Thanks to RP for a very clear and emlightening account of two senses of "language-game" in the Wian corpus. T'l analyses/reconstructions of the competencies presupposed by either sense is possible, I would think. I've been arguing that "language game" as presented in the Brown Book constitutes a T'l condition for the possibility of meaning, language and onowledge, whether W identified things in this way or not. Interesting to think what a T analysis of the other sense of language game would look like. That would involve a reconstruction of the competencies present in master-level performance (asssuming W knew something about philosophy of course.) Hubert Dreyfus, along with some philosophers of education are into that kind of thing. Walter O (The least confused in RP's language game of hierarchical confusion) Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>: > Eric's comments are useful, as always, but although he's dead right > about the assumptions underlying Walter's questions, his assimilation of > language games to games is misleading. The segué from language games to > games is too easily made. The initial talk about games, and their > similarity to language in some broad sense, has its roots in > Wittgenstein's quarrel with Frege, who had said that a concept without > clear and definite boundaries is no concept at all. Wittgenstein > skirmishes with this notion throughout the early sections of the > Investigations (he wonders, for example, why 'Stand roughly here,' isn't > a perfectly clear request). > > Against Frege, he introduces the notion of games, lists their obvious > differences (and similarities), and asks by what standard might they all > be called games. (Talk of 'family resemblance follows this.) This > invocation of games is specific to the question of the need for clear > and precise boundaries—of concepts, and of the use of words. > > Then there's a shift, not always noticeable, perhaps. > > In §84, he notes that he'd said earlier that 'the application of a word > is not everywhere bounded by rules,' and goes on to ask, 'But what does > a game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? whose rules never > let a doubt creep in, but stop up all the cracks where it might?' > > In §83 he'd said, 'Doesn't the analogy between language and games shed > light here? We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field > with a ball so as to start various existing games , but playing many > without finishing them and in between, throwing the ball aimlessly into > the air, chasing someone with the ball and bombarding one another for a > joke and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing a > ball-game and following definite rules at every throw. > > 'And is there not also the case where we play—and make up the rules as > we go along? And there is even one where we alter them—as we go along. > > One of his targets here is the view of language (as founded on rules > which are themselves founded upon unalterable logic) in the Tractatus; > and this is a different target from the stricture that concepts in order > to be usable must be demarcated with absolute precision. > > Language games. Wittgenstein introduces language games briefly in the > Blue Book, and in more detail in the Brown Book. In the Brown Book > they're presented as primitive elements of language out of which our > complex natural languages might be constructed. (How, he does not say.) > > But in the Investigations, things are different. There, language games > are presented as examples (usually fanciful) stripped of the messy > trappings that surround our everyday talk. They are part of the > 'reminders assembled for particular purposes,' that make up his > technique. Language itself (whatever that could mean) is not one vast > language game. However, he does sometimes refer to 'the language game > played with...,' and also remark, with respect a particular word or > expression, 'This language game is played.' They are meant to be clear > and to help us see things that are unclear. > > He wants the simple language games he imagines to be perspicuous: not > themselves complicated or mysterious; and especially not in need of > further interpretation or of any worry about their (ordinary) game-like > variability. > > So we have four confused commentators: Walter, Eric, John McCreery, and > me. I come last, so I'm the most confused of all. > > Robert Paul > > Eric wrote: > > > As I read Wittgenstein, the notion of 'language game' was never intended > > to be a rigorously defined technical construct. It was, rather, what he > > seemed to see as a suggestive image, one that invites the analyst to > > consider what people are doing when they communicate, rather than > > focusing on what they are saying. > > > > The notion of 'game' served, in that context, several purposes. Every > > game has its rules, and every game's rules are arbitrary in an important > > sense. The only answer to "Why does the knight move this way" is > > "because that's how knights move." In general, adults don't expect > > there to be further answers. It is a concrete illustration of his > > dictum that explanations stop somewhere. > > > > Second, apart from involving human beings and having some notion of > > rules, games differ so much from one another that it's hard to see makes > > them all games. What exactly do cribbage and ice hockey have in > > common? Games bear family resemblances to one another, and the family > > of games is pretty capacious. I think Wittgenstein meant for us not to > > be searching for exactly what the language game is that is under way. > > > > Finally, the 'meaning' in a game is not to be found by examining the > > rules nor even, generally, in examining how the rules constrain the > > choices before the players. It is, instead, to be found in how the > > players interact with one another through the actions offered by the > > rules -- the meaning is in what they're doing, not in syntactic analysis > > the rules might offer. > > > > Wittgenstein's referring to language games in talking about language was > > not, I believe, intended as a "theory of language" or something else > > that could be tested with empirical research. It was, instead, intended > > as a suggestive metaphor that might lead those who caught its sense to a > > reconsideration of how they think about language. > > > > Walter's first question, as I read it, appears to presume that "language > > games" are definable things, which I do not think Wittgenstein actually > > believed. > > > > Walter asks: "What did W himself actually believe regarding the status > > of language games for the possibility of meaning and knowledge?" > > Something that can have a 'status' in this sense, is something that can > > be defined independently of that status, i.e. something which can be > > identified and then the status of which can be assessed. This is > > decidedly not what I think W was trying to describe. > > > > I'm not entirely sure what Walter is asking in the rest of his > > question. If he was asking what connection W drew between language > > games and the possibility of meaning and knowledge, I would suspect that > > the answer is that W in a way had no question about whether meaning and > > knowledge were possible, since there are frequent non-technical, > > practical circumstances in which we ask "what do you mean?" and "how do > > you know?", questions which are widely accepted as legitimate and > > questions which often can receive answers that the questioners accept as > > legitimate. In that sense, of course meaning and knowledge are > > possible, though exactly what we're calling 'possible' with that > > statement might be intractably elusive, because the myriad situations in > > which "what do you mean?" or "how do you know?" might legitimately be > > asked bear only a family resemblance to one another. > > > > But the bottom line is that the question I think Walter's asking has > > misunderstood what Wittgenstein is doing when he talks about language > > games. He is not expounding a theory of language, he is inviting > > attention to a facet of what is happening when we talk about language. > > > > So when Walter goes on to ask "What possibilities for meaning and > > knowledge are there independent of the construct of language games?" I > > think he greatly misses the point. The short answer to the question is > > "none" -- but to give that answer is to acknowledge that the question > > makes sense when the entire point of the exercise with language games > > has been to encourage setting aside the sort of analysis that leads to > > those kinds of questions. > > > > W goes on to ask, "Assume that human beings did not/could not engage in > > language games, what would the 'meaning' of a word or statement itself > > mean?" Again, the simple answer is that assuming human beings could not > > engage in language games is assuming human beings have no language. The > > meaning of the question seems to have been assumed away with its > > assumption. But more importantly, the idea that such a question is > > useful is exactly what W was calling into question. > > > > So, in closing, I *don't* think W saw the force of the question. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html