[Wittrs] Re: Is Computation too Static to Sustain a Mind?
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 14 Aug 2010 19:25:47 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
>
> > Well I'm going to have to disabuse you of a presupposition here.
> > A science of psychology is perfectly compatible with a BP explanation
> of consciousness.
>
> I'm intrigued with your position because in my 40 yrs around
> psychologists (not certain philosophers) I don't believe I've
> encountered your position. So let's see...
>
> > Having concepts is going to be parasitic on having a BP story
>
> Words like "parasitic" and "story" don't sound scientific. In fact, I
> don't know how to read them
>
> > As Fodor puts it, meaning may be (and some insist should be)
> something to do with states of nervous systems.
>
> "Something to do" is vague enough to mean virtually anything.
Like toast is tasty?
> Obviously,
> no brain, no concepts. But also, no two people, no marriage, but what
> one can say about a marriage can't be said about either person. A man
> and a woman don't cause a marriage. Though their presence is a necessary
> condition. By the same token, a brain is a necessary condition for
> concepts.
Really the same token?
>
> Can one argue that a necessary condition is a cause without actually
> demonstrating how the cause leads to the effect? Shouldn't the cause
> connect with the effect? Stuart argues that brain is more than a
> condition, a cause, but doesn't feel compelled to show the continuity
> between the cause and effect. You seem to have a different idea...
Synchronic causation, as the gravity example was supposed to convey, but didn't
for you. PP for Stuart.
>
> > It will be a form of synchronic causation. An example would be
> gravity causing the chair to stay seated on the floor.
>
> Does that work? Gravity is the concept we apply to observations in which
> objects behave such and such. Gravity doesn't cause.
Yes it does.
The causal account
> is in terms of molecules interacting in accordance with certain laws.
A tricky issue: nothing causal happens, strictly speaking, "in accordance with
certain laws." We discover laws by observation and talk in terms of how things
can necessarily happen. But this is a quibble.
> Are you imagining a law of physics which will tell us when the molecules
> of brain generate a concept?
Like I said, the gravity example was an example of synchronic causation..
How would you state the relationship
> between brain molecules and concept?
I needn't if I have larger middle-sized objects to hunt down in the form of,
say, neurons.
> And where would you place the
> person in relation to the concept?
Hopefully not too far away.
>
> None of this relationship stuff appears on the BP level.
>
> bruce
On the contrary, all of it does. You just have to know where to look.
For example, one doesn't need a molecular story of how an internal combustion
engine works.
The problem here is that you raise questions which make it appear that there
can't be a psychology which is also read off physics. But there has to be.
But it will be an empirical matter of finding corrolations--this goes for
consciousness as well as concept formation and may indeed be at levels of
organization that instantiate discoverable laws about how concept formation
necessarily happens at higher than the molecular level.
There is no good a priori argument to the effect that we can't have what Fodor
is groping for. And it is clear that many are fond of not trying.
I'm being a commentator here--I'm not getting paid to think about what Fodor is
thinking about.
And thanks for the questions. I hope you see why I maintain that Fodor is
right to have a problem with Putnam's a priori argument about meaning
realism/naturalism.
Weaker than Putnam's not trying would be just betting (except if it involved
money and a long lifespan I guess), as Neil simply bets that Fodor's
program/Searle's program can't be brought off.
The reasons for so saying are a few. I can imagine one saying that subjective
categories can't be formulated in the third person and such like.
k
Have you any major difficulties with Searle's paper "Why I Am Not a Property
Dualist"?
Cheers,
Budd
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