[Wittrs] Re: some helpful guidelines for reading Wittgenstein's philo...

  • From: "gerardoprim" <gerardoprim@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 09 Aug 2009 05:59:21 -0000

(Stuart) I didn't say change is bad or that this change you describe may not 
even be the case. My only point is that, in this case, one has so changed the 
concept as to include what before was excluded in which case it is no longer 
about behavior alone. But what is "behaviorism" if it isn't about behavior 
alone?
(Gerardo) When you say "it is no longer about behavior alone" you´re sticking 
to "behavior in the old sense" (overt action), so you think "private phenomena 
are not REALLY behavior, we´re just pretending they are". But I´m looking the 
same issue from the new conceptual usage, and I don´t see private events as 
"not really behaviors": they are legitimate behaviors in the sense I´m using. 
It´s like if you´ve never seen a PC in your whole life, and when you see the 
screen you say "that´s not REALLY a desktop", and you think that only a desk on 
which you put pencils and papers can be named as "desktop". Obviously, for a PC 
user, the PC´s desktop is no less legitimate as a referent of the word.

(Stuart) Okay but note that I have given examples where mental phenomena occur 
without any behavioral aspects ever arising. I grant they could under the right 
circumstances.
(Gerardo) You´re doing the same as before: you´re sticking to "behavior in the 
old sense" (overt action). You say "mental phenomena occur without any 
behavioral aspects ever arising", and by "behavioral aspects" you mean overt 
action. I don´t, so I´d say instead that "covert behaviors can occur without 
having any public aspects that can be observed by other persons".

(Stuart) But merely because they could doesn't mean they ever will and yet the 
mental phenomena were real.
(Gerardo) The covert phenomena are real, but from this conceptual usage they´re 
behavioral, not mental. Remember that there´s a new distinction (between 
private experiences and other kinds of mental concepts), and this case falls in 
the first side, not the second.

(Stuart) This, it seems to me, obliges us to go beyond methodological 
behaviorism in giving any complete account of minds. But this is not to say 
there may not be real value in methodological behaviorism for psychological 
research.
(Gerardo) I guess you´re right if you mean that we must go beyond the 
assumption that "private experience is mental and must be excluded from 
research because it´s not objective" (this is one of the senses of 
"methodological behaviorism"), but this is exactly what Skinner proposed (as 
I´ve told you in my previous message), but I guess you´re wrong if you mean 
that we must go beyond the assumption that "studying overt behaviors is the 
best method for studying covert phenomena" (this is other of the senses of 
"methodological behaviorism"), because of the same arguments that Dennett gave 
for defending his heterophenomenology (we need public replicability of 
behavioral relations).

(Stuart) I didn't say it was wrong. I said it ceases to be strictly about 
behavior.
(Gerardo) You´r sticking to the old sense. I´d say instead "it ceases to be 
strictly about overt action".

(Stuart) In fact I think it's the correct move because it improves the 
behaviorist account. But I suspect that it is now something of a reach to 
continue to call it behaviorism. Certainly it is not the kind of behaviorism 
that was once popularized as Skinnerian.
(Gerardo) You´re having in mind only "logical behaviorism", but there were many 
kinds of "behaviorisms" (e.g.: Watson, Kantor, Skinner, Hull, Spence, Tolman, 
Carnap, Quine, Ryle, Rachlin, Staddon, Hayes) with only a "family resemblance" 
between them. There´re some paradigmatic features that are more typical: 
psychology is a branch of natural science (against dichotomy between natural 
and human sciences), psychological evidence should be objective evidence, 
introspection of private phenomena is problematic as evidence (but not as topic 
of research) and must not be used as basic data, mental constructs (as 
volition, intention, purpose) are problematic and must not be considered as 
causes, theoretical concepts ought to be tied to empirical observations, strong 
concern on the study of learning (relations between environmental events and 
responses), strong concern on the study of adaptation of the organism to its 
environment (learning, evolution), intensional concepts must be avoided in the 
theoretical accounts because they divert attention away from the focus on 
relationships between behavior and environment, causes must be searched in the 
environment (against postulating internal causes of human agency), etc. But not 
all behaviorisms agree with all features, and each kind argues its own 
combination of features in a specific way.
Don´t forget that we have two issues here: the usefulness of the conceptual 
framework that weakens the "overt-covert" distinction and strengthens the 
"observed activity-hypothetical concepts" distinction (against other possible 
conceptual frameworks), and the usefulness of the retention of the name 
"behaviorism" (against other possible names). If you have a better name, tell 
me your proposal and I´ll analyse it. But meanwhile, I guess that "skinnerian 
version of behaviorism" is possibly the more accurate and less confuse term to 
name such conceptual framework.

Regards,
Gerardo.

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