[lit-ideas] Re: Sounds right to me

  • From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2008 13:44:09 -0800 (PST)

Perhaps related. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/magazine/14wwln-Wallace-t.html?_r=3&ref=magazine
I liked the following:
He then ventured modestly that his own analysis of the problem “seems to 
warrant the following conclusion of our own: if Taylor and the fatalists want 
to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not 
semantics. And this seems entirely appropriate.” 
 
O.K.


--- On Mon, 12/15/08, wokshevs@xxxxxx <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:

From: wokshevs@xxxxxx <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Sounds right to me
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, wokshevs@xxxxxx
Cc: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Robert Paul" <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
Date: Monday, December 15, 2008, 9:22 PM

I just had a thought. (I know, beginner's luck.) 

Consider the claim:

"I can refer to a sensation by the use of 'S' only if I can check
my use of
'S'." 

Is there a claim here as to a necessary condition for the possibility of
something? Or is this simply an empirical, and hence, contingent, matter?

Consider now the following claim:

"Philosophical problems cannot be solved via appeal to experience."

Compare with:

"Odd coincidence: every time we've tried to solve a philosophical
problem via
appeal to experience, we've failed. We must re-double our efforts
here."

One last one:

"If one tried to advance *theses* in philosophy, it would never be
possible to
debate them, because everyone would agree to them."

What kind of a claim is one that denies the very possibility of debate
regarding
a philosophical thesis? Could it be one that W is presupposing a necessary
condition of debate that is not met by philosophical "theses."? 

Walter O.
MUN



Quoting wokshevs@xxxxxx:

> There seem to be two different questions here:
> 
> 1. What did W himself actually believe regarding the status of language
> games
> for the possibility of meaning and knowledge?
> 
> 2. What does his account of language games itself presuppose regarding the
> possibility of meaning and knowledge?
> 
> We distinguish between the 2 questions because it is possible that W did
not
> himnself understand what his account of language games actually entails. 
> 
> Perhaps a question to begin with here is: "What possibilities for
meaning
> and
> knowledge are there independent of the construct of language games?"
Assume
> that human beings did not/ could not engage in language games, what would
> the
> "meaning" of a word or a statement itself mean? I believe W
recognized the
> force of this question.
> 
> The remarks garnered together by Malcom and Von Wright as "On
certainty" are
> surely a testament to transcendental philosophy. The fundamental and
> pervasive
> claim running throughout those remarks is that if you doubted the validity
> of
> "hinge propositions," you would not be able to coherently doubt
at all, nor
> would you be able to make any knowledge-claims. W claimed Moore "knew
> nothing,"
> despite his hand waving, precisely because Moore occluded the necessity
and
> universality of such certainties for genuine knowledge-claims. 
> 
> We have here an interesting tug of war: was Witters a transcendental
> philosopher
> who claimed that our language games constituted the possibility for
meaning
> and
> knowledge or was he a cultural anthropologist in the tradition of Geertz
et
> al?
>  
> 
> Walter O.
> MUN
> 
> 
> 
> Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>:
> 
> > Walter asks
> > 
> > > Would anyone know of a source on Wittgenstein who examines why W
> believed
> > that 
> > > meaning and knowledge are not possible independent of language
games,
> and
> > what
> > > W specifically meant by that claim?  
> > 
> > This may be a futile search, for that is something he did not
believe; 
> > that is, there are no grounds for attributing such a belief to him.
> > 
> > There's very little epistemology in Wittgenstein, unless one
counts what 
> > he says about certainty, and claims to know such-and-such, in Über 
> > Gewissheit.
> > 
> > Robert Paul
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> 
> 
> 
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