[Wittrs] Re: My Chinese Encyclopedia: The Red Chicken Footnote
- From: "College Dropout John O'Connor" <sixminuteabs@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2010 00:12:20 -0400
> I wrote:
> You could just have easily made animal sounds, but sensible or senseless,
> these are logical. Unless you were making some other point... Maybe you
> think of logic narrowly? The TLP has remarks dismissing the notion that
> sentences are T/F. Truth tables help illustrate this.
>
You wrote:
I am thinking of the discipline of logic, firstly, and, secondly, of the
logical relations involving assertions of truth and falsity and how our
language is far broader than just that.
Now one can stipulate a different meaning for "logic", say that it is all those
relations expressed in the full gamut of rules of linguistic usage but the
later Wittgenstein tended to use a different term for that: "grammar". Well is
logic grammar or is grammar what we mean by logic? I think that this so
broadens the meaning of logic that it enables it to be seen in the inclusive
way you want to use the term but then I don't think it is very useful anymore
since Wittgenstein himself chose to move from an emphasis on logic as being the
paradigm of linguistic usages to that of rules (grammar) some of which will
involve logical relationships (true-false dichotomies) while some will not
(expressive and emotive statements, for instance).
I write:
All you ever do is hide behind false presentations with me. The latter, the
early, etc. There is no such thing. We have both been speaking of nonsense,
with your continual cues as to how the "early" and "latter" agree with what we
were discussing... and now, when asked questions, all is relative to you!
Please of please quit speaking of the 'meaning of words' while citing
Wittgenstein. Even if there were a "latter" Wittgenstein, the 'meaning of
words' would have nothing to do with it.
We were originally speaking of the uselessness of the word "mind" in scientific
discourse. Your response seems to be that it is not useless; and then when we
try to talk of anything, you get abstract and say "it depends". I think that
shows my point. Nay, Wittgenstein's point.
As for blurring grammar and logic, please at least pretend to have read the
TLP. Grammar is mentioned in there, with great emphasis, as to not being
arbitrary, even if it has the appearance of being arbitrary.
> I quoted:
> > 314. Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in
> > philosophical investigation: the difficulty-- I might say-- is not that of
> > finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution
> > something that looks as if it were only preliminary to it. "We have
> > already said everything.-- Not anything that follows from this, no, this
> > itself is the solution!"
> > This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation,
> > whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the
> > right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to
> > get beyond it.
> > The difficulty here is: to stop.
> >
> > -LW, Zettel
>
> You wrote:
> Yes, in some contexts that is the way we use language.
>
> I write:
> What makes you think we are speaking of language use? Surely the generality
> can be applied to any search. Again, what does an ellipse add that is not
> already present? A marker? An instruction?
>
You wrote:
Yes, language is just one of the things we do and I agree that we may just
decide to stop in many other activities in which we are engaged. That is the
value, though, of noting that this is also the way language works when making
claims, arguing, etc. Language, after all, is just another form of human
behavior, just another thing we humans do.
I write:
How is language only one of the things we do? Considering the context of you
and I, language is all we have. And yet all these 'other things' you wish to
say are important are contained; What sort of tone does my writing confer?
> I wrote:
> > What is the difference between [1 2 3] and [1 2 3 ...]?
>
> You wrote:
> Depends. One could say it's the way the notation of inscription is to be
> read. The first allows for the idea that three numbers are the whole story,
> the second, with its dots of continuation (a notational convention), that
> they aren't. The first could be a way of presenting a descriptor that
> reflects the combination of the three digits. The second, suggests not a
> descriptor but merely the commencement of a counting series, etc.
>
> I write:
> Saying it is notation is hardly any more than saying it is three period is a
> row.
You wrote:
That would be a description of this particular notation. Saying it's a notation
is to say it has a role in our method of employing written coordination, i.e.,
it signifies something (or some things) when added to a sentence, the proper
recognition (understanding) of which will reflect seeing the context in which
it occurs in a clear enough way.
I write:
All I see is a bunch of abstract language in that last paragraph. Which, as I
have attested to, says nothing. I don;t think I can stand to hear much more of
it. "proper" and "particular" and "some thing" ...
(See, I can use the ellipse as signifying exasperation. But was that not
present even without the ellipse?)
I wrote:
> As for the whole story description, consider that we have a base 10 number
> system, but ten numbers is not the whole story. Thus, from whence does your
> description come from?
>
You wrote:
An understanding that something has been left out when an ellipse is employed
in this way. And that is to recognize its notational role.
I write:
Nothing is left out! Read the quote from Zettel again. This is the confusion
of philosophers; all this superfluous nonsense adds nothing.
I could write [1 3 6 10] and a pattern is easy enough to guess. But what
pattern of numbers could not be made out to confirm a rule?
"this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule."-LW
> I write:
> You say you would not characterize nonsense in any definite way,
> and then you characterize in 5 definitions.
You wrote:
None of which are claimed by me to be definitive, only to be examples of how we
would use the term. Nor would I claim that that list is exhaustive though it
exhausts my thoughts on the usage for the moment. My point: Linguistic uses,
though involving specific rules and rule following, are not close-ended. There
is always room for new variations.
I write:
You definitions are not definitive? Is this not a contradiction? It is
nonsense.
I wrote:
> All of which say the same thing: nonsense breaks rules, or nonsense is
> obvious.
>
You wrote:
Sometimes breaking rules is not nonsensical at all, or it is seen to have sense
only in the context of different rules. Is nonsense obvious? I think that
sometimes it is, but in different ways, depending on the type at issue.
I write:
I was not the one arguing that nonsense breaks rules, you were. Nonsense is
perfectly legitimate. We simply must be aware when we are speaking it.
Am I coming off as contradictory?
Good luck!
--
He lived a wonderful life.
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