[Wittrs] Re: Is Computation too Static to Sustain a Mind?
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 21 Aug 2010 19:59:59 -0000
> > Budd:
> > Way back at Analytic the Piraha people's lack of color words was
> > being discussed. Perhaps they _could_ and do see different shades
> > of color despite their having no reason to discuss them;
>
> I probably wasn't involved at that time. I am not arguing for the
> Sapir Whorf thesis. While there may be some validity, the claims of
> Sapir/ Whorf are too strong.
Thanks for the reference here.
>
>
> > Budd:
> > Also, perception is a biological phenomenon that happens causally
> > and not necessarily due to measurement.
>
> I don't agree with that. Yes, it is biological. Whether it happens
> causally depends on what "causally" means here.
I would agree.
> And it surely does
> depend on measurement.
I really do think it depends on blind causal mechanisms. I suppose these
mechanisms are sensitive to this and that and the sensitivity is given a
measurement interpretation as if measurement is going on.
> Biology is built out of homeostatic processes.
It is also built out of BP: brute physics that is blind.
> And a homeostatic process is, in effect, measuring its own current
> status and adjusting its behavior accordingly. From my perspective,
> the kind of measurement involved in homeostasis is a core biological
> activity.
I see what you mean.
>
>
> > Budd:
> > I find it a kind of humunculus fallacy to say that there is actual
> > measurement going on as part of the causal story about how perception
> > as such is possible.
>
> If you think that there is a homunculus fallacy in assuming that
> homeostasis exists in biological systems, then I wonder how you could
> account for biology itself.
By BP at an organic system level. The measurement idea of yours may just be
another way of talking about blind processes which are sensitive to (and so
measure) other blind (but sensitive) processes.
>
>
> > Budd:
> > What I'm indirectly getting at is Fodor's notion of narrow content
> > in his "The Revenge of the Given" found in _Contemporary Debates
> > in Philosophy of Mind_.
>
> I have not read that. I do think Fodor is way off target.
Many may say that. But many are out of their gourds on the topic for either of
two reasons: They haven't quite read him that thoroughly; they are committed
to a form of functionalism of (mental) content which is is, to put it mildly, a
disaster--even though no one has the key concepts to get us beyond the blind
alley contemporary theory of mind has led us, which is nowhere.
>
> Here's a summary of my basic approach.
>
> Traditional philosophy starts with facts, and then attempts to draw
> conclusions from those facts. Fodor's philosophy is consistent with
> that.
>
> My position is that it is impossible to start with facts, because there
> isn't any way of having facts. So we must start with the invention of
> ways of having facts.
But you said you weren't into epistemology earlier. Put it this way, there are
plenty of things you know without having to do philosophy. Like there are
pianos. Like you represent the door as open when it is open (when you are
seeing straight, blah, blah). "I have thoughts" doesn't need an invention of
ways of having them; and describing them is easily done with ordinary language.
> In a way, that's consistent with Fodor's view,
> too, though it is also directly opposed to Fodor's view.
Well, let's just say Fodor would think it nuts and call it a day. Positing
narrow content is not the sort of "way of world-making" someone who is an
externalist might suppose.
>
> Fodor says that you can't have facts unless you first have concepts.
And you can't invent ways of having facts if you haven't concepts.
> And since we start with facts, we must have a bunch of innate concepts.
Facts and concepts aren't, I suppose, of the same scope; further, some of the
facts we start with are nomologically (one would suppose) related to
observer-independent facts like the piano in the room. I am supposing, at the
same time, that by "innate" is meant "capacity for."
> I say that since we can't have facts unless we first have concepts,
> that we must start by constructing or inventing suitable concepts, and
> only then can we have facts.
>
> Regards,
> Neil
Fodor would distinguish responding to anomic properties from responding to
nomic properties. While there is need, perhaps, for narrow content to do the
type of bridge work between wide content and having those concepts from which
we begin a possible psychology for Fodor, I think it fair to say you might be
groping in his part of the woods, even though a novice has no clue. Maybe many
problems had with Fodor are because the nature of the subject matter. Just try
getting through:
CONCEPTS: WHERE COGNITIVE SCIENCE WENT WRONG. By Jerry A. Fodor. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 174.
I just want to add that it may be necessary to wear bright colors in this part
of the woods so no one accidentally gets shot!
Somewhat shot,
Budd
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