[Wittrs] Re: My Chinese Encyclopedia: The Red Chicken Footnote
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2010 00:11:39 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "College Dropout John O'Connor" <wittrsamr@...>
wrote:
> I wrote:
> > You can look into W's argument for there being nothing outside of logic,
> > for then we would have to think illogically, etc.
> >
> > I mean, if we aint logical, then we are all ... well, could anything even
> > be said if that were the case?
>
> You wrote:
> "Ouch" "I love you" "Don't kill" "Where's Waldo?"
>
> I write:
> You could just have easily made animal sounds, but sensible or senseless,
> these are logical. Unless you were making some other point... Maybe you
> think of logic narrowly? The TLP has remarks dismissing the notion that
> sentences are T/F. Truth tables help illustrate this.
>
I am thinking of the discipline of logic, firstly, and, secondly, of the
logical relations involving assertions of truth and falsity and how our
language is far broader than just that.
Now one can stipulate a different meaning for "logic", say that it is all those
relations expressed in the full gamut of rules of linguistic usage but the
later Wittgenstein tended to use a different term for that: "grammar". Well is
logic grammar or is grammar what we mean by logic? I think that this so
broadens the meaning of logic that it enables it to be seen in the inclusive
way you want to use the term but then I don't think it is very useful anymore
since Wittgenstein himself chose to move from an emphasis on logic as being the
paradigm of linguistic usages to that of rules (grammar) some of which will
involve logical relationships (true-false dichotomies) while some will not
(expressive and emotive statements, for instance).
> I quoted:
> > 314. Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in
> > philosophical investigation: the difficulty-- I might say-- is not that of
> > finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution
> > something that looks as if it were only preliminary to it. "We have
> > already said everything.-- Not anything that follows from this, no, this
> > itself is the solution!"
> > This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation,
> > whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the
> > right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to
> > get beyond it.
> > The difficulty here is: to stop.
> >
> > -LW, Zettel
>
> You wrote:
> Yes, in some contexts that is the way we use language.
>
> I write:
> What makes you think we are speaking of language use? Surely the generality
> can be applied to any search. Again, what does an ellipse add that is not
> already present? A marker? An instruction?
>
Yes, language is just one of the things we do and I agree that we may just
decide to stop in many other activities in which we are engaged. That is the
value, though, of noting that this is also the way language works when making
claims, arguing, etc. Language, after all, is just another form of human
behavior, just another thing we humans do.
What does an ellipse add? Depends on the use of that notation (which occurs as
part of our written language, by the way). Using the notation prompts us to see
the text including it in a certain way, etc.
> I wrote:
> > What is the difference between [1 2 3] and [1 2 3 ...]?
>
> You wrote:
> Depends. One could say it's the way the notation of inscription is to be
> read. The first allows for the idea that three numbers are the whole story,
> the second, with its dots of continuation (a notational convention), that
> they aren't. The first could be a way of presenting a descriptor that
> reflects the combination of the three digits. The second, suggests not a
> descriptor but merely the commencement of a counting series, etc.
>
> I write:
> Saying it is notation is hardly any more than saying it is three period is a
> row.
That would be a description of this particular notation. Saying it's a notation
is to say it has a role in our method of employing written coordination, i.e.,
it signifies something (or some things) when added to a sentence, the proper
recognition (understanding) of which will reflect seeing the context in which
it occurs in a clear enough way.
> And that, of course, leaves us with the notion that an ellipse says nothing.
> You say it depends.
>
On the context.
> As for the whole story description, consider that we have a base 10 number
> system, but ten numbers is not the whole story. Thus, from whence does your
> description come from?
>
An understanding that something has been left out when an ellipse is employed
in this way. And that is to recognize its notational role.
> I wrote:
> > And of the "Wittgenstein paradox" of the PI?
>
> You wrote:
> Can you be more specific?
>
> I write:
> That any numerical sequence has a variety of patterns that it could be
> following, of which it can never be set in stone which one IT follows,
> because only we recognize it. So many teachers say, "No, you must count this
> way" and never ask the student what pattern she is counting along. Here I am
> inclined to quote Wittgenstein on what he finds in every cultures' chapter
> titled WISDOM...
>
I still don't see the point of the reference but will read along.
> I wrote:
> > And that you insist that "a+b=c" is true and not false (and do not care to
> > recognize it as nonsense to even say of it)?
> > --
> > He lived a wonderful life.
> > ==========================================
>
> You wrote:
> Are you referring to my response here? I did not "insist" that "a+b=c" is
> "true and not false" but only that there could be contexts in which it would
> make sense to say that, e.g., in cases where we already know what the
> variables stand for or where we are speaking of a formula which is true, say,
> by stipulation, i.e., if one learned a certain set of such statements as part
> of learning some larger operation and then understood that the "a+b=c"
> formulation must always be constructed so as to be true for the formula to
> work. And so forth.
>
> I write:
> Well, is it true that it is true that a+b=c? Or is it false that it is true
> that a+b=c? "Socrates is Identical"??? Ah, the confusion of philosophers!
>
It depends on context, i.e., what is meant when the statement is made, what the
reference is, what the game is in which the reference is made, etc.
> You wrote:
> I am not wedded to the idea of "nonsense" nor would I characterize it in any
> definitive way. What we mean by "nonsense" may vary in lots of ways. I can
> think of five right off the bat:
>
> 1) non-sense as in lacking a referent or meaning while appearing to have one
> 2) being a claim that is obviously false or mistaken (factually or logically)
> and yet held to be the case as though it weren't
> 3) being an instance of doggerel in the service of an artistic effort
> 4) being a mistaken combination of terms because of a confusion in the
> grammatical rules of use
> 5) being expressed in a context for which the expression is obviously unsuited
>
> I write:
> You say you would not characterize nonsense in any definite way,
> and then you characterize in 5 definitions.
None of which are claimed by me to be definitive, only to be examples of how we
would use the term. Nor would I claim that that list is exhaustive though it
exhausts my thoughts on the usage for the moment. My point: Linguistic uses,
though involving specific rules and rule following, are not close-ended. There
is always room for new variations.
> All of which say the same thing: nonsense breaks rules, or nonsense is
> obvious.
>
Sometimes breaking rules is not nonsensical at all, or it is seen to have sense
only in the context of different rules. Is nonsense obvious? I think that
sometimes it is, but in different ways, depending on the type at issue.
> What are we even speaking about?
>
You brought it up!
> It seems that your first definition would define a+b=c as nonsense (and,
> thus, not T/F).
And my point was that it would depend on the context. In some contexts there
might well be referents for the variables involved while in others there might
not be. So to determine whether a statement like "a+b=c" is merely nonsense
depends on the context (game) in which it is deployed. In a classroom perhaps,
where the statement represents a particular formula with a known use, it would
hardly be nonsense to utter it in response to a question which was directed at
eliciting it. I think it's a mistake to try to define these terms too narrowly
or too tightly. Doing so departs, I think, from Wittgenstein's insights into
the richness of ordinary (natural) language.
SWM
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