[Wittrs] Re: Defining Consciousness -- Can we, and if so what is it?

  • From: "Stuart W. Mirsky" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2009 23:27:29 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart wrote:
> > Cayuse wrote:
> >> I'm at a loss to know how correlation can be considered "evidence" for 
> >> causation.
> > 
> > Why? It's always treated as evidence of something. Correlation either shows 
> > a strong or a weak relation and under certain circumstances it is 
> > causation. When we do a regression analysis we are looking for the factors 
> > that exert the strongest influences on the effects we are measuring. The 
> > strongest influences of course are ultimately the causative ones.
> >
> > We can see correlation because it's a statistical factor. No, we don't see 
> > it like we see a rock or tree but we see it in the results of things, the 
> > outcomes. But we don't see causation. THAT is a concept we apply under 
> > certain circumstances. The occurrence of correlations beyond a certain 
> > degree or strength level indicates when we are to apply "casuation" as the 
> > relevant explanation. 
> 
> 
> Consider the case of correlated tsunamis on the east coast of America and on 
> the west coast of Africa. It would be absurd to claim that one of these 
> tsunamis is the cause of the other. It would be equally absurd to claim that 
> this correlation is "evidence" for the idea that one of these tsunamis is the 
> cause of the other. The only way we can include causation in this scenario is 
> by postulating that both of these tsunamis are different effects of a single 
> prior cause (e.g. an earthquake at the mid-Atlantic ridge). Now consider the 
> case of consciousness and brain activity. This case is not like the case of 
> an undersea earthquake and a subsequent tsunami since there is a clear causal 
> mechanism connecting such an earthquake to a tsunami. The best we can claim 
> in the case of consciousness and brain activity is a correlation (like the 
> case with the two tsunamis) since no causal mechanism has yet been 
> established. Consequently, in the absence of a causal mechanism, the claim 
> that "brains produce consciousness" is prejudging the issue. 
> 


Some correlations are strong, some weak. Some indicate a causal relation, some 
don't. We recognize the former based on a picture of the facts and how they fit 
into the larger picture of the world we hold.

While with consciousness there is no particular thing or event we can observe 
(but only a range of events and phenomena we recognize as being aspects of 
consciousness), behavior and mental phenomena are observable. Where do these 
come from?

How we interpret the evidence reflects how we picture the world. No one says 
you cannot picture it in a non-physical way, of course, or at least there is no 
law against that. The real question is what is to be gained by doing so? 
Sometimes it's more psychologically satisfying I suppose. But it doesn't work 
if we aim to apply either science or common sense about things.

One can see the correlations as evidence of causality if one subscribes to a 
physical picture of things. Or one can deny it if one prefers an idealist or 
dualist picture and hold out for some other explanation or none at all. 
Philosophy before Wittgenstein worried a great deal about which picture was the 
right one and, indeed, many in philosophy today still seem to make that their 
issue. But it is not resolvable by argument and logic, so why bother?

You asked me to "defend" the claim that brains cause minds. There is no need 
to. If one subscribes to the picture that I subscribe to (that the world is 
physical), the strong correlation is all the evidence one needs. If one doesn't 
so subscribe, then one can see some other relation here.

I recall the mystic philosopher P. D. Ouspensky proposed that brains are like 
lenses through which minds shine through. I thought that was ingenious because 
he managed to come up with an analogy which captured the obvious fact that a 
drugged brain or an injured one inevitably produce altered behaviors and mental 
phenomena. But so what? In the end, any decent metaphysical theory will explain 
everything about the world including the obvious dependence of minds on brains 
and their conditions. But that resolves nothing since this still leaves no way 
to differentiate between the competing metaphysical pictures.

If all the pictures can account for the full range of phenomena of the world 
then are they all equally true? Or equally false? Wittgenstein redirected his 
attention to something more concrete, and wisely so. As to whether brains cause 
minds, there is nothing to discuss, especially if you want to talk about "the 
microcosm" since you have already said that THAT is beyond discourse (so citing 
it is no answer, either).

Well there must be a lot that is beyond discourse given the fact that language 
is inherently bounded and can only go so far. More, if "the microcosm" is the 
"all" it is not much of an object at all or, rather it is too much of one for 
language to refer to.      

If you want to hang onto an idea that we cannot presume that brains cause minds 
and hang THAT hat on the hook of correlation (that correlation doesn't imply 
causation by itself) feel free. Bruce Denner, who has now joined us (though I 
haven't yet had the time to offer him a response), likes to argue that talk of 
brains causing minds is, ultimately, unintelligible and that this would have 
been Wittgenstein's position. In fact, I doubt the last very strongly and as to 
the first, I think it is perfectly intelligible to talk of brains causing minds 
in a scientific sense (how else could science proceed in talking about 
brains?). What is really unintelligible, I think, is trying to discuss and 
debate competing metaphysical pictures of the world.

If you want to do science you pick the picture that best suits science. If you 
want to do something else (religion?) you pick the picture that suits that. If 
the two pictures are incompatible you make a choice or jump between them and 
live a compartmentalized life. That's about the best you can get, I think. 
(Needless to say, I am interested in the scientific perspective so Ouspensky's 
or other dualist or idealist pictures aren't going to suit me very well.)    


> 
> >> To presume that brain activity is the cause of consciousness amounts to 
> >> nothing more than the adoption of a prejudice (as it would to presume that 
> >> consciousness is the cause of brain activity).
> <snip> 
> > Well should we take an idealist or dualist stance anyway? Nothing prevents 
> > it because both are perfectly consistent with the way the world works (that 
> > is their point, to explain everything as it is). But what is gained if it 
> > doesn't help you in the world (except maybe in some psychological way)? 
> 
> It is nonsensical to adopt an idealist or a materialist or a dualist 
> position. 
> Nothing can be known about any putative domain beyond the microcosm.
>

And "the microcosm" cannot be spoken of (and so has no meaning in language as 
the later Wittgenstein would have noted) so what is there to say about that? 

 
> 
> >>> It might make for an interesting paper though. Have you thought of making 
> >>> the case for this in detail, i.e., the idea that he did not, in fact, 
> >>> leave the TLP behind but merely supplemented it with some later work (as 
> >>> most philosophers do)? In essence this would be to argue that there were 
> >>> not at least two distinct Wittgensteinian philosophies but just one. 
> >>
> >> This is not my primary interest but merely a peripheral issue.
> <snip>
> > What is your primary interest then?
> 
> It's in the title you gave to this thread.
>

But you don't want to talk about it but, rather, about "the microcosm" which, 
you tell us, cannot be spoken of. So then what?

 
> 
> >>> If you think he is clear (and I don't in light of the quote) can you 
> >>> offer a reason why it is?
> >>
> >> Because of the context within which he places it in the rest of section 
> >> 5.6.
> > 
> > Can you explicate what you have in mind?
> 
> That's what I've been trying to do all along, and I take full responsibility 
> for my evident lack of success. Articulation is not one of my strong points.
>

I suspect it's because of what you are endeavoring to articulate. If you have 
already decided there is nothing to be said, why try to say anything? 

 
> 
> >> Having reached the conclusion that he did in TLP7, there is nothing left 
> >> to be said about it.
> > 
> > And yet he came back to philosophy after abandoning it. If there was 
> > nothing left to say, why come back and start saying again? 
> 
> 
> There's plenty of philosophy to be getting on with, without getting embroiled 
> in that which cannot be spoken about.
> 

And what cannot be spoken about cannot be known or integrated in any claims of 
knowledge. Now if the title of this thread is interesting then it must also be 
intelligible or we would be fooling ourselves about having found something of 
interest here to discuss. But if it is intelligible then we must be able to 
talk about it. Yet you want to replace it with the phrase "the microcosm" 
which, you tell us, denotes the all and cannot be spoken of. So now what? Can 
you find something interesting that is unintelligible and not susceptible to 
discussion (referencing, comparing, analyzing, etc.)? If we can't talk about it 
then why talk about it? But if consciousness can be spoken about in some other 
terms, why invoke "microcosms"?  

> 
> >> To turn this consternation into a question is a mistake. 
> > 
> > To presume there is "consternation" is a mistake. 
> 
> I can assure you that it is no presumption.
>

How? I take it you mean you can speak for yourself. But that any of us are 
psychologically uneasy in any way doesn't mean either that others of us are or 
must be or that being so must lie at the heart of all the most serious concerns 
we might find ourselves wanting to address. Why, if you find defining 
consciousness (as header of this thread) interesting, would you then conclude 
or presume that it overlays a deeper phenomenon of "consternation"?

I wonder, are any others who may be following this discussion feeling this 
"consternation" you cite?

And what is it precisely we are to feel consternation about? That we ARE 
conscious? That we won't always be? That it's unclear how being conscious fits 
into the broader scheme of things?

What does this sense of "consternation" you cite have to do with "defining 
consciousness -- can we, and if so what is it?"

SWM

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