issue to which Nagel is adverting.

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