[Wittrs] Re: Is Computation too Static to Sustain a Mind?
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2010 23:31:25 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
> > We have a starting definition that awaits an analytic definition after
> enough empirical inquiry.
>
> Do you mean to say that we start with the everyday, indisputable fact
> that we are conscious but a more technical definition might served us
> better in scientific research? If so, why called it "ontological
> subjectivity?" What does that convey that hasn't been said in my first
> sentence? Is it you want to stave off behavioristic and/or functional
> definitions that try to bypass our consciousness, which, of course, can
> only be seen in the 1st person, in order to restrict study to the 3rd
> person point of view?
>
> I don't see your consciousness. Then again, you don't see yours either.
> You are conscious.
Perhaps you would be well served to check out Searle's book _Consciousness and
Language_.
> > we're after scientific explanations which don't involve programs.
>
> On what grounds do you claim that accounts of mind characterized as
> programs is less than scientific?
If you don't know by now, why should I bother? Let me pull a Stuart and
conflate programs with physics. Call all programs BP. I wouldn't; but a
Stuart could.
>
> Are you suggesting that only a causal account of mind in terms of BP is
> a scientific account?
Yes.
> Aren't there lots of scientific accounts not
> causal?
No.
>
> > If not, then one has to show how the notion of "information
> processing" is carved off the physics,
>
> Again, biology and psychology are respectable scientific disciplines not
> carved off physics.
>
> bruce
I think you speak falsely. They surely are carved off physics but at
middle-sized levels where brains figure in concepts and consciousness.
So there are different types of explanation w/out there having to be any
nonphysicalist explanations at all.
When we talk about having concepts, it is not enlightening to be told that they
are examples of nonphysical facts. We have concepts precisely because we have
brain capacity. This capacity is not really explained computationally.
Searle notes that consciousness is as biological a phenomenon as digestion even
though the character of consciousness is exactly one perfectly described as
ontological subjectivity--it happens, is real, and maybe we can find
corrollations between what brains are doing when we enjoy having concepts or
are otherwise conscious.
I think Searle's book _Consciousness and Language_, which collects a few
individually produced papers, is an excellent guide in view of the sorts of
questions you are asking.
Note that Searle is such a good Wittgensteinian but only in the following way:
He doesn't talk smack and leaves the story short, clear and distinct. The rest
is empirical investigation.
Strong AI is like a quest for Disneyland. Not that Searle would argue that
Disneyland isn't fun. It's just that simulating the world for a minute or two
tells us nothing about how it works. Not that I ever need know how the brain
works to understand what functionalist explanations amount to.
Your buddy Stuart, however, talks smack when arguing that Searle equivocates,
is confused, and contradicts himself. Those charges would require heavy
lifting. Thanks to Stuart for keeping all this rather light!
Cheers,
Budd
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