[lit-ideas] Re: virtue-practical example of being taught

  • From: "Mike Geary" <atlas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2006 01:18:47 -0600

RP:

...but as there's no guarantee that the (merely) prudent person will ever advance to a principle some might see the grasping of one as supererogatory,*

*Mike Geary challenged me to use this word in a sentence.

And well done, indeed, yes! But what about 'abstemious'? You haven't used it yet. Not to mention 'persiflage'. Come, come, Robert, papers were due two weeks ago. I can cut you some slack considering your load, but I have to turn in grades on Thursday. I'd love to give you more time, but I'm as much a cog in the inexorable process of the ineluctable laws of bureaucracy as you are, and though you may believe in a theodicy that will raise you above the checklists of pencil pushers -- hey, don't we all believe that? -- let me remind you that we are not yet living in those eschatological times when your glory will shine without being plugged into the culture system. Get busy, in other words.


Mike Geary
desperately putting off year end pencil pushing
in Memphis



----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Paul" <robert.paul@xxxxxxxx>
To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Sunday, January 01, 2006 11:32 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: virtue-practical example of being taught



John McCreery wrote:

Re Robert's remark that taking care of others should be more than
prudential. Here again, I certainly agree. But isn't it, I wonder, one
of the roles of institutions to make doing what's right doing what is
prudential as well? Habits born of prudence may ripen into principles.
Principles proclaimed—even skillfully defended—in classroom settings
alone remain where classroom exercises leave them.

Yes, this needs talking about. It may be one of the roles of institutions to do this, but as there's no guarantee that the (merely) prudent person will ever advance to a principle some might see the grasping of one as supererogatory,* as long as the right actions are carried out.


On the other hand, (Western) ethical theory has never recovered from Kant's insistence that moral action excludes prudential considerations, so that questions like 'Why should I be moral?' have, or seem to have,
a sense that Plato and Aristotle wouldn't have understood.


Plato thought that justice had to benefit the just person, or else, as Thrasymachus says, justice is a fraud. Kant dissolves this problem by saying justice not only needn't but shouldn't. I'd like to be able to show that it does and must benefit the just person but I'm not smart enough to show how it does. ('It makes me feel all warm inside,' isn't a very good answer to 'Why should I be just, etc.?]

Robert Paul
The Reed Institute

*Mike Geary challenged me to use this word in a sentence.
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