[Wittrs] Re: My Chinese Encyclopedia: The Red Chicken Footnote
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2010 04:11:35 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "College Dropout John O'Connor" <wittrsamr@...>
wrote:
<snip>
> You write:
> I don't have to quote when I am not claiming anything controversial about
> what he actually said (or challenging something someone else claims about
> something he said). Philosophy isn't about citing chapter and verse. It's
> about ideas and exploring them. If you think otherwise then we are clearly
> not talking about the same thing.
>
> I write:
> When you are not claiming anything controversial? If you haven't noticed,
> there is controversy in this thread. Back up your claims. If you think
> otherwise, you are not thinking.
>
What is in controversy are certain claims I have made and you have made. That
is, I questioned your claims re: certain positions which you have 1) asserted
are expressed by Wittgenstein in a certain way and 2) held by Wittgenstein as
his positions.
Recently we have been addressing your interpretation of his view of "nonsense"
and so forth. You have presented certain textual quotations which you then
proceed to interpret as supportive of your views.
I have offered 1) variant interpretations which do not support your view and 2)
some quotes from Wittgenstein's own preface to the PI that back up my claim
that he changed, in his thinking, from the old book to the new, that he
recognized that he had changed and that he articulated these changes in terms
of his recognizing "grave mistakes" in the earlier work (wherein you found your
evidence as to his view of "nonsense").
I had previously claimed that the later Wittgenstein took a broader view of the
notion, in sync with his later thinking about how language works. After all, he
not only noted that he had made mistakes in the earlier book, he offered a new
book that looked at things quite differently.
Therefore, I pointed out, that, when presented with two divergent
Wittgensteinian notions, one ought to favor the later if one is aware of
Wittgenstein's own movement from his earlier thinking.
My claim has to do with this:
The idea of nonsense as seen in the Tractatus is oddly restrictive and far too
narrow from the point of view of the later Wittgenstein. If nonsense is any
word or statement which has no referent, but may seem to (as in the Tractatus),
in the later Wittgenstein it will be seen to be lots of things, which may
include, but not be limited to, the Tractarian notion. (Though I think it would
also be arguable that his movement away from a picturing theory of language to
a tool box notion would also place the idea of useful but referentless terms in
question because these would seem to be examples of the kinds of linguistic
muddles he railed against in his later work, i.e., examples of taking language
"on holiday" -- this, by the way, is also to quote him though you often seem to
miss these briefer quotes I have included in my responses to you.)
Let's look at this a little more closely. You offered the claim that the first
sentence of the Tractatus is nonsense and so not discussable but, at least,
profound and worthy of intellectual deference. What is that sentence? "The
world is everything that is the case."
You likened this to the first line of words in Genesis.
Now I pointed out that while there is a similarity in tone and style of
delivery, there is not quite the similarity you claim for it. The first words
in Genesis purport to give us an account of how things came to be. The first
sentence in the Tractatus does not. As you correctly note, it has the form of a
tautology. That is, it tells us that what we mean by "the world" is everything
of which we can formulate a true sentence AND it tells us, further, that what
we mean by all those things of which we can speak truthfully is just the sum
totality that we refer to as "the world".
No one who thinks about it logically is going to challenge the truth of that
though, certainly, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth" is
not a tautology in this sensse. After all, there could be other alternatives.
Maybe many gods did it. Or maybe no God did it, i.e., it just happened. Or
maybe it didn't happen because, in fact, there is no beginning, in this sense,
at all.
Now note, as well, that the first sentence in the Tractatus has a stipulative
element and this is because there are readings of the sentence which would NOT
be tautological. For instance "the world" can also be taken to mean this planet
Earth which, after all, is not the sum total of everything about which a true
sentence can be uttered. Moreover, "world" has still another meaning. My wife,
who happens to be religious, often refers to her world, meaning the milieu in
which she moves (i.e., the company of people who share her views, the range of
practices which she follows, the things she believes, etc.). On either of these
two uses, "the world is NOT everything that is the case."
So Wittgenstein's sentence is tautological, yes, but only in a stipulative way,
i.e., he is telling us that THIS use of "world" is what he has in mind and,
askign us to follow along from this use to see where it leads us in terms of
the logical implications. Where it finally leads us, he says at the end, is to
a way of seeing things which, finally, depends on no facts but only on an
understanding of the logic, a way of understanding that then implies that we
recognize that nothing factual has been said and that, therefore, one has only
explored that which is nonsense in the sense of being non-sense.
You want me to offer you quotes from Wittgenstein demonstrating that my
interpretation that the sentence in question is tautological and therefore
nonsense in the sense in which he understands nonsense in the Tractatus is NOT
nonsense in every sense of the use of "nonsense"? Why? I am not claiming he
said THAT. I am claiming that his later thinking leads us to that view. And I
am pointing out that he, himself, knowingly moved beyond his earlier ideas and
he explicitly told us he did and, further, that the ideas found in the
Investigations, which hinge on his exploration of word usages in different
contexts, apply to a word like "nonsense" as much as to other words.
The point is that his later approach to language vitiates the more narrowly
constricted view (as found in the Tractatus) that referentless terms are a
useful form of nonsense.
> I wrote:
> > I am not interested in what textbooks say.
>
> you wrote:
> I am not giving you what textbooks say. I am giving you what I say in
> relation to the Wittgensteinian works we have been discussing here.
>
> No, you have been saying you are saying what Wittgenstein has said.
No, I am saying that the view of "nonsense" you are insisting on is finally
left behind by the later Wittgenstein based on his points about the nature of
language. In the Tractatus he took a view that language pictures the world,
that that is its function. Therefore claims of logic, which we make and
understand, finally play a different role than the main body of language, they
are supporting players as it were, without sense of their own. Hence the idea
that the propositions of the Tractatus are, finally, nonsense. Now obviously if
he meant "nonsense" in the common pejorative way he would have been making a
colossal joke, having first enticed us to follow along and then saying, at the
end, but what I have just told you is simply nonsense, a waste of your time!
But obviously he did not consider it a waste of the reader's time. Indeed he
thought and hoped it was an important work in philosophy and others told him
so, as well. So he was using "nonsense" in an almost polemical way, i.e.,
telling us that these statements tell us nothing about the world because there
are no referents which they point at in the world, but that hey, they are a
useful form of nonsense after all, thus suggesting that some nonsense is better
than other nonsense.
In his later years his thinking shows greater linguistic sophistication as he
no longer engages in efforts to depict truths of a sublime nature (a la the
Bible), that is, nonsense that really isn't. Rather he focuses on specific
linguistic usages, showing us how our words mislead us into making mistakes
that lead us to metaphysics. Of course, the Tractatus, for all its logical
form, is, finally, an exercise in metaphysics, endeavoring to describe for us
the limits of knowledge in terms of the limits of language, using a series of
logical statements and exploring their implications.
> I said, back it up and take your time in the next post. It is the same day
> and you are not backing up your claims but defending your right to claim
> whatever as Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is
> absolutely your right to bullshit your way through this thread;
I'm sorry you think actually applying thought to the ideas in question is just
"bullshit". I suppose it can look that way to some. But I will point out once
more that you seem to have an idea of Wittgenstein as a saintly expositor of
some kind of arcane wisdom. Thus, you want chapter and verse. You don't seem
willing to discuss the ideas on their own terms. You want me to give you some
statement of Wittgenstein's denying what you claim he is saying while I am
telling you why your claim as to what he is saying is suspect! I can see this
is having no effect however.
As I recall, you once put up a statement by Wittgenstein in which he is quoted
as saying that a reference he had made to "nonsense" meant one and only one
thing, that there wasn't anything else he meant, that nonsense is nonsense.
You maintained that that quote demonstrated that Wittgenstein's position was
that there are no such distinctions as I offered. So let's go over that again.
Why not put up the same quote, with its source and a link, or other means by
which we can see it in context, and let's take if from there? It would be
interesting to place it in the context of the progress in his thinking and in
terms of the full issue he was addressing in the quote in question.
I would be more than willing to look closely at your quote and consider whether
or not it definitively demonstrates, as you claim, that Wittgenstein's
definitive position was that all nonsense is just the same and that he never
held any other view, never evolved his position, etc., etc.
> I just do not see why we would even be having a conversation on philosophy if
> your thesis is "I can say whatever and claim that smart people agree with me
> without evidence, proof, or even the decency of citing my sources".
>
I made no claim about "smart people" agreeing with me. In fact, while agreement
is often welcome, I am no stranger to finding myself in disagreement with
others, even smart people! Nor am I worried about being out of agreement with
others, even smart people.
> I wrote:
> > I find it quite easy to quote the man; I read a little bit, see something
> > that relates to our discussion, and stick a scrap piece of > paper in the
> > book at that page.
>
> You wrote:
> Just repeating his words is not to properly consider and understand them. He
> said lots of things. Context is critical in understanding his points.
>
> I write:
> What are you talking about? You call quoting "just repeating his words" and
> then babble about relativity again.
I am pointing out that context matters, not just in terms of exploring word
usages, a la the later Wittgenstein, but in terms of determining what any
particular quote offered from someone meant. That's why we hear about problems
like taking someone's words "out of context".
> This is why I ask you to quote, because blanket statements like these add
> nothing to the conversation-- and really bore me. If you have more responses
> like this in this post I quoted of yours, there doesn't seem any sort of
> response to them.
>
I'm sorry you are bored by exchanges like this but I can't help that. This kind
of discourse, about ideas, is about what we think and our reasons for taking
those positions we report to one another. I can't help it if you prefer chapter
and verse. It's not enough to string lots of quotes together because all you
have then, at the end, are mantras and dogmas. We need to explore ideas and
understandings. If that isn't what you want to do then I'm definitely not the
right interlocutor for you!
> I wrote:
> > I dunno why you say the things you do and act as if you have proved a
> > point;
>
> You wrote:
> If I make a claim and then support it (sometimes with quotes, when needed, as
> in the case of the text I provided here from the preface to the
> Investigations) then I suppose I do think I have proved something. Why would
> I not? Obviously I think X and if I give reasons Y and Z for thinking it, and
> claim that those reasons are supportive, then, having given them, I think I
> have shown why I'm right. If you respond with reasons to disregard what I've
> cited and those reasons make sense, then you may very well undermine my claim
> to having made my case. But just denying them and saying you think otherwise
> and/or citing some unrelated text from Wittgenstein as justification for
> thinking otherwise isn't sufficient to demonstrate that what I've offered
> doesn't do the job I've set for it.
>
> I write:
> Quoting an introduction is not philosophy. There isn't any philosophy in the
> introduction to the TLP, the PR, nor the PI. So, what are the things he
> corrected? If you cannot pronounce them, then are you not simply making
> assumptions? At the least, you are not
> adding to the debate.
The quote was offered in support of my point that Wittgenstein changed his
views, acknowledged errors in his earlier views, etc. And it amply demonstrates
that.
If you want quotes from the PI then read it. The point is to understand the
work, the things he was doing, claiming in it, etc.
Now I don't recall offhand what he had to say specifically about "nonsense" in
the PI nor do I need to go back and discover some sacred text that explicitly
makes the point I am making. I am saying that the method of doing philosophy in
the PI amply supports my response to you that "nonsense" may have a range of
meanings, that there is not just ONE meaning to the term that is always the
same!
Now maybe you or someone else reading along here can offer some useful quotes
one way or the other from the PI that we can explore. But my points were these:
1) The PI introduced a radically different way of thinking about philosophical
questions that diverged from the earlier Tractatus;
2) That that way implies that words like "nonsense" are not limited to one
meaning and one meaning only;
3) That therefore one cannot rely on some earlier notions of his, say as found
in the Tractatus, to understand what he thought about a word like "nonsense";
and
4) That, if one does, one is effectively disregarding his own statements about
his break with his earlier way of doing philosophy; which
5) If so, then one is failing to consider the work of the man in its fullest
development in favor of deifying his every word and phrase throughout his life
as being of equal and unquestioned merit -- though he, himself, had the good
sense to do otherwise!
>
> I wrote:
> > if you think quoting in philosophy is religious fanaticism, then allow me
> > to refer you to philpapers.org; I've quoted Wittgenstein, Mark Twain,
> > Joseph Conrad, Ernest Hemmingway, etc. I may not be in college, but I
> > still know how to back up a claim; I can only hope that you don't fall into
> > the following category:
>
> You wrote:
> I have no problem with anyone offering quotes but the quotes should support
> one's case. I have not agreed that you have offered quotes here that support
> some of the claims you've made re: Wittgenstein's thinking and I have told
> you why. What you do with that is up to you.
>
> I write:
> You think the quotes shouldn't support the cases? What planet are you from?
> I have provided quotes that contradict what you have had to say about
> Wittgenstein (namely on the lack of need to
> differentiate kinds of nonsense);
I believe I responded to that but if you feel I haven't done so adequately,
please just re-post the quote, its source and (if possible) a link so we can
see it in context!
> you have simply responded tat Wittgenstein doesn't say that in the PI; But if
> he disagrees with his own words, and you think it is clear that he does,
> where is the quote to suggest to me that such is the
> case?
The entire PI militates against the view you ascribe to him, i.e., that he
believed that there is only one meaning of "nonsense".
> Simply stating that the quote I found was not from the PI doesn't prove a
> point.
It may if it represents an older position since, as we have seen, he grew and
altered his positions over the years.
> So, back up your claim because I have have quotes. It isn't as if you have
> to say "I lose" or "point taken"... heck, you don't even have to say "nice
> find". You don't have to say anything-- but that isn't the same as
> perpetuating unfounded claims.
>
Again, my point is that the PI, which is his definitive mature work, even if
published in incomplete form, and on which his later reputation is based,
presents an approach to philosophy that simply denies that there must be one
and only one meaning to a word found in ordinary language in most cases. Now
it's possible that he could have excluded "nonsense" from this class but I am
not aware that he did so and, more, it would be wrong, on the basis of his own
work, to have done so (so I am pretty confident there is nothing to be found in
his later work, including the PI, that does so). Why am I so certain? Because I
have already given at least four or five examples of different uses of
"nonsense". They all share the term itself but that, on his later thinking,
could hardly be enough. Again, there is:
1) Nonsense as a term that seems to refer but has no possible referent.
2) Nonsense as a term denoting something that is obviously false and known to
be so by knowledgeable people.
3) Nonsense as an artistic expression, say as an instance of doggerel as in
Lewis Carroll's Jaberwocky.
4) Nonsense as a term of logic that shows relations between other terms but
lacks referential meaning.
5) Nonsense as in a statement that combines otherwise meaningful terms in a
non-meaningful way.
6) Nonsense as in an uttered response that has no relation to the circumstances
in which it is uttered.
The later Wittgenstein would have recognized all these variations even if he
isn't on record discussing them. The point is to see what his later thinking is
telling us about language use and to apply it.
I am reminded that you have denied there is a distinction to be made between an
earlier Wittgenstein and the later but, to do that, you have to presume that
there was no change, no growth, indeed, no radical shift in his thinking from
his earlier to his later periods in philosophy. But this is gainsaid by his own
statements in the preface to the PI which I have quoted at some length here.
> I quoted:
> > "Apart from other things, I think that there was indeed something in the
> > content of his philosophy that, improperly assimilated, had and still has
> > an unfortunate effect on those influenced by it. I refer to his conception
> > that words are not used with 'fixed' meanings, that concepts do not have
> > 'sharp boundaries'. This teaching, I believe, produced a tendency in his
> > students to assume that precision and thoroughness were not required in
> > their own thinking. From this tendency nothing but slovenly philosophical
> > work could result."
> > -Norman Malcolm, 53, Memoir
>
> You write:
> While I do not think Malcolm is the most perspicacious expositor of
> Wittgenstein, I think he is absolutely right in the above. Precision is
> important in examining our word uses. Indeed, it is just that precision we
> must apply in every case. In fact, it's what I have been urging on you here,
> i.e., to pay attention to the changes in his approach over the years and
> don't lightly disregard his own words concerning his earlier work merely
> because you find that work attractive. Noting that word usage is flexible and
> dependent on context, on the other hand, is not a denial of precision. It's
> just to look for it in the right places, i.e., in the places where the words
> are used in ordinary language as opposed to in some rarified realm of our
> philosophical or theological imaginations.
>
> I write:
> More blanket statements. I've seen numerous claims of his against the TLP
> (and have not denied such claims, but have been precise in what those claims
> are); numerous clarifications about his thoughts then; and even posted my
> thoughts on the PI in light of the TLP; but you still haven't provided any
> examples for the claims you are making. So, take your time, search for those
> examples that make your point about Wittgenstein's changes, etc.
>
Again, I will tell you, I am responding to you with my understanding of
Wittgenstein on these issues. I am not offering you chapter and verse but
application. Now you may say that's not good enough in your view and you are
welcome to cite material disputing my interpretation as you attempt to do above
with Malcolm. However, note that I don't disagree with that particular point
made by Malcolm. However, I do have a somewhat different interpretation of
Malcolm's words than you seem to.
From the context of your quoting, I take it you are using Malcolm's words to
suggest that Wittgenstein's view was contrary to the notion "that words are not
used with 'fixed' meanings, that concepts do not have 'sharp boundaries'" since
I have made the point here, numerous times, that Wittgenstein's later thinking
recognized just this, i.e., that words' meanings aren't fixed in some permanent
way, that they are a function of use and often in flux, that there are no sharp
boundaries delineating meanings (think family resemblances), etc.
Presumably you read Malcolm's criticism of some students of Wittgenstein for
relying on this way of thinking as an excuse for loose and sloppy thinking,
etc., as a condemnation of this view, namely that words are in flux, do not
have clearly delineated boundaries, etc., etc. In this I think you misread the
Malcolm quote. Note that he is NOT denying such claims but pointing out that it
is easy to use these as an excuse for being cloudy and imprecise.
> I wrote:
> > I have been saying that 'mind' is nonsense, and so is a lot of other stuff;
> > and there is no point in differentiating nonsense (and
> > I've quoted W on this matter).
>
> you wrote:
> I don't believe your quotes showed that Wittgenstein didn't think that
> nonsense takes many different forms and I explained why.
>
> I write:
> I quoted the guy saying there are not different kinds of nonsense and I also
> showed how several examples make his point clear. You are welcome to
> disagree, but at the least I back my claims up. I would hope you would do
> likewise, to show some common courtesy.
>
I would welcome your putting up that quote again with the citation sources so
we can look at it once more. I believe I addressed it adequately at the outset
but if you think I haven't, let's have another go. The point will be to see at
what stage this represented Wittgenstein's thinking, did he really say this in
a context that supports your view of his meaning, and how does this accord with
his later ideas?
> You write:
> However, let's say your quotes showed he did agree with that viewpoint. Would
> that oblige me to agree, too, do you think? After all, Wittgenstein was an
> insightful thinker but not a prophet who was infallible. Indeed, he himself
> acknowledged having made what he called "grave mistakes". Is the ultimate
> source of the rightness of any idea to be found in Wittgenstein alone?
>
> I write:
> If ya disagree with him, don't claim he disagrees with me. If I disagree
> with him, I'll state it. And whether he was right or wrong has nothing to do
> with the conversation at hand.
>
The issue seems to have come back to that quote you presented and how it should
be understood, so let's have another go. At this point the issue is not with
how we each think but which of us is right in interpreting his ideas as applied
to a word like "nonsense". So let's proceed. All you need do is put that quote
back up here with its source, and, hopefully, a link so we can see it in
context.
> you write:
> Is the term "mind" nonsense as you seem to want to put it? Can you show that
> this was Wittgenstein's position since you seem to take this position on the
> grounds that that was what he thought?
>
> Now I will grant that you can likely come up with some texts of his seeming
> to suggest something along those lines, e.g., it's nor a something but not a
> nothing either. But Wittgenstein also had occasion to speak of minds. Did he
> do so because the term was nonsense?
>
> I write:
> The only book Wittgenstein ever published was 100% nonsense. Of course he
> spoke nonsense and of nonsense. So do I. And so do you. And so does, like
> everyone. From C&V, paraphrased, 'It isn't that we mustn't speak nonsense
> but be aware of it'.(If you must, I'll grab the quote, but ,iirc, I posted
> that quote in our other thread.
>
Please repost. By the way, I think Culture and Value is a very iffy book. There
are lots of interesting parts in it that give us insight into his thinking but,
finally, they are just a bunch of personal jottings he made to himself in the
course of thinking various issues through, on the way to refining his ideas.
The remarks in Culture and Value are very uneven in quality and, besides, the
editors expunged the text so we will never know what the full text contained.
As to your comment about the Tractatus being "100% nonsense" note, again, that,
by his own admission, he made "grave errors" in that book and the PI was being
prepared as a means, at least in part, of correcting those errors. If the
thinking in the PI applied to the notion of "nonsense" is grasped, it will be
seen that at least one of the errors in the Tractatus he may well have had in
mind was that you could speak about the unspeakable by speaking around it in
terms of what, finally, had no sense in any ordinary sense of "sense".
> Quote:
> > <snip>
> . . . I don't think I quoted the Bible in that topic, but I did a little
> quote from the
> > opening lines in this topic and !
>
> You write:
> In your later presentation it was offered by way of showing how the Tractatus
> is laid out. I think that reflects another "grave mistake", in this case a
> deification of Wittgenstein and his work. The Tractatus is a book, a
> metaphysical effort built on logic which aims to delimit and differentiate
> the zones of speech from what is beyond speech. In the end, he writes, we
> must climb up the ladder he has built, then throw the ladder away beneath us.
> Aside from the peculiar imagery of THAT metaphor, it has the effect of
> acknowledging that the Tractatus, in the end, is nonsense (in the way you
> take nonsense to be -- referentless terms that seem to make references). I
> suggested to you that the later Wittgenstein abandoned this approach in favor
> of one that looks at language in all its manifestations equally. Just as
> there is not only one way of using language, i.e., as referencing the
> elements of the world, so there is not only one way of speaking nonsense.
>
> I write:
> There you go with unfounded claims again, saying what Wittgenstein thought of
> the TLP (and only after I make the grammar clear to you).
Oy (as PB on Analytic used to say)! Look, I gave you direct quotes of what
Wittgenstein himself said about the Tractatus. If you want to deify him and
refuse to recognize the changes he himself recognized in his thinking in order
to hold that he was always a source of some sort of holy philosophical writ,
there's not a lot I can do to disabuse you of that notion. We have his own
words. If they aren't enough for you, then nothing could be.
> Your eyes are brown in what I have quoted.
?
> Please, take your time with the next post, or just say you disagree with
> Wittgenstein, or don't care, or leave, or whatever. If you still want to
> speak of "minds" and "infinities" and "deities" then you haven't thrown the
> TLP out the window. I read it once and
> have moved on.
No, I don't think you've moved on at all.
> I constantly get accusations that I read the book religiously, but it simply
> is not true. But I was trained to be a journalist and I'll quote everytime I
> wish to make a claim for another person.
>
Again, my claims have to do with the fact that YOUR interpretation of
Wittgenstein on "nonsense" doesn't accord with the later work of the man. I
don't claim there is some particular quote of his that has him saying "there
are many kinds of nonsense and here they are". I only claim that his way of
understanding things, in his later period (which you strangely deny differs in
any substantive way from his earlier!), is inconsistent with the view you
ascribe to him in the earlier phase of his thinking. I don't deny that it looks
like he once thought differently and may even have thought as you suggest. I
only deny that THAT way you ascribe to him is consistent with his later ideas.
Think "family resemblances" again!
> You wrote:
> The later Wittgenstein had a richer, more robust understanding of language
> and its role in our thinking, in our ideas. That is the point you should not
> forget. Let the Tractatus go. He did.
>
> I write:
> "Richer" and "More robust" and other nonsense words... We are discussing
> philosophy here. You have anything pertinent to say, or are you going to be
> responding to my post with more empty claims in 4 hours time?
>
No, I guess you are not someone who is open to the input of others. Like many
on lists like these, you are here to advance your own agenda which, right or
wrong, is fixed for you. As I said, repost that quote you had and let's examine
it again since you didn't like my original answer. If it supports your view,
I'll say so. My view, as you may recall, is that the later Wittgenstein's
thinking does not accord with an idea that a word like "nonsense" has one and
only one meaning.
> I wrote:
> > you seemed to have a lot to say about translating languages and the
> > numbered verses, etc. And you seem to accuse me of some things while using
> > some nonsense words (and, going by what I've been saying, > I cannot reply
> > to nonsense with agreement or disagreement).
>
> You wrote:
> Well if you aren't specific about what you deem nonsense in what I said, I
> cannot respond. Maybe that's the easiest way to go here.
>
> I write:
> Quit being an ass. "Deity" is a nonsense word.
>
"Ass" is a nonsense word. I don't know about "deity". However a case can be
made that there are referents for both, just as Russell's bald king of France
can be understood as a fiction and hence a kind of referent (albeit not one
found in the physical world), so can "deity". As to "ass" well I don't know
whether you mean a donkey or a butt or maybe both or maybe some hybrid!
> I wrote:
> > I must say that if you think I (or W) is about hierarchies, you have
> > simply misunderstood.
>
> You wrote:
> I don't know what that refers to.
>
> I write:
> The word "deities". It isn't exactly a secret that church is hierarchical.
>
I wasn't referring to churches but to the religious inclination of some, the
tendency to believe rather than to understand.
> I wrote:
> > If W can write the opening lines of the Bible without mentioning 'creation'
> > or 'God' or 'Heaven', I do not know why you wish to speak to me about
> > 'deities' or 'minds' or 'infinities'.
>
> You wrote:
> What makes you think "The world is everything that is the case" is equivalent
> to the opening lines of Genesis? They do have a similar cadence in English
> and a similar apodictic tone. And both seem to be about the world, of course.
> But in the end those aren't a lot of similarities nor do they get at the
> meaning to be found in the two statements.
>
> I write:
> They are not. That is the whole point. Why do you think he speaks of a
> calculus. They are both nonsense, however. And there isn't any meaning in
> it. The world is tautological.
>
Is it? See my points at the top of this post.
> I wrote:
> > I hope I have made it clear that if I am to say anything about those
> > words, it is that they are nonsense.
>
> You wrote:
> Since you don't recognize kinds of nonsense, but do accept that we can speak
> nonsense, you essentially shut the door on further inquiry here by labeling
> these statements as nonsense. Perhaps that is all you want to do though?
>
> I write:
> Well, you can reread that quote from Zettel if you like. Or maybe the PI or
> something else by W. Yes, I am imitating Wittgenstein, albeit quite terribly.
>
Ah it was from Zettel. Yes now I recall! Do put it up again and I will get my
copy down and we can have a look. However, bear in mind that Zettel is a very
early compilation of his thoughts, roughly around the time of the writing of
the Tractatus, actually!
> You wrote:
> In fact the biblical phrase purports to tell us a story about how things came
> into being while the opening lines of the Tractatus announce a logical truth.
> There is a great disjunction there unless one decides to treat both
> statements as just "nonsense", and mean by this term that nothing more is to
> be said about either of them, in which case the disjunction in their meanings
> is merely to be ignored (there being, of course, no meanings now to be
> discovered!).
>
> I write:
> Have we not already been through this? I do wonder if you have read any
> Wittgenstein when you say something like this. Metaphysical statements, like
> "it is what it is" and more robust variants, are tautological. But you
> wanted to say something about logic?
>
The Tractatus has a logical form and it is the place where he introduced the
Truth Tables that became a part of the discipline of logic.
> You wrote:
> You are asking us to accept the two statements as nonsense in both cases, the
> biblical phrase being a pronouncement from on high that may not be questioned
> because of its provenance; the opening statement of the Tractatus being a
> pronouncement from the true philosophical prophet which is also, presumably,
> beyond questioning.
>
> I write:
> Acceptance? Hardly. I would normally ask if you can see, but I don't think
> there is any point in asking that here. Nor adding that was one of
> Wittgenstein's questions without an answer.
>
As I said, you seem to have a religious approach to Wittgenstein: questions
without answers and so fort. Have you not heard that what can be said can be
said clearly?
> You wrote:
> But how is this philosophy? And why, if it is, did Wittgenstein alter his
> methods in his mature years? Did he receive a new revelation? Or are you
> still certain that he didn't really alter anything at all, despite his own
> acknowledgement that he did?
>
> I write:
> There is a lot of gray area between never changing one's mind and having "a
> new revelation". Simply because I disagree with your interpretation that
> Wittgenstein abandoned all ownership of what he published and lectured on
> besides the PI and OC, doesn't mean my claim is the opposite. Subtle changes
> are difficult to perceive.
>
You misunderstand my claim. I never said "Wittgenstein abandoned all ownership
of what he published and lectured on besides the PI and OC". I said he passed
beyond it and recognized, in doing so, that he had previously made what he,
himself, called "grave errors". I further said that his later work does not
accord with the position you ascribe to him (taken from a quote in the very
early Zettel) that there is one and only one kind of nonsense. Therefore, we
should not take THAT view as definitive of his position as it only reflects a
stage in his thinking which he left behind him.
> You write:
> I would suggest that this is the kind of stuff that often gives Wittgenstein
> a bad name in the minds of other schools of philosophy, i.e., he is
> interpreted by some as being beyond question because he is seen to be beyond
> all logic and discourse, to have entered the realm of pure revelation. I
> think his Tractatus does point in that direction which, on my view, is part
> of the "grave errors" he made there.
>
> I write:
> More blanket statements. Considering he is the most popular philosopher of
> the 20th century, often regarded as the best thing
> since Kant, etc. ... well, I guess that is a point in its own right.
There are a great many in the philosophical community, especially exponents of
other philosophical schools (Direct Reference Theory, Critical Rationalism)
that hang their claims of opposition to Wittgenstein at least in part on the
tendency of many of his acolytes to engage in what Malcolm refers to in that
quote of yours as loose and imprecise thinking. Many of these Wittgensteinains
fall back on the idea that his views cannot be challenged or questioned, they
must simply be imbibed and accepted. That isn't philosophy and it isn't what
Wittgenstein himself did (see his crediting Ramsey and Sraffa for critiquing
his ideas).
> You just gunna jab at me all night or say something with substance?
>
Sometimes we just don't see what others are saying. I suspect that is so in
your case from this last remark.
> I wrote:
> > However, applying the notions of language-games to the evolution of
> > religions doesn't seem too far out. Language-games are sometimes used as a
> > notion for comparative theology. Maybe there are other applications, but
> > applications would be significant. And this goes back to whether a+b=c is
> > true or false or nonsense.
>
> You wrote:
> "language games" a la Wittgenstein "as a notion for comparative theology"?
> Well I think he would have said that yes, the claims of different theological
> persuasions reflect different ways of speaking. But does that convert into
> the doing of theology? Isnt theology, as a way of describing notions of the
> deity, to fall into the very mistakes he was on about in his later years, to
> suppose that one can speak of a deity, which one wishes to have faith in, as
> though it were a provable object in (or outside) the universe?
>
> I write:
> Now you claim I am doing theology?
You are the one who wrote: ". . . applying the notions of language-games to the
evolution of religions doesn't seem too far out. Language-games are sometimes
used as a notion for comparative theology."
> Or do you think I am saying the TLP is about theology?
No. That you are treating it theologically.
> Where does all this nonsense that you claim come from? I gave an example of
> what some people do with the notion of language games; google it or
> something. I was not asking whether you agreed with it. As for proving a
> deity, or even proving the meanings of words, there is no such thing.
>
Well we can certainly prove the meaning of a word or else why do we have
dictionaries and sometimes cite them to others during discourse?
> "He thought that the symbolisms of religion are 'wonderful'; but he
> distrusted theological formulations. He objected to the idea that
> Christianity is a 'doctrine' .... For Wittgenstein, the emphasis on religious
> belief had to be on doing -- on 'amending one's ways', 'turning one's life
> around' .... Once I quoted to him a remark of Kierkegaard which went
> something like this: 'How can it be that Christ does not exist, since I know
> that he has saved me?' Wittgenstein's response was: 'You see! It isn't a
> question of proving anything!'"
> -Malcolm's Memoir
>
> I wrote:
> > But here I am stuck (for the moment :p ). I wish to say something about
> > applications. 1+2=3 comes to mind, and so too does apple+pine=pineapple.
> > Maybe the 'verification principle' would do good here. It seems to me, at
> > least, that it may be related to the good old quote, "Back to rough ground!"
>
> You wrote:
> We should be very careful emulating the master here! As Malcolm notes, many
> get him wrong because he is so cryptic at times, leaving so much open for the
> individual's own interpretation. (And that's because, in his case, philosophy
> was about individual instances of seeing things in a new way.)
>
> I write:
> Why are you calling Wittgenstein "master"? And why do you tell me to be
> careful when I tell you I can not go on from here? Is it dangerous ahead?
>
I was being facetious. I guess I should have used quotes, eh? But I thought the
context and the exclamation point would suffice. My bad.
As to what you are doing, my point is that your text above looks like you are
trying to emulate Wittgenstein's method. But I think you err in that since
rather than getting clarity you are raising smoke and this IS the kind of thing
Malcolm would have had in mind in that first quote of his you placed here.
> You wrote:
> I never said what he said outside the PI is irrelevant so why would I have to
> back it up? What I said was that there is a sharp break between the later and
> earlier Wittgensteins and that the Tractatus represents the earlier at its
> zenith, the PI the later at its. There are lots of good intervening materials
> to be discovered and read and certainly the Tractatus is not without
> interest. But the works he produced are not all of equal merit and even he
> explicitly announced that there were "grave errors" in his earlier thinking
> (manifested in the Tractatus).
>
> I write:
> Yeah, that'd be an unfounded claim. If there are grave errors in the TLP,
> then there ought to be in the PI too, no?
Not necessarily. Why would the fact that someone erred in one text imply he
erred in another, that one text with mistakes implied that any other texts must
also have them? Have you never heard of correcting oneself? As to being
"unfounded" what is unfounded about my point that he, himself, informed his
readers of "grave errors" in the Tractatus, especially since I took the time to
transcribe the text onto this list from the preface to the PI and gave full
citation?
> If they are not all of equal merit, then we still have a hierarchical
> structure.
?
> This sharp break has not been made sufficiently made clear, unless it is one
> of those "obvious" things and I am just supposed to roll with what you have
> to say.
>
He said it when he alluded to "grave errors" and thanked two individuals
publicly for helping him to realize those mistakes. The sharpness of the break
is evident in the two texts and I have already described the features which
evidence that break.
> I write:
> Say, if Wittgenstein wrote a book on calculus and then a history of calculi,
> and these were the TLP and the PI, where would this sharp break be?
>
But he didn't. He wrote the Tractatus and the Investigations and said in the
latter that there were "grave errors" in the former and that it would help
readers of the latter to have the former before them when they read the latter
so they could better see what he was writing in the latter. Your problem is
that you don't want to take Wittgenstein at his word and rely, for that choice,
on the fact that he wasn't as explicit as he could have been, i.e., he didn't
list the errors, discuss them, explain what he was abandoning and what he
hadn't abandoned, etc. Of course to see that you have to do as he says: read
the PI and compare it to the Tractatus.
> That would probably be one of those questions without answers, like many of
> those I "asked" on this thread. Go read some HL Finch or watnot; this thread
> is dead.
> --
> He had a wonderful life.
> ==========================================
Yes, I suppose it is. You are wedded to your belief about Wittgenstein
regardless of anything he, himself, said or what the texts actually
demonstrate. I cannot change that.
SWM
=========================================
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