Hi Ron. Thanks for your comments--I was getting very lonely. I'm a bit short of time at present, so will only note now that your remarks seem quite un-Griffinian (even if they're not un-Tractarian!). I'm curious: How much of the Griffin book have you gotten through so far? And, in your opinion, how did he get so off base with respect to what W had in mind as elementary props and (atomic) objects? Walto --- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ron Allen <wavelets@...> wrote: > > Hi Walter: >  > I've fallen a little bit behind, but let me offer a few comments here. I'm > reading Griffin's book, by the way, and think it's pretty informative...if a > bit quirky. >  > I don't think it's right to say Russell "eliminated" definite descriptions > (DDs); it was one of his most important and lasting contributions to > philosophical logic (cf. Neale, "Descriptions," Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, > 1990). And W, I think, basically adheres to the analysis of DDs given by > Russell, namely, that they are disguised existential and uniqueness > statements. >  > Agreed, of course, that no DD is atomic. The atomic sentences in predicate > logic are just the strings of symbols of the form R(a, b, c, ...), where R is > an n-ary relation, and each a,b,c, etc. is either a constant or a term > containing no variables. So, if W. has this logic in mind for the way the > world of all that is the case operates, then he has to at some point concede > that there are atomic facts and corresponding atomic propositions. I don't > see any way around this, unless the TLP is vacuous. >  > At the same time, I think I can see how "The leaf is green" might be > analyzed into atomic propositions. We need names for simples and we need > either names for spatial locations or predicates that define spatial > locations (otherwise, there's no language for the arrangment of objects). So > "The leaf is green" becomes "Leaf is here" & "Green is here". In this way, > every atomic fact is just a thing at a place. But then we need properties or > effects, like green, warm, liquid, noisy, etc., to be things. >  > Why can't there be names for complexes? Why can't I have a name for a house, > "Tara", for example? Propositions about Tara resolve into more elementary > propositions about Tara's component objects: "Tara is burning" = "The roof is > burning" & "The porch is burning" & .... >  > It would also appear that species and genera would acquire names and logical > structures through disjunctions of some sort: water = this_water_1 | > this_water_2 | .... >  > Individual things, even if they are composite, like Tara, would be given by > logical conjunctions Tara = this_stud & that_stud & this_rafter & this_brick > & that_joist & .... >  > It's practically impossible to carry the analysis of complexes as far as it > would need to go, and there is always the possibility that empirical > investigation leads to the discovery that what we had named a simple is in > fact analyzable into components. Thus, there is no dire need to provide > examples, and this, I would suggest, is why W. did not provide concrete > examples. Although, as you point out, he did indicate their form: just what > first-order predicate logic would demand. >  > Thanks! > --Ron > > --- On Tue, 8/3/10, walto <calhorn@...> wrote: > > > From: walto <calhorn@...> > Subject: [quickphilosophy] What are objects, and what is the form of an > atomic prop? > To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Date: Tuesday, August 3, 2010, 3:33 PM > > >  > > > > In Wittgenstein' s Logical Atomism, James Griffin says that one common view > of what W meant by "analysis" in the Tractatus is mistaken. The confused > commentators have said that as W admired Russell's elimination of definite > descriptions by the use of bound variables, when he talked about analysis of > propositions down to ultimate elements, he must have been thinking of the > Russellian model for elimination of definite descriptions. But Griffin > points out that no such expression as > > > > "(Ex) Fx and (y)if Fy then y=x" > can be elementary because it contains logical terms, and, in any case, if > there is a problem of ambiguity with respect to "the biggest guy in the room" > it won't be eliminated through by  Russellian analysis. > In Griffin's view, W's propositional analysis is strictly analogous to > chemical analysis, and an analysis of "the broom is brown" will start with > such sentences as "the bristles are brown, the broomstick is brown, and the > bristles are connected to the broomstick." It will in this way analyze "the > broom" into smaller and smaller referents, just as a physical analysis would > break down the broom itself. > As Griffin understands the Tractatus, what's being claimed is that the > multiplicity of language mirrors that of the world partly because the most > elementary words (names) can designate only the most elementary objects > (simples). And, like Leibnizian monads, no atomic object can be altered or > destroyed, only moved around and/or combined with others. Similarly, on > Griffin's view of W, no name can be of any complex, but only of a simple > object. If that's true, it's unsurprising that W couldn't provide any > examples of atomic propositions. > With that intro in mind, here are a couple of interesting excerpts from > Griffin's book: >  > Every element in a proposition will be either a name or defined by names. > But this means that descriptive words like `broom', `brush' and `stick' will > be defined by names. But if names are of particulars, how can they define > general words? `Broom', after all, can be used to describe many things, and > how can I possibly give the meaning of this general word in terms which refer > to particular objects? It would almost seem on the basis of this that > names, other evidence to the contrary, cannot be restricted to particulars. > Now, however, we should see a way out of this difficulty. I said earlier > that analysis explains that what I mean by `the broom' is `the brush in a > certain relation to the stick'. What it explains, in other words, is what I > mean on this occasion; I mean this brush in a certain relation to this > stick'. And analysis is definition in this sense; by moving from statements > about complexes to statements about particulars, I > eventually define what I now mean by the signs in the unanalysed sentenceâ?¦. > [S]ince particulars configured in such and such a way constitute a broom, > names configured in such and such a way will say that these objects > constitute a broom. The role of general words in propositions is, in other > words, taken over in the elementary proposition by the configurations of its > signs. > What Griffin attempts to deduce from this is that no prop of the form Fa can > be an elementary proposition. In a recent post, I reproduced this: > 4.123 A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not > possess it. (This shade of blue and that one stand, eo ipso, in the > internal relation of lighter to darker. It is unthinkable that these two > objects should not stand in this relation.) > and I mentioned some difficulties it seems to engender. Griffin handles > them as follows: > If a shade of blue can have an internal property, then it also has a > structure; and if it has a structure, then it cannot be an object in the > strict sense. It is called an object because it and a darker blue are > spoken of as standing in a relation to one another, and speaking loosely we > can call terms of a relation objects. So, at least when the "F" in "Fa" is > a colour, "F" cannot refer to an object and "Fa" cannot be elementaryâ?¦.The > "a" in "a is blue" must therefore be complex. A blue object is an object > whose elements have a certain structure. Now, this way of talking, along > with W's earlier talk of physicists' points as examples of simples, makes his > account of blue very close to that of physics: a blue object is blue because > its surface is structured in a certain way, and it is blue rather than, say, > red, because to be red it would have to be structured differentlyâ?¦. > [B]oth colours and shapes, i.e. what we see, and sounds, i.e. what we hear, > turn out to be analyzableâ?¦.These areâ?¦good grounds for entertaining > seriously the idea that W thinks all `F''s in "Fa" are to be analysed away. > All facts, it seems, are quite literally objects in some configurationâ?¦ . > In analyzing `the broom is in the corner' we pass through several stages in > which we talk of the brush and the stick and then, presumably, of > sub-descriptions of these. The final stage comes when, leaving descriptions > altogether, we mention only particulars. Thus, names appear only in the > final stage. > This means that a name will appear in a proposition only when all the rest of > the signs in it are names too. This in turn, would seem to mean that since > the propositional sign "Fa" has the sign "F" in it, which is not a name, "a" > cannot be a nameâ?¦.Consider 3.221. `Objects can only be named'; in other > words, I cannot describe them; I cannot say of an object that it is an F. > 3.221 does not say just this, but I think we can surmise it. It does say > that I can only state how a thing is and not what it is. That I can only > say how a thing is means, I think, that I can only say how an object stands > in realtion to other objects; I can only give its configuration with other > objects. > I think it's worth mentioning here that the method by which Griffinâ?"and, he > says, Anscombe tooâ?"attempts to make this interpretation of objects and > simple props consistent with 4.24 (in which W explains his symbolism) doesn't > seem entirely convincing. On the Griffin interpretation of 4.22, it seems > to conflict with the simplest reading of 4.24, which certainly suggests that > there are atomic props of the form `Fa'. > Walto >