--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > We have a starting definition (of consciousness) > that awaits an analytic definition after enough empirical inquiry: Could you please give me other examples of starting definitions that after empirical inquiry allowed for an analytic definition. Also, and I hope I'm not asking too much, what empirical work do you have in mind that would allow for a definition of consciousness other than the ordinary one. > BP system can be given, willy-nilly, a computational description. How about a non-willy-nilly computational description. If a computational cognitive model has predictive power, is it or is not the best science for our buck? > given that we're after BP-type explanations > which don't need computational explanations. we just might want to reflect that the world doesn't necessarily bend to our conceptual dreams and we may have to give up the BP dream. That doesn't mean giving up science, if by since one means prediction, control, and coherent account. Just means recognizing that not all natural phenomena fit into the procrustean bed of matter. bruce ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/