--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > We have a starting definition that awaits an analytic definition after enough empirical inquiry. Do you mean to say that we start with the everyday, indisputable fact that we are conscious but a more technical definition might served us better in scientific research? If so, why called it "ontological subjectivity?" What does that convey that hasn't been said in my first sentence? Is it you want to stave off behavioristic and/or functional definitions that try to bypass our consciousness, which, of course, can only be seen in the 1st person, in order to restrict study to the 3rd person point of view? I don't see your consciousness. Then again, you don't see yours either. You are conscious. > we're after scientific explanations which don't involve programs. On what grounds do you claim that accounts of mind characterized as programs is less than scientific? Are you suggesting that only a causal account of mind in terms of BP is a scientific account? Aren't there lots of scientific accounts not causal? > If not, then one has to show how the notion of "information processing" is carved off the physics, Again, biology and psychology are respectable scientific disciplines not carved off physics. bruce ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/