[Wittrs] Re: Is Computation too Static to Sustain a Mind?
- From: "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2010 01:25:01 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
> responding to http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/message/6183
> Budd:
> Minor quibbles: ...
Yes, it needs some work. At present, that's low priority.
I did recently start a blog where I am making occasional comments that
might be relevant to the issues. It's at
http://nwrickert.wordpress.com/ but you might be the only reader of
that blog.
> Budd:
> Also, it is hard to understand how perception as such is a product
> of learning.
I don't think that I suggested it is entirely a product of learning.
Eleanor Gibson (perceptual psychologist, married to JJ Gibson) did
write a whole book on perceptual learning.
> Budd:
> What we _say_ is perceived, though, is very largely influenced by
> a culture and its language.
And that would require perceptual learning.
> Budd:
> Way back at Analytic the Piraha people's lack of color words was
> being discussed. Perhaps they _could_ and do see different shades
> of color despite their having no reason to discuss them;
I probably wasn't involved at that time. I am not arguing for the
Sapir Whorf thesis. While there may be some validity, the claims of
Sapir/ Whorf are too strong.
> Budd:
> Also, perception is a biological phenomenon that happens causally
> and not necessarily due to measurement.
I don't agree with that. Yes, it is biological. Whether it happens
causally depends on what "causally" means here. And it surely does
depend on measurement. Biology is built out of homeostatic processes.
And a homeostatic process is, in effect, measuring its own current
status and adjusting its behavior accordingly. From my perspective,
the kind of measurement involved in homeostasis is a core biological
activity.
> Budd:
> I find it a kind of humunculus fallacy to say that there is actual
> measurement going on as part of the causal story about how perception
> as such is possible.
If you think that there is a homunculus fallacy in assuming that
homeostasis exists in biological systems, then I wonder how you could
account for biology itself.
> Budd:
> What I'm indirectly getting at is Fodor's notion of narrow content
> in his "The Revenge of the Given" found in _Contemporary Debates
> in Philosophy of Mind_.
I have not read that. I do think Fodor is way off target.
Here's a summary of my basic approach.
Traditional philosophy starts with facts, and then attempts to draw
conclusions from those facts. Fodor's philosophy is consistent with
that.
My position is that it is impossible to start with facts, because there
isn't any way of having facts. So we must start with the invention of
ways of having facts. In a way, that's consistent with Fodor's view,
too, though it is also directly opposed to Fodor's view.
Fodor says that you can't have facts unless you first have concepts.
And since we start with facts, we must have a bunch of innate concepts.
I say that since we can't have facts unless we first have concepts,
that we must start by constructing or inventing suitable concepts, and
only then can we have facts.
Regards,
Neil
=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
Other related posts:
