[Wittrs] Re: Is Computation too Static to Sustain a Mind?
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2010 23:42:25 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
>
> > responding to http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/message/6172
>
>
> > Bruce:
> > None of this relationship stuff appears on the BP level.
>
> Yes, I agree with Bruce there.
>
>
> > Budd:
> > The problem here is that you raise questions which make it appear
> > that there can't be a psychology which is also read off physics. But
> > there has to be.
>
> Why does there have to be? To me, your statement comes across as an
> argument from ignorance.
We might be talking past each other here. By "having to be read off physics,"
I am including psychological generalizations which, though read off physics,
are read off brains as middle-sized objects such that the system-level
explanations are read off physics but not at some fundamental level where hard
core physics rules all potential laws that we might discover _at_ the barebones
level. For example, it is perfectly alright to think one may make a science of
psychology yet, despite tendencies of Dennettians, Wittgensteinians, and almost
the entire populations of Germany and France, as Fodor says in his inimitable
way.
>
>
> > Budd:
> > But it will be an empirical matter of finding corrolations--this
> > goes for consciousness as well as concept formation and may indeed
> > be at levels of organization that instantiate discoverable laws
> > about how concept formation necessarily happens at higher than the
> > molecular level.
>
> Correlations between what?
Between brain processes and:
1. Consciousness. (What caused the coma?)
2. Having concepts. (Why is that guy so much better at logic or have better
memory than I?)
> IMO, much of the talk about neural
> correlates of consciousness is terminally vague.
Perhaps for you. But you're not going to come up with an a priori argument for
this. It is a guess, a bet, a "what do you think of that" thought. I think
that the qualifier "much" above is much ado about potentially weak arguments
about terminally vague "much talk."
>
>
> > There is no good a priori argument to the effect that we can't have
> > what Fodor is groping for. And it is clear that many are fond of
> > not trying.
>
> That seems to reinforce the view that you are appealing to the argument
> from ignorance.
I won't begrudge appearances. But I did enjoy his paper: "The Revenge of the
Given" in _Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind_.
>
>
> > Weaker than Putnam's not trying would be just betting (except if
> > it involved money and a long lifespan I guess), as Neil simply bets
> > that Fodor's program/Searle's program can't be brought off.
>
> I wasn't betting; I was predicting. That is to say, my conclusion
> does not come from guessing.
>
> Regards,
> Neil
Okay, but if you convince enough that your prediction comes not from guessing,
then you may offer your possible theories instead or win by getting all not to
try. But that isn't going to work. Do you actually have a more plausible idea
in mind if it doesn't square with actually looking for correlations between
brain processes and consciousness or the having of concepts (thoughts)?
I think Peter is still waiting too!
At the end of the day, I'd rather not come off as cocky. But one does court
such an appearance when reminding others of their own brand of cockiness.
Cheers,
Budd
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