[Wittrs] Re: Is Computation too Static to Sustain a Mind?
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2010 23:34:27 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
> Bruce asked: Are you suggesting that only a causal account of mind in
> terms of BP is a scientific account?
>
> > Yes.
>
> Then psychology is not a science by your lights. Thanks for your candor.
> I'm not interested in changing your mind but in discovering how you come
> to way of thinking.
Well I'm going to have to disabuse you of a presupposition here. A science of
psychology is perfectly compatible with a BP explanation of consciousness.
Having concepts is going to be parasitic on having a BP story and the story of
concept acquisition and how there can be mental events causing other mental
events is a story about middle-sized objects like brains. As Fodor puts it,
meaning may be (and some insist should be) something to do with states of
nervous systems. Putnam's _The Threefold Cord_ argues a priori that such a
proposed psychology as Fodor would have it is full of promissory notes no one
knows how in principle to cash. Fodor just is not impressed with pragmatists
flouting a priori arguments against honest research programs. Cf. Fodor's
review of Putnam's book cited above: "A Science of Tuesdays." I'll offer the
entire review below.
> > When we talk about having concepts,
> > it is not enlightening to be told that they are examples of
> nonphysical facts.
>
> Agreed. I have no idea what a non-physical fact is. Facts are facts.
> They are not of any substance.
>
> > We have concepts precisely because we have brain capacity.
>
> In part. A necessary condition. Or at least that's we think about it.
>
> > This capacity is not really explained computationally.
>
> Not sure what a real explanation vs. an ordinary explanation. But if one
> insists that the old valid explanation is in terms of molecules in
> motion, then, by your lights, psychological accounts, using a computer
> metaphor, is not a full blooded account.
> >
> > Searle notes that consciousness is as biological a phenomenon as
> digestion
>
> I know. But I wouldn't say "notes." I'd say "trying to convince."
> Consciousness can be conceived from a 1st person or a 3rd person point
> of view. Digestion cannot. There is a world of difference there.
That's a good point. And that's why Searle notes (sorry) that consciousness is
a form of ontological subjectivity while digestion is not even though both are
biological phenomena.
>
> > maybe we can find corrollations between what brains are doing
> > when we enjoy having concepts or are otherwise conscious.
>
> Not "maybe", we have. But that empirical finding alone doesn't decide
> whether the correlation is best conceived as cause-effect, Searle vs
> "responsible-for", Sacks and Dehaene's usage.
>
> So what will it be?
>
> bruce
It will be a form of synchronic causation. An example would be gravity causing
the chair to stay seated on the floor. "Responsible for" would/could be just
another way of talking about synchronic causation.
But I'm not familiar with a proposed difference between synchronic causation
and "responsible for."
Need there be one?
Cheers,
Budd
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