[Wittrs] Re: Is Computation too Static to Sustain a Mind?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 22 Aug 2010 13:21:09 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
<snip>
> The common view seems to be that we get information about the world in
> an entirely mechanistic way that has no effect on us at all. And at the
> same time there is a currently unexplained playing of color movies in
> the cartesian theater. Perhaps it is not obvious, but right there is
> the committment to substance dualism.
>
> Regards,
> Neil
>
I've been trying to follow along on this but I'm not clear on what you're
saying above, Neil.
While it's true that the "common view" in scientific circles, and in those
arenas influenced by these circles is that "we get information in an entirely
mechanistic way" (i.e., physical data is received through our sensory apparatus
and sent up the line of the nervous system to a central processing area where
the inputted signals become our multitude of experiences through the workings
of the physical organ known as the brain), it is also true that most of us
constantly think of ourselves, when we allow our thoughts to stray in this
direction, as minds within bodies.
Our language seems to be structured for this kind of treatment of the
phenomenon of being a subject and so it leads to lots of misconceptions
including ideas about souls and bodies which, of course, is dualism.
If all you mean by your comments above is that the notion, described by Dennett
and you as the "Cartesian Theater" wherein the experiences of the data are
played for an observing mind already present, is dualism, then I would, of
course, agree. But it seems to me that you may not have that in mind. (I admit
I often find it difficult following the points you're making on this subject.)
If, on the other hand, you mean to say that the idea that the brain operates
physically is, itself, dualism (as some have claimed on this list), I would
demur.
Supposing that what we speak of as "mental" is a phenomenon that is physically
derived and dependent (no mental entities along for the ride, no ghosts in the
machine!), can hardly be characterized as "dualism" even if we continue to
refer to it as "mental" to distinguish it from what we call "physical".
Dualism is not the supposition that there are at least two distinct categories
of things: what is mental and what is physical. It is, rather, a matter of
whether the former (the mental) finally reduces to the latter (the physical) in
a causal sense.
I would hope, therefore, that you would clarify your point above. Is it
dualism, on your view, to hold that our experience(is) is(are) the outcome of
purely physical phenomena?
SWM
=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
Other related posts:
