[Wittrs] Re: Is Computation too Static to Sustain a Mind?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 05 Aug 2010 13:34:40 -0000
Since no one's picked up on Charlie's argument here, which seems to amount to
the claim that computer logic is necessarily too limited (because it is static
rather than dynamic) to produce consciousness via machine operations alone, I
thought I'd post my response to Charlie's off-line claim. (Again, Charlie had
indicated that he would be okay with my placing our debate for more public
review. However, so far I am not doing that with the entire exchange, only this
small portion).
Charlie said:
> From: "CMoel888@..." <CMoel888@...>Add to Contacts
> To: swmaerske@...; CMoel888@...
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Stuart,
>
> I observe:
>
> 1. Computing is the method of applying or performing algorithms on static
> frames of data.
>
> 2. Consciousness and thinking are dynamic processes, of which computing has
> none.
>
> Given these self-evident truths, how do you propose to reconcile
> "consciousness in a computer?"
>
> Best regards,
>
> Charlie
>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
My response below:
Well we don't know what consciousness (or the array of features we group as
"consciousness") is so, of course, there isn't a genuine logical problem posed
by your two seemingly incompatible statements below.
You speak of consciousness as consisting of "dynamic processes", just as you
speak of computing as "static". But the issue is what underlies that which you
call "dynamic"? After all, why shouldn't it be the sort of thing you call
"static" in computers?
These terms seem to have a meaning to us and the meanings seem to be clear.
What is dynamic is not static and vice versa. And I would say that's true. But
I would add that there are ranges of meaning and that what we mean in any
situation always depends on context, on the use.
For instance, while I think we would both agree that "static" means without
movement, without change, etc., I'm not sure that THAT meaning is applicable to
computers or computation. Yes, in a computational machine the processes can be
described as a series of fixed states. But once you introduce the idea of "a
series" into this, we are back to being "dynamic" aren't we?
Well you may say that's not what you mean by "dynamic". You have in mind the
flow of things we encounter in our own experience, our own consciousness.
Surely THAT is dynamic! But note that that says nothing about whether THAT
sense of changing states is or isn't grounded in a series of fixed states in
brains, states that are fixed in roughly the same way computational states in a
computer operation are fixed.
If by "dynamic" on the other hand you just mean the ability to respond on the
fly, so to speak, to incoming stimuli, i.e., the capacity of the platform to
operate with flexibility and even creative autonomy in the way most (perhaps
all) programmed computers cannot operate today, I would just note that we
aren't speaking of those computers but of a complex system designed and built
to more robust specifications which is yet to be developed and implemented. The
question of the viability of computationalism as a theory of consciousness is
not whether any given machine available today is conscious but whether a
machine that is built of nothing more than such components ever could be.
If being "dynamic" and being "static" are not strictly contradictory as you
assume (above), then there is no reason why a machine that is described as
consisting of static states in the way you mean (by your reference to
"computers") could not, at least in principle, be constructed to operate in a
dynamic way vis a vis the world or to have the dynamism of experience that we
find in ourselves.
<snip>
SWM
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