[Wittrs] Re: My Chinese Encyclopedia: The Red Chicken Footnote
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2010 01:17:09 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "College Dropout John O'Connor" <wittrsamr@...>
wrote:
> > I write:
> > So how can something be left out if this something can never be included?
>
> You wrote:
> The next number in the sequence is left out, and the next, and the next and
> so forth.
>
> I write:
> So, an infinite series of numbers is left out? Again, how can something be
> left out if it could never be included?
>
The individual numbers could be included one by one but, of course, they go on
forever if we are talking about an infinite series so they also can't be
because of time constraints and so forth. While any individual number can be
added, if it is the next one after the last written, we cannot conceive of
getting to the end, by definition.
So what the ". . ." shows is that the next and the next and the next and so
forth are being omitted, i.e., that we can go on to the next if we need to but
don't expect to ever reach a point where there is an end to the listing.
Infinity isn't the referent. The ". . ." doesn't stand for infinity, it stands
for (signifies) the open-ended nature of the sequence which, of course, is
understood via a concept of infinity.
> You wrote:
> I didn't say infinity is left out because infinity isn't something that could
> be included. It's not a thing or object though, as a concept, we may refer to
> it as an object of reference and thus one could re-write the statement in
> such a way as to include that.
>
> I write:
> An infinite series of numbers is left out according to you.
No, the next number and the next and so on. I make no claim about there being
such a thing as an "infinite series of numbers" that can be referenced in some
finite way. Of course, language makes it look like that is what I mean since
referring to something tends to imply the something. But here the ". . ."
doesn't refer, it shows, as in it shows that "we stop here because ______",
i.e., that is how we explain our use of the ". . ." in this case.
Of course, we may use the notation ". . ." to do other things in other cases,
e.g., if we want to quote a text but not some portion of it. In THAT case we
may drop the words we're not interested and replace them by the ellipsis.
Infinity now has nothing to do with the use though the absence of something
that could otherwise be included is still included.
> And I have also stressed the "Wittgenstein's paradox" that no sequence of
> numbers could not be accorded with some (infinite) series of numbers.
>
> What else can I say? 2+2=4?
>
"accorded"?
> You wrote:
> But by "left out" what I had in mind were the numbers in the series, which,
> being open-ended would be a demonstration of something infinite, namely a
> series that could not be completed. As a demonstratiion of an infinite
> series, reference to such a series could be taken as a proxy for the concept
> of infinity.
>
> I write:
> Are you just speaking tautologies? You say you had in mind an infinite and
> open ended number series. Why not just say you had number(s) in mind?
>
Because the point of the ellipsis is to show something to the effect of "and
here we can continue, but we don't (for whatever reason is pertinent)".
> > I write:
> > What? Erroneous definitions? Incomplete definitions? I surely couldn't
> > call them definitions. And yes, I think etymology is quite important. But
> > I think this little squabble has gone far off the railings.
>
> You wrote:
> Are there no erroneous definitions? No incomplete definitions? Are all
> definitions equal? Are all dictionaries? Must etymology's importance in some
> contexts lead to its being taken as important in all contexts?
>
> I write:
> What is an erroneous definition? (sharks are mammals)
> What is an incomplete definition? (sharks are)
>
> There are many systems of classification. Are they all true, or just the
> modern classification of life are true? Why not differentiate between fact
> and custom? Some will tell you that humans are primates; I might say, if
> plants are not algae, how are humans primates?
>
And I am not saying anything (for or against) the idea that systems of
classification proliferate, often differ markedly, and are dependent on
conventions (what we decide to adopt). I am just noting that definitions can be
better or worse, true or false, complete or incomplete, and so forth.
> Someone says sharks are mammals. What good would it do to tell him he has
> the wrong definition?
A lot! It would put him or her right in his or her usage, because the notion of
"mammals" is fixed in the language. Of course if one meant by the term, a
certain class of primitive water breathing, cold blooded animal that lives in
the sea, etc., etc., then the claimant might have it right. But THAT isn't what
"mammals" means in English, even if the term's meaning has as its source a
particular classification system that was adopted by English speakers at a
particular point in time in the history of the language.
The fact that language has the nature of convention doesn't mean that we have a
free-for-all in its use. (If it did, Wittgenstein's private language insight
would have no point!) The way language works is that we have rules of
application that we learn and rely on in deploying our terms. Someone who says
a shark is a mammal, in THAT context, is badly mistaken because he or she is
using the word incorrectly according to the conventions relied on by the
community of language speakers in which he or she is operating.
> Why not tell him he has the wrong word (or you think he has the wrong word).
Why not indeed? But, of course, that's my point, i.e., that definitions can be
right or wrong, etc.
> So often philosophy breaks down into archetypes- only vanity would allow one
> philosopher to tell another that he had the wrong definition- rather than hhe
> thinks it to be the wrong word.
> --
When using ordinary words in ordinary ways we can assume that most people
schooled enough to be engaged in philosophy will not mess up the uses in their
own languages. However, many of us, philosophers especially, are remarkably
prone to be misled by uses in a great many cases. THAT, after all, is the point
of the later Wittgenstein! In such cases, when philosophers stray into using a
word in a context that isn't appropriate for it and expect it to mean the same
as in its ordinary milieu, confusion occurs. That's when, as Wittgenstein used
to say, language goes on holiday. Then the point of philosophy is to set things
right, to examine and notice where the term has been misapplied and why and to
adjust our expectations and ways of speaking accordingly.
The later Wittgenstein's work was all about clearing up linguistic muddles,
showing how words can be taken so out of context as to lead us into conceptual
mistakes. Of course, THAT is a big part of the difference between the later
work of the man and the earlier.
SWM
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